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This thesis contributes to the research on determinants and welfare effects of real 
exchange rate movements. Chapters two to four focus on a discussion of money 
supply shocks as one of the sources of changes in the real exchange rate. More 
specifically chapter two contains a critical overview of empirical and theoretical 
research that contributes to our understanding of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in open economies. The chapter analyses two specific classes of models, 
liquidity models and sticky price models and investigates to which degree these 
models are able to rationalise the result of related empirical studies.
The third chapter focuses on the determinants of the welfare effects of money supply 
shocks across countries if prices are sticky. It analyses specifically the implications of 
different forms of price stickiness. Furthermore it combines these nominal rigidities 
with different real imperfections in the labour market. The chapter concludes that the 
impact of a money supply shock on real exchange rates and the welfare effect at home 
and abroad depend strongly on the type of nominal rigidity assumed.
The fourth chapter analyses the effect of a money supply shock on tradable and 
nontradable producers inside a country and shows that the widespread belief that 
tradable sectors benefit the most from a depreciation of the exchange rate could be 
misplaced. It stresses the importance of sectoral labour mobility and risk sharing in an 
evaluation of relative welfare effects.
The fifth chapter discusses the link between structural changes inside economies with 
the real exchange rate using transition economies as an example. In doing so the 
chapter abstracts completely from any nominal variables. Instead it argues that the 
real exchange rate movement in transition countries is at least partly driven by 
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This thesis provides an analysis of causes for real exchange rate movements and discusses 
the welfare implications of the implied changes in relative prices. More specifically, the 
second, third and fourth chapters discuss the impact of monetary policy on the real 
exchange rates, the current account and the welfare effects of its movements. In contrast 
the last chapter, discusses nonmonetary causes of real exchange rate changes through an 
analysis of the real exchange rates in transition economies.
The second chapter gives an overview of recent progress in the understanding of the 
effects of monetary policy in open economies. In doing so it concentrates on models in 
which money is not neutral. It reviews the two most prominent classes of models with 
this feature - models that assume sticky prices or sticky wages and models that assume 
a trading cost in financial markets i.e. liquidity models. Furthermore it presents recent 
evidence on the impact of monetary policy shocks on domestic and foreign consump­
tion and output as well as on nominal and real exchange rates. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the international transmission of monetary shocks on prices. Thus, it discusses 
pricing to market, stickiness in the consumers’ and the producers’ currency, a recurring 
theme of this thesis. Furthermore it argues, there is not enough evidence to  distinguish 
liquidity and sticky price models. In fact with respect to the evidence gathered here 
they are observationally equivalent. This is the case even though they have very differ­
ent implications for the welfare impact of monetary shocks and thus for the impact of 
international monetary coordination.
The third chapter discusses the implications of different forms of price stickiness for 
the movement of exchange rates and welfare abroad and at home after an asymmetric 
money supply shock. The chapter extends the two country Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
setting and shows tha t the impact of a money supply shock on the national economy 
and the spillover effects to other countries depend crucially on (i) the form of price or 
wage stickiness as well as on (ii) the structure of the labour market. W ith prices sticky 
in the consumers’ currency, the exchange rate overshoots even though uncovered interest 
rate parity is violated and an unexpected monetary expansion leads to a “beggar thy 
neighbour” effect. Exactly the opposite occurs if prices are sticky in the producer’s 
currency . In this case a positive money supply shock causes positive spillover effects. 
The chapter also discusses the implications of different imperfections in the labour market 
for the impact of money supply shocks on the exchange rate and the current account. 
The impact of wage stickiness depends crucially on the structure of the labour market. 
If the labour market is dominated by labour unions, a positive money supply shock leads 
qualitatively to the same spillover dynamics and exchange rate dynamics as under sticky 
prices in the producers’ currency. II' on the other hand, firms have all bargaining power 
in the labour market the opposite output dynamics and exchange rate dynamics follows 
a money expansion.
The fourth chapter investigates the welfare effects of assymetric money supply shocks 
in an open economy under sticky prices and monopolistic competition inside a country. 
Agents differ with respect to their exposure to the exchange rate  and foreign markets. 
It is generally believed tha t it is the producers of tradables tha t gain from exchange rate 
devaluations following an increase in the money supply. This chapter shows tha t under 
reasonable assumptions this view is actually misplaced and it is nontradable producers 
tha t end up gaining more than the tradable producers. This is on account of the assym- 
metry between the wealth effects at home and abroad which benefits the nontradable 
producers more than the tradable producers. The relative gain to non-tradable produc­
ers outweights the benefit tha t tradable producers have in the short term  due to the 
improved terms of trade. The analysis also shows tha t this gain depends crucially on the 
type of nominal rigidity. The chapter also contributes to recent research on the impact of
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monetary policy on exchange rate volatility and deviations from PPP. It argues that the 
impact of monetary shocks on the exchange rate depends crucially on the opportunities 
to share risks across sectors.
The fifth chapter analyses the behaviour of real exchange rates in transition economies. 
The investigation abstracts from any monetary effects. Real exchange rates appear to 
present a specific behaviour in the early phase of transition: they are largely unaffected 
by nominal exchange rate movements and exhibit trend appreciation. The model pre­
sented here describes the transition process as the emergence of two new (traded and 
non-traded goods) sectors and the decline of an inefficient and subsidised state sector. 
The absence of financial markets means that firms accumulate capital through retained 
earnings. Labour markets are imperfect giving rise to a wage gap. The model shows that 
the real excahnge rate plays the crucial role of determining real wages. Through real 
wages it sets the pace for the development of the new sectors as workers are attracted out 
of the state sector. The link beween growth and real appreciation differs from the usual 
Balassa Samuelson effect. The chapter explores the role of labour market distortions 
and foreign financing.
The fifth chapter concludes.
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Chapter 2
Sticky Price M odels and Liquidity 
M odels of Open Econom ies 
D o they fit the evidence?
2.1 In trod u ction
This chapter gives an overview of the recent research into the effect of monetary shocks 
on nominal and real exchange rate dynamics and the implied impact on real variables. 
As such it also reviews a part of the litterature tha t is most relevant for the research 
presented in chapters 3 and 4.
The recent research programme in the transmission of monetary shock in open 
economies has been to a large extent motivated by the impact that the ending of the 
Bretton Wood fixed exchange rate period had on real exchange rate volatility. It is a well 
known fact tha t since the end of the Bretton Woods period not only have the formerly 
fixed nominal exchange rates displayed much larger volatility but also the real exchange 
rates. Further puzzling evidence is reported by Stockmann and Baxter (1989) who find 
tha t the increase in the volatility of nominal and real exchange rates is not accompanied 
by any structural changes in correlations or variance for other real variables like output 
and consumption. This is described by some authors as nominal and real exchange rate
11
dynamics being almost disconnected from fundamentals in the short to medium run, also 
referred to as the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. The fact th a t a structural change in 
the dynamics of the real exchange rate which is a relative price does not result in any 
change in the behaviour of volumes appears to be difficult to reconcile with economic 
theory.
These empirical findings sparked a lively debate amongst economists at the time. 
Mussa (1986) argues that the increase in the variance of real exchange rates can not 
be explained without resorting to some form of sluggish price adjustment. Stockmann 
(1987), in contrast, points out that the root should be found in real shocks because of 
the persistence of the movement in the real exchange rates, a view tha t was supported 
by research by Huizinga (1987). Huizinga claimed tha t real exchange rates possess a 
unit root and that most of the variance of real exchange rates should be attributed to 
permanent shocks and not monetary shocks which should only have a transitory impact.
Nevertheless, since the structural change in the behaviour was brought about by a 
change in the setting of monetary policy, i.e the move from fixed exchange rate systems 
to (managed) floating arrangements, models tha t allowed for real effects of monetary 
policy were perceived as a good starting point to find an explanation. Unfortunately 
investigations in this direction provided devastating results at tha t time. Meese and 
Rogoff (1983) investigated the forecasting performance of the models of exchange rate 
dynamics tha t had been developed up to that time. They analyse the performance of 
a variety of monetary models of exchange rate determination including the Dornbusch 
(1976) model and the flexible price models, first introduced by (Frenkel (1976) and Mussa 
(1976,1982), both of which allow for sticky prices. They showed tha t for horizons of up 
to one year a simple random walk prediction outperformed the existing models in its 
accuracy of forecasting even if one allowed perfect foresight for the exogenous variables 
of these models. They report specifically tha t they don’t find any correlation of real 
exchange rate movements and real interest rate differential, one of the core predictions 
of models with sticky prices, a finding tha t is again stated in Campbell and Clarida 
(1987). Several authors have tried to overturn this negative result w ithout much success 
(see Frankel and Rose). To the credit of these models both Meese and Rogoff (1983) and
12
more recently Chinn and Meese (1995) show that the models are able to outperform the 
random walk at horizons of more than 2-3 year. Nevertheless this is of little consolation 
with respect to nominal shocks. Since there is little controversy nowadays amongst 
economists tha t money is neutral in the long run, real effects of monetary disturbances, 
if they exist, should be most prominent in the short rim.
Even though the findings by Meese and Rogoff are damning, they are not restricted 
to the field of exchange rate dynamics. In fact, this failure is true for almost every field 
in economics that tries to explain asset prices. Currently many economists believe that 
this failure might be due to the micro structure of financial markets, an area tha t has 
seen a lot of interest over the last decade. Unfortunately this is well beyond the scope 
of this chapter.
Instead we restrict ourselves in this survey to the macro-economic research, tha t tried 
to improve on the Meese/Rogoff finding either by developing new models or by applying 
more recent econometric techniques. The next section provides an overview about the 
empirical research, which is mainly using vector auto regressions. The subsequent section 
provides a survey of recent theoretical research in the area where we restrict ourselves 
to models tha t allow for nonneutralities of monetary policies. First if money is neutral, 
exchange rate dynamics stemming from monetary policy are not very interesting because 
they trivially translate into equiproportinate changes of the nominal exchange rate with 
the real exchange rate remaining unaffected. Second it is difficult to explain the close 
correlation of nominal and real exchange rates in low inflation countries if money is 
neutral, unless we attribute most of the changes to real shocks as Stockmann proposed.1 
Third, much empirical evidence suggests that monetary policy has real effects.
Models of theories with nonneutralities can be broadly divided into two classes. One 
class makes use of the Keynesian assumption tha t prices are sticky, mostly rationalised by 
the assumption tha t it is costly to change prices. The other class assumes that financial 
markets are segmented, meaning access to financial markets is not freely available to 
everybody.
1If real shocks were at the root of the puzzles stated  in the introduction, it  would be difficult to  see 
why these show up in high volatilities o f prices like exchange rates but not in volum es
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2.2  E m pirica l R esearch
Before we discuss the theory of the impact of monetary policy on nominal and real 
exchange rates we provide an overview of recent empirical research on the topic. We 
also present information on the transmission of monetary shocks on consumption and 
production in open economies. Of particular interest in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary shocks in open economies is the pass-through of exchnange rate movements 
into prices. That is why section 2.2.3 is specifically devoted to this topic.
W ith few exceptions recent empirical research on the topic has used vector auto 
regressive methods to investigate the impact of monetary shocks. While some use a 
structural approach, using identifying restrictions tha t are justified by a specific model, 
the restrictions imposed in the papers reviewed could actually be derived from many 
of the models tha t are discussed in section 2.3. Thus with respect to the identifying 
restrictions the models discussed in the subsequent section are observationally equivalent. 
That is why we do not go into how the authors are justifying the restrictions they 
imposed. Only empirical research that makes use of calibration techniques is model 
specific. That is why this class of papers is discussed in the section on theory rather 
than in here.
2 .2 .1  M o n e ta r y  p o licy , n om in a l an d  rea l e x c h a n g e  r a te s  a n d  d o m e stic  
o u tp u t
Clarida and Gali (1994) were probably the first who used a VAR approach, to analyse 
the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations since the end of the Bretton Woods pe­
riod. In an initial step the authors extend earlier non structural work on the connection 
between real interest rates and real exchange rates, investigated before by others such 
as Cambell and Clarida (1987). The idea is tha t the interest parity condition which is 
more or less uncontroversial in theory as it only assumes a possibility of international 
arbitrage, should be allowed to affect future expected exchange rate movements. Sim­
ilarly real interest differentials should in turn  allow interference on real exchange rate 
movements. We revisit this research because it demonstrates the scale of the problems
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economists have with rationalising the movement of real exchange rates. Clarida and 
Gali’s estimation strategy is based on the fact that it should be possible to estimate the 
transitory deviation of the real exchange rate from its long rim equilibrium by using ex 
post interest rate differentials. Since monetary shocks should only have an influence on 
the transitory component as money is neutral in the long run this should provide an 
upper bound for the impact of monetary shocks on the real exchange rate.
More specifically let rJt = i3t — Et7rj.+1 denote the ex ante real interest rate in country 
j  (i.e. i denotes the nominal interest rate and 7r the inflation rate). If uncovered interest 
rate parity holds (i^ — = Et(et+i — e*), where et denotes the exchange rate), then
the ex ante real interest differential A rt between the home and foreign country can be 
written as A rt = Et(qt+ 1 — qt) where qt denotes the real exchange rate qt = st + p{  — 
P t . Solving this equation, the deviation of the real exchange rate can be written as 
qt — qt = Et(EtJLQArt+j) where qt = lim ^oo Etqj denotes the expected long run level 
of the exchange rate. As said before that means tha t as long as uncovered interest rate 
parity holds the temporary deviation of the real exchange rate should be given by the 
expected sum of future ex ante interest rate differentials. Although ex ante interest rates 
are unobservable they are by definition given by the expectation of observable ex post 
real interest rates. Thus, using the law of itterated expectations the deviation of the real 
exchange rate from its long run expected level can be w ritten as qt~qt — E t { T ^ QA8t-\-j)) 
where denotes the ex post interest rate in country j . Clarida and Gali use
ex post interest rates to find the temporary deviations of the real exchange rate from 
its long run expected level (assuming uncovered interest rate parity holds). In fact 
they use a bivariate VAR tha t contains ex post interest rates rt and changes in the 
real exchange rate A qt in the information set to forecast the sum of real interest rate 
differentials for each period. Using this method they find tha t little of the variance of 
real exchange rates can be accounted for by changes in the expected sum of future real 
interest rates. They investigate if this is due to their choice of the VAR but they find 
(using Granger causality tests) that it is quite possible to forecast future real interest rate 
differentials using past and current differentials and past real exchange rate movements 
thus, validating to some extent their choice of the VAR. Consequently they conclude that
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the interest parity restriction tha t is relevant for estimating the transitory component in 
the real exchange rate from real interest rate differentials is violated in the data, raising 
doubts about the uncovered interest rate parity condition.
After having followed this more traditional approach and having failed to shed light 
on real exchange rate movements the authors continue with an investigation or real ex­
change rates using a structural VAR in the tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
They specify a Dornbusch type model and allow for three types of shocks; money sup­
ply shocks, supply shocks and demand shocks and estimate a structural VAR on output, 
the real exchange rate and expected inflation. They identify the shocks by assuming 
that only real shocks have a long term  impact on output. Demand shocks can have a 
long term  influence on the real exchange rate and the price level and monetary shocks 
only cause a change in the relative price level and nominal exchange rates in the long 
run. Even though these identifying restrictions are derived using a sticky price model, 
they are not inconsistent with other classes of models like the liquidity models discussed 
in section 2.3. Using this methodology they find tha t nominal shocks explain a substan­
tial amount of the variance of the real exchange rates of Germany and Japan vis a vis 
the US at short horizons. For example 50% of the real exchange rate movements at a 
horizon of one year are explained by monetary shocks. Strangely enough this is not true 
for Britain and Canada. Only 1% of the variance is explained for the UK at the same 
horizon. Almost all the rest of the real exchange rate variance is explained by demand 
factors rather than supply factors, a finding tha t is in line with work by de Gregorio et 
al (1994).
They also show tha t not only do nominal shocks explain large parts of the exchange 
rate movements for some countries, the impact also goes in the ’’correct” (according to 
basically all the theoretical models) direction. Thus, episodes of tight money or expan­
sionary demand are episodes of a real dollar appreciation. Analysing impulse response 
functions for Germany, they find tha t the impact of a nominal shock fits remarkable well 
the predictions of their Mundell Flemming Dornbusch model. The dollar depreciates 
on impact, US output rises compared to that of Germany and US prices rise by more 
than in Germany although by less than the shock. The output and real exchange rate
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movements die out after 16 to 20 quarters. There is also a significant overshooting of 
the exchange rate. They also find tha t the depreciation reaches its maximum only 4 
months after the shock. In a similar VAR Schlangesief and Wrase (1995) additionally 
report tha t a rise in the federal funds rate simulaneously raises short term  interest rates 
in other OECD countries, although by a smaller amount. The differences found in the 
impact across countries is a recurring pattern in this sort of investigation and raises 
doubts about the robustness of the results against changes in the identifying restrictions 
and the set of variable included.
Other authors have subsequently tried to increase the numbers of variables included. 
Evans and Eichenbaum (1995) and Grilli and Roubini (1995) use 7 variable VAR systems 
that in both papers include foreign and domestic output, domestic and foreign short term 
rates and the exchange rate. They differ in as far as Evans and Eichenbaum include 
the ratio of nonborrowed reserves to total reserves while Grilli and Roubini include the 
foreign price level. They also differ in the way they identify monetary innovations. While 
Grilli and Roubini identify monetary innovations as changes in short term  interest rates, 
Eichenbaum and Evans identify them by changes in the monetary aggregate. Both use 
a recursive structure to identify monetary shocks. Despite these differences the results 
are pretty similar and confirm the results obtained by Clarida and Gali. They find 
what is widely called the forward discount puzzle, namely that after the impact of a 
monetary contraction the exchange rate takes up to two years to reach the peak of its 
appreciation. This implies that the interest differential can easily have the opposite sign 
of the ex post exchange rate movement in the short term. Similar to Clarida and Gali 
(1994) Evans and Eichenbaum find that between 13 and 42 percent of the 12 quarter 
ahead forecast error for the US dollar/DM  exchange rate is attributed to US monetary 
policy. Furthermore both papers find the liquidity puzzle, namely tha t interest rates fall 
after a monetary expansion. Additionally they report an exchange rate puzzle -while the 
dollar appreciates after an increase in interest rates other OECD currencies depreciate.
The last puzzle has often been linked to the price puzzle in closed economies (Sims), 
namely tha t prices tend to rise on impact after a monetary tightening, identified as a 
rise in interest rates. Sims (1992) had argued that the price puzzle is due to the fact that
17
interest rate innovations partly reflect inflationary pressures and Sims and Zha (1995) 
proposed a structural VAR approach that include proxies for expected inflation to resolve 
the price puzzle. In their paper the methodology involves contemporaneous restrictions 
rather than the recursive structure used in Evans and Eichenbaum (1995) and Grilli and 
Roubini (1995). Extending this work to the open economy Kim and Roubini (2000) 
showed tha t using the same technique of contemporaneous restrictions in a structural 
VAR and involving variables that can proxy for expected inflation the exchange rate 
puzzle is resolved. Furthermore they find much less evidence of a delayed overshooting. 
Although the impact of a money shock on the exchange rate is not instantaneous, the 
period in which it appreciates is much shorter than the two years found earlier.
The critical element in all of these emprical studies is the exact identification proce­
dure used by the authors and the set of variables included. Typically the results are not 
very robust to the choice of variables included and assumptions made. Specifically the 
large differences across countries raise some doubt about the identification procedures 
used. This issue is rather akward as there are a few identification assumptions which 
are noncontroversial on theoretical grounds. This also restrict to some extent the num­
ber of variables that can be included as with more variables more and probably even 
more controversial identifying restrictions are needed. Faust and Rogers and Uhlig have 
suggested procedures of how to improve on these weaknesses.
Faust and Rogers (2000) critizise the recursive structure Evans and Eichenbaum or 
Grilli and Roubini use in their identification. These authors assume that in order to 
identify shocks tha t the foreign interest rate does not react simultaneously and tha t the 
Fed does not take into account exchange rate movements and shocks to interest rates 
that occurred for the month before the decision. Both of these restrictions are quite 
questionable. Since past interest and exchange rate movements are clearly inside the 
information set of the Fed, when interest rate decisions are take the assumption that 
these are ignored is rather ad hoc. Furthermore central banks tend to talk to each 
other and to some extent either coordinate their approaches or one might be the leader 
for the others. Faust and Rogers think tha t it would be difficult to come up with less 
controversial restrictions to avoid this dilemma. Instead they argue th a t in the absence
18
of any non-controversial identifying assumptions one should try a whole set of plausible 
identifying assumptions (including the once used in the previously discussed papers), to 
study the robustness of the results. Therefore their procedure returns a whole range 
of values, of which they report the minima and maxima. In doing so they find that 
the delayed overshooting, reported in the earlier papers is due to  the assumption about 
the recursive structure in money markets assumed by Evans and Eichenbaum. They 
show tha t if money innovations by the Fed could influence foreign interest rates in the 
same month, the effect on the exchange rate peaks on impact, i.e. there is no delayed 
overshooting. W ith respect to other regularities reported above, their identification leads 
to similar results with the difference tha t they report wide ranges depending on the set 
of identification restritions included. For instance they report th a t US monetary policy 
accounts for between 8% and 56% of the forecasting error in the US/DM exchange rate 
at the 48 month horizon. A distinct advantage of their procedure is that they can 
expand the Eichenbaum/Evans 7 variable VAR to a 14 variable set because they do not 
have to choose specific identifying assumptions. They include besides others, commodity 
prices and long term interest rates. They find that in the larger VAR the share of the 
forecasting error that is attributable to nominal shocks falls to between 2%-30%. While 
they find evidence of substantial overshooting, these periods are times of large and 
volatile deviations from uncovered interest parity. These deviations are larger than the 
change in short term interest rates or interest rate differentials. This suggests that the 
Dornbusch overshooting model is ill equipped to explain the overshooting found in the 
data and also explains why authors such as Clarida and Gali have repeatedly failed to 
find a connection between real interest rate differentials and real exchange rate changes.
Rogers (2000) again investigates the part of real exchange ra te  volatility tha t can 
be attributed to nominal shocks using a structural VAR and a similar methodology as 
Faust and Rogers. He extends the period for the data substantially. Using data over 
the last hundred years for the dollar pound exchange rate  he finds tha t depending on 
the identification of monetary shocks in his VARs about 19%-60% can be attributed to 
nominal shocks, which would solve one of the anomalies of Clarida et al. (1994) discussed 
above. He argues that the difference with Clarida et al is due to the fact tha t he uses a
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different model (built on Rogoff 1992), that makes him estimate a VAR that includes the 
difference in the share of government in GDP, the money multiplier, the real exchange 
rate and the difference in output additionally to the difference in base money. In the 
spirit of Faust and Rogers he considers different identifications and states the minima 
and maxima of what can be attributed to different shocks.
Summarising, the evidence found in VARs of the impact of monetary shocks on 
real exchange rates is rather sketchy and most results are not very robust to changes 
in the variables included, countries investigated and identification restritions employed. 
Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, authors find th a t a substantial amount of real 
exchange rate volatility can be attributed to monetary shocks and the movement of the 
rate goes in the ’’correct” direction. The exchange rate depreciates if the money supply 
is expanded and appreciates if it is contracted. Furthermore the exchange rate seems 
to overshoot its long term equilibrium, although it is not clear if it reaches its peak on 
impact of the shock or if there is delayed overshooting.
2 .2 .2  S p illovers  o f  m o n eta ry  p o lic y
After having discussed the relationship between monetary policy shocks and exchange 
rates we continue by discussing their impact on volumes of consumption and produc­
tion abroad. Unfortunately none of the papers above specifically analyses the spillovers 
from foreign monetary policy on foreign output and consumption. The scarce evidence 
is surprising because competitive devaluations and beggar thy neighbour effects have 
always been a topic in political and economic discussions. According to the impulse re­
sponse functions in Faust and Rogers the impact of a positive monetary shock on foreign 
output is positive, of smaller magnitude than the domestic output expansion but of a 
similar duration. Clarida and Gali report only the ratio of the change in output which 
is sharply positive, thus in line with Faust and Rogers. Schlangensief and Wrase confirm 
the observation of a positive although much smaller spillover on foreign output in their 
VAR analysis. Furthermore they find quite substantial persistence. Unfortunately none 
of the papers includes any measures of consumption
Thus, we can only report the international correlations of output and consumption
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rather than the impact of monetary policy on them. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) 
report that somewhat puzzlingly the international correlation between output is higher 
than tha t of consumption, an observation which is at odds with international risk sharing. 
Backus et al notice that this is difficult to reconcile with standard real business cycle 
models. In the Penn World Table, correlations for output for the period (1973-1992) is 
0.53 while tha t for consumption is only 0.4. Similarly Lane (1998) reports that GNP is 
more volatile than GDP at the business cycle frequency for OECD countries. In a way 
this observation is not tha t surprising given the large evidence of a very strong home bias 
in asset holdings, specifically equity holdings. For example the US population holds 90 
per cent of its equity portfolio in US firms while in Japan this ratio is as high as 98 per 
cent. In Europe, however, the homebias is not as extreme. For an exhaustive overview 
of the literature see Lewis (1999). Nevertheless, while the home bias can only provide 
a reason why there is no perfect risk sharing and thus a low correlation for foreign and 
home consumption, it cannot explain why the volatility of consumption or GNP is higher 
than tha t of GDP.
The author has come across little evidence that analyses the effect of money shocks 
on the current account. Backus et al. (1992) find the so called J-curve effect, i.e. the 
current account initially turns negative when the exchange rate depreciates and only 
turns positive with a significant delay. This is at odds with recent evidence found by 
others. Lane (1999) and Betts and Devereux (1997) report tha t positive monetary shocks 
lead to a depreciation and have a positive impact on the current account which is in line 
with standard theory.
Similarly Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (1999) report tha t there can be a significant rela­
tionship between changes in net foreign assets and changes in the real exchange rate, 
suggesting tha t even temporary changes in the real exchange rate can have long term 
effects through the distribution of assets.
In summary there are very few papers tha t have tried to quantify the impact of 
home monetary policy on foreign consumption and production and the current account. 
The evidence tha t exists suggests that foreign output rises on impact after a home 
monetary expansion. The small correlation between consumption abroad and at home
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seems to suggest tha t the impact on consumption is smaller (this is obviously very 
speculative). Furthermore there is some evidence tha t the current account surplus for 
the home country rises and that the net asset position is positively affected after a 
positive domestic money shock .
2 .2 .3  T h e  p a ss  th ro u g h  o f  ex ch a n g e  ra te  m o v e m e n ts  to  p r ices
As mentioned in the introduction, the passthrough of exchange rates to prices has drawn 
a lot of attention recently and later chapters in this thesis will argue, that the degree of 
exchange rate pass through has im portant implications on the transmission of monetary 
shocks in the international economy.
The research on exchange rate passthrough is partly driven by the aim to understand 
the large short to medium run deviations from purchasing power parity, which are ob­
served in the data. The main reason why economists look for monetary shocks as one of 
the driving forces for this phenomenon is the following. There is little controversy about 
the fact tha t money supply shocks are one of the driving forces behind the movement 
of nominal exchange rates and, as explained above, it appears th a t nominal exchange 
rate movements spill directly into real exchange rate movements in OECD countries. In 
fact, the correlation between nominal and real exchange rates is close to one for these 
countries. Since most of the OECD economies are quite open economies this appears 
to suggests tha t the passthrough from exchange rates to prices is far from complete. 
The same is not true in countries that have higher inflation rates. In those countries 
the corrletation between real and nominal rates is much lower. These regularities have 
often been used as evidence that sticky prices in the consumers’ currency must be at 
work, but we discuss in the last section of this chapter th a t these regularities can also 
be rationalised without this assumption.
In the long run, movements in real exchange rates should be due to changes in the 
relative productivities in the nontradable and the tradable sectors. Suppose there are 
only two countries, home and foreign. Furthermore assume tha t productivities in the 
home country stay constant in both the tradable and the nontradable sector while in 
the foreign country the productivity rises in the tradable sector, but stays constant in
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the nontradable sector. Wages will rise in the foreign tradable sector compared to the 
home tradable sector, if expressed in the same unit because of the gain in productivity. 
If there is labour mobility across sectors, wages will also rise in the foreign nontradable 
sector compared to the home nontradable sector. Since productivities in the nontradable 
sector haven’t changed the price of nontradable output in the foreign country will rise 
compared to tha t of tradables, which should be tantam ont to  a real appreciation (Balassa 
(1964) Samuelson(1964)). Nevertheless, Canzoneri et al. (1999) show tha t while it is true 
tha t in the long run the relative productivities of the tradable and nontradable sectors 
determine their relative prices, it is much harder to establish tha t this also determines the 
real exchange rate. The reason is tha t contrary to much theory, it is not only different 
prices for nontradable goods that drive the real exchange rate bu t also differences in 
the prices for tradable goods. While the difference in these prices should, according to 
many theories be negligable because of international arbitrage, the data  seem to suggest 
that the international disparities in the pricing of easily tradable goods seem to be both 
large and very persistent. Thus, Conzoneri et al find very little evidence that tradable 
goods prices are governed by the law of one price even if they consider the relatively 
long period from 1970-1990. This evidence is confirmed by Feenstra and Kendall (1997) 
who also show tha t much of the change in real exchange rates is due to only partial pass 
through of nominal exchange rate movements by exporting firms. For an explanation 
they actually don’t refer to price stickiness in the consumers’ currency but instead argue 
that monopolistic power induces firms to lower their margin rather than  fully adjust the 
prices.
Contrary to the evidence by Canzoneri et al.(1999) other authors have shown that 
it is possible to confirm the PPP  hypothesis for OECD countries if one uses data sets 
tha t span almost 100 years. Thus, the long run, in which P P P  holds is understood to be 
quite extensive. The time period needed for half the deviation from PPP  to disappear 
is estimated to be around four years (see Rogoff for a survey).
All the papers discussed so far looked at price indices, at best disaggregated into some 
form of nontradable and tradable components. Since the earlier evidence has suggested 
that temporary movements in the real exchange rate are as much due to tradable goods
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as to nontradable goods economists have started to look at disaggregated price series 
for similar traded goods in different countries to study the law of one price for these 
goods. Engel and Rogers (1996) investigate the variation in prices for similar goods 
between cities in Canada and the US close to the border and compare this with the 
variation across different cities inside the US. They find tha t being on the other side 
of the border adds about 2000 miles to the distance between cities, measured as the 
increase in variance. While this border effect could obviously also be due to many other 
effects such as tariffs etc, the authors believe tha t much of the effect should be attributed 
to firms pricing to market together with sticky prices in the consumers’ currency. In a 
follow-on model about Europe, Engel and Rogers (1999) find further evidence for this 
hypothesis by separating the two effects in a panel study. They use both a border dummy 
and a measure of nominal exchange rate volatility.
K nettner (1993) also attributes much of the variability in real exchange rates to 
swings in the nominal exchange rate and sticky prices in the consumers currency. For 
intermediate good prices, a class of goods whose prices are believed to be less sticky 
and for which international arbitrage is probably easier, Goldberg and Knettner (1997) 
report that while deviations from the law of one price still show a lot of persistence, 
50% of the deviation disappears after one year, a rate th a t is much higher than for other 
classes of goods.
The conclusion from most of these papers appears to be tha t pricing to market is 
widespread. A major part of the short term  movements in real exchange rates is due to 
tradable goods being priced differently in seperate countries and nominal exchange rate 
movements not being passed on fully. Furthermore the persistence of these deviations 
appear to be surprisingly long and explain large part of the slow decay of deviations 
from P P P  in OECD countries.
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2 .3  T h e o r y
This section provides an overview of recent progress in the theory of the monetary 
transmission mechansim in the open economy. In doing so, we concentrate on models 
tha t allow for money supply shocks to have real effects. As outlined in the introduction, 
the theory of two country models with non-neutralities of money can be roughly classified 
into two groups. Models that assume sticky prices or wages and models with segmented 
financial markets. Grilli and Roubini (1996) put the difference as follows. ”In a sense, 
sticky price models assume that adjustment in asset markets is instantaneous while the 
one in goods markets is slow; while liquidity models assume tha t adjustment in asset 
markets is slow while the one in goods markets in instantaneous.”
While sticky prices or wages are commonly believed to exist, economists have more 
or less failed so far to come up with an explanation for the persistence of nominal prices. 
Few attemps of a rationalisation exist like firms selling insurance to  workers by long term 
wage contracts or simply the adjustment of a price involving a menu cost (for a survey 
see Stiglitz). Similarly market segmentation is usually implemented in the models by 
assuming transactions costs in financial markets. While again these are plausible it would 
still be desirable to model where these costs come from and which economic variables 
they vary with.
Indeed, Sims (1999) argues tha t all these models fail on the same score. Neither 
prices nor quantities adjust instantaneously, while in each of the discussed models one 
of the two do. Keating (1997) showed tha t at both quarterly and monthly intervals, 
output and price data is hardly related. Instead the relationship between variables is 
confined to a smooth slow impulse response. Thus, Sims suggest tha t a new theory is 
needed which might involve limited information processing capacities. Agents typically 
face a signal extraction problem, when observing a change in prices. They need to find 
out if the price change is due to a general change in prices for tha t good or an increased 
margin in the shop they visit. Finding out would involve substantial costs, at least in 
form of time. Thus, only over time are the signals extracted and as a result both prices 
and volumes would change smoothly. This picks up an old idea of Lucas (1973).
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While much of the literature is usually an extension of work in one country models, 
we restrict ourselves here as much as possible to the models tha t are concerned explicitly 
with two countries. The next section is devoted to models th a t assume some form of 
price or wage stickiness, while the section thereafter deals with liquidity models.
2 .3 .1  S tick y  P r ice s
Recent years have seen extensive research in an attem pt to improve on the still widely 
used Mundell Flemming model while keeping the assumptions of sticky prices or wages. 
The main building block used in this field of research is a static model developed by 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) for a closed economy. In contrast to the ealier sticky 
price models, this model starts from micro foundations, i.e. it has utility maximising 
consumers and profit maximising firms.
Not only does it allow for sticky prices in contrast to a neoclassical world but it 
also assumes monopolistic competition in the goods market, an assumption tha t is now 
widely believed to be realistic for many markets. Monopolistic competition is useful in 
these models because it allows firms to earn positive profits even if their price is not 
optimally set from a profit maximising point of view. Furthermore it allows money 
supply shocks to have real effects if there are nominal rigidities. The reason is that 
under the assumption that firms don’t change their nominal prices in the short term, 
real prices can change after a money shock. O utput is suboptimal in equilibrium due to 
the monopolistic distortion, which imposes higher prices than marginal costs. Under the 
assumption of price stickiness agents effectively loose their price setting power. Since in 
equilibrium they earn positive profits they will expand their production when demand 
rises knowing that the expansion has no impact on the price they charge. Thus a money 
expansion raises output, i.e. money is not neutral in the short run.
The first paper that extended this model to a two country world is Svensson and van 
Wijnbergen (1989). In their paper money shocks do have output effects but they do not 
have any effect on the current account. The reason is tha t agents in the two countries 
pool risks with respect to money shocks, which effectively makes the model behave very 
much like a Blanchard/Kiyotki one country model.
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T he basic tw o country m odel
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) extend the Svensson and Wijnbergen framework by introduc­
ing a home bias in asset holdings. Agents only own firms in their own country and are 
not able to use ownership in foreign firms to diversify the risk. They use their model to 
analyse the Dornbusch experiment of an unanticipated monetary shock on the economy. 
Prices are assumed not to be changed in the producers’ currency, which is similar to the 
assumption tha t wages are sticky in this setting. Because the money shock has an impact 
on the exchange rate and exchange rate pass through is complete in this setting (prices 
are only sticky in the producers’ currency) the relative prices between home and foreign 
goods change instantaneously after the money supply shock. Despite the assumption of 
sticky prices in the producers’ currency, price levels are not sticky because the price of 
imported goods changes. Naturally, this also alters the terms of trade. After a posi­
tive money supply shock output in the home country expands both because the money 
shocks stimulates demand just like in the Blanchard/Kyotaki model (the monopolistic 
deadweight loss is reduced) but also because home goods become cheaper compared to 
foreign goods. Under the assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution between real 
balances and consumption, the exchange rate immediately jumps into the new steady 
state, altering the relative price between home and foreign goods. As a result of the 
associated terms of trade shock, foreign producers earn more per unit in real terms 
while home producers earn less. This effect allows the foreign agents to participate in 
the temporary gains and raises their consumption. Due to the change in relative prices 
foreign production decreases after a home money supply shock, i.e. the spillover effects 
on foreign output are negative, just like in the Mundell Flemming Dornbusch model. 
This feature of the model is clearly at odds with the econometric evidence provided in 
the last section.
One of the advantages tha t this kind of analysis has over the static Mundell Flem­
ming model is tha t it allows for endogenous current account dynamics and a meaningful 
welfare analysis. In the Obstfeld Rogoff model the current account turns positive as 
the wealth effect is bigger at home than abroad. Thus, the simple model does not gen­
erate a J-curve effect, i.e. the current account does not deteriorate on impact after a
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depreciation (Backus et al.(l992). The reason could be tha t volumes adjust immedi­
ately in the model, while the traditional explanation of the J-curve effect relies on an 
assumption that volumes do not adjust instantaneously to changes in relative prices. It 
nevertheless should be possible to alter the current account dynamics without relying on 
a sluggish adjustment of volumes by introducing investment. If the elasticity of demand 
for investment with respect to the interest rate is high enough it should be possible to 
raise demand for investment at home after a money shock enough to cause the current 
account to go into deficit.
In the absence of any overshooting and because of the positive initial impact on 
the current account, the exchange rate jumps by less than it would do under flexible 
prices. The reason is tha t the long run terms of trade need to change in favour of the 
foreign country, such tha t that country will be able to  export enough to pay back for 
its short term borrowing. This result makes it more difficult to attribute much of the 
observed exchange rate volatility to money shocks. In principle the model can produce 
overshooting if the utility is changed such that consumption does not enter the money 
demand equation linearly. However, to produce substantial overshooting the exponent 
of consumption in the money demand must be much larger than one - an assumption 
that is quite questionable. Therefore the model is ill suited to explain exchange rate 
volatility. Furthermore the kind of overshooting does depend on the fact that nominal 
interest rate parity holds, which is at odds with many empirical studies such as Faust 
and Rogers (2000).
Contrary to the asymmetric effect on production and consumption the authors show 
that in their specification welfare rises symmetrically in the home and foreign country. 
The terms of trade effect is large enough to allow the foreign producers to gain as much 
from the home money expansion as the home producers. As the authors point out this 
welfare result is not robust to different assumptions on distortions. If governments for 
example tax income, foreign money expansions might very well reduce domestic welfare. 
This point has been further investigated in the subsequent literature. Chapter 3 of this 
thesis argues that the international distribution of welfare gains depends crucially on the 
specific assumption on price stickiness or the extent of exchange rate pass through. In
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light of the evidence provided in the introduction, the assumption of full exchange rate 
pass through in the Obstfeld/Rogoff model is far from noncontroversial.
A  m odel that allows for a closed solution
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) need to log linearise their model around the symmetric steady 
state to derive the impact of a monetary shock. The model is therefore ill suited to 
study nonlinearities or non monotonic effects money shocks could have on the economy. 
In contrast Coresetti and Pesenti show tha t a two country sticky price model can be 
analytically solved without a log linearisation, if a particular elasticity of substitutions 
is assumed. In the Obstfeld/Rogoff model the elasticity of substitution between foreign 
and home produced goods is the same as the one between two home goods. Corsetti 
and Pesenti change this assumption and assume instead th a t agents have Cobb Douglas 
preferences over the home and foreign produced consumption bundle while they have 
CES preferences over the goods produced in their own country. The assumption of Cobb 
Douglas preferences implies that the current account is always balanced, because agents 
spend a constant share of their real expenditure on each class of goods. This artefact 
makes the model essentially static, e.g. once prices are adjusted the economies return 
to the steady state tha t prevailed prior to the money supply shock. The share of total 
world income is always constant in each period. A m ajor advantage of this outcome 
is tha t the authors are able to refrain from the log linearisations Rogoff and Obsteld 
had to employ. The reason is that the budget constraint is always linear as long as the 
economy is initially in the steady state, in which no country is a net creditor. This 
allows them to show that at least in their model the welfare effects of monetary policy 
are non monotonic. While small changes in the money supply at home benefit the home 
population more than the foreign population the effect of large changes might actually 
be vice versa. This is because the advantage to foreigners of the terms of trade effect that 
follows a large money shock can outweigh the large impact on the demand for domestic 
goods. Consequently the optimal monetary expansion becomes finite and is smaller 
than the one tha t would move the economy to the outcome tha t would be imposed by a 
central planner. While this result allows for something of an endogenisation of monetary
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policy, (the money supply shock still occurs with zero probability), it is at the cost of 
assuming that money supply shocks do not have current account effects. In contrast 
the evidence provided in section two suggests tha t money supply shocks do have current 
account effects and alter the international distribution of assets.
N ontradables and trading costs
Hau (1998) introduced nontradable goods into the Obstfeld Rogoff model, which alters 
the counterfactual result in the basic model tha t there is no home bias in consumption. 
As a result the impact of a money shock on the exchange rate depends upon the openness 
of the economy i.e.the impact on the exchange rate is larger the less open an economy 
is and on the size of the two countries. This is in contrast to the Obstfeld Rogoff 
model where the impact on the exchange rate is independent of the size of the two 
countries. Just like in the Obstfeld and Rogoff model only prices of imports change 
in the short rim as the exchange rate movement is passed through. All other prices 
stay fixed intially if prices are sticky in the producers’ currency. W ith fewer tradable 
goods available more of a relative price change between individual foreign and home 
tradable goods is needed to create the same relative change in the price level and in 
the current account. Consequently the exchange rate needs to change more in the short 
run for less open economies. Hau argues tha t this allows for a reverse causality between 
openess and exchange rate volatility. Usually it is assumed tha t high volatility causes 
firms to refrain from trade, instead he argues that because countries are closed their 
exchange rate volatility is higher. The disadvantage of this explanation for volatility is 
that it relies on a high price volatility of imported goods which hasn’t been found in the 
data. He finds some econometric evidence for his result by showing tha t volatility rises 
if he controls openess by the size of the country in a two stage least square estimation. 
Nevertheless it could be that central banks just pay less attention to the exchange rate 
in less open economies.
Sutherland (1996) introduced a friction into the bond market. He assumes that 
there are convex adjustment costs in buying foreign currency denominated bonds. This 
assumption in fact reinforces the home bias in asset markets. Different costs in buying
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foreign bonds is in line with recent research by Hau (2000), who empirically shows 
empirically that at least in the stock market, average returns for foreigners are lower 
than those for domestic investors. As a result of the friction in financial markets, interest 
rates can differ temporarily across countries. Since it becomes more difficult to lend to 
foreigners, the domestic interest rate falls by less after a domestic money shock than 
it would without the friction. Clearly current consumption at home rises more than it 
would if agents could costlessly smooth their consumption stream. The current account 
surplus is smaller and the exchange rate depreciates by less. In fact the exchange rate 
undershoots its long run equilibrium. Less financial integration (higher costs) therefore 
leads to more consumption but less exchange rate volatility and more ouput and interest 
volatility. Consumption and output obviously track each other more closely which is in 
line with the findings by Feldstein and Horioka(1980). Thus, while financial integration 
raises the volatility of exchange rates according to Sutherland, trade integration lowers 
it according to Hau (1998). The implications for interest and exchange rate volatility 
seen together is difficult to reconcile with the data. Interest rates tend to behave rather 
smoothly while exchange rates are volatile.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) discuss how the introduction of trading costs for the 
imports and export of goods can resolve many of the puzzles in international macro 
economics. Trading costs are obviously able to mimic the home bias in consumption as 
the cost incurred for exporting raises the price of goods produced abroad compared to 
those domestically produced. The paper argues further tha t trading costs can explain 
the relatively small size of current accounts (the Feldstein Horioka Puzzle). The reason 
is tha t trading costs can drive a wedge between real interest rates at home and abroad. 
Borrowing from abroad is expensive because in order to pay the due interest more goods 
have to be exported and more resources are lost in form of trading costs. The authors 
show how the real interest rate rises quickly with the size of the current account and 
claim that this is the reason why current accounts never rise too much.
They continue by giving an explanation for the home bias puzzle in equity holdings. 
Trading costs are able to reduce the incentive of foreigners to buy claims on foreign 
equity even though these are costlessly traded. The reason is tha t dividends have to be
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ultimately paid in goods and that the flow is therefore taxed by transport costs. Thus, 
even though it might be optimal for risk sharing purposes to have a global portfolio, the 
transport tax introduces a home bias.
Adding price stickiness to their model Obstfeld and Rogoff claim they can explain 
the Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle, i.e. the slow dissipation of deviation of the real ex­
change rate from its PPP level in OECD countries. They argue th a t the PPP  puzzle can 
be explained by the sticky consumer price models surveyed above but there must be sub­
stantial costs to international trade to rationalise the international price discrimination 
that these models allow for.
A  stochastic m odel w ith  rational exp ectations
All the models discussed so far assume that agents don’t anticipate the money supply 
shock, a notion that is clearly open to the Lucas’ critic. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) 
introduce rational expectations and uncertainty into the model. They use the specifica­
tion of Corsetti and Pesenti since the implied consumption risk sharing allows the model 
to be almost completely solved without a log linearisation. Not using log linearisation 
allows them to calculate the risk premia they are mainly interested in. Again this comes 
at the expense tha t money shocks do not have any impact on the current account for 
the reasons explained above. Unfortunately many of the results are driven by exactly 
this limitation of the model.
It is not surprising that they find tha t output is reduced in the steady state due 
to increased demand risk. If volatility is assymmetric, e.g. the home money supply is 
more volatile than the foreign money supply, terms of trade, output and consumption 
are affected. Home producers incorporate the risk premium and produce less but as a 
result benefit from better terms of trade. Nevertheless, home and foreign countries have 
the same incentives to coordinate since monetary uncertainty has symmetric effects on 
ex ante welfare. This is not necessarily true ex post. While the specification of Cobb 
Douglas preferences ensures perfect consumption risk sharing it is still likely that the 
money shocks have asymmetric effects on output and labour input. Thus, ex ante welfare 
coincides despite the above mentioned differences in ex ante prices and the associated ex
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post differences in relative output levels. In welfare terms the authors show that higher 
volatility of prices leads to less welfare both at home and abroad. A further interesting 
result they obtain is concerned with the risk premium of the exchange rate. The authors 
argue tha t this risk premium that is associated with monetary policy shocks can be 
quite large and its volatility helps to explain the observed high volatility of exchange 
rates. Furthermore the risk premium can be negative. The reason is tha t if home 
monetary policy is an im portant source of uncertainty, home currency denominated 
assets might actually hedge against that risk. Thus, the risk premium gives rise to a 
possible explanation for the forward discount puzzle. If higher inflation countries also 
have a more volatile inflation rate, it is at least theoretically possible that the forward 
premium is opposite in sign to the expected rate of currency depreciation.
Devereux and Engel (1999) extend the model to the case of stickiness in the con­
sumers’ currency with the main aim to study the welfare implications of fixed versus 
floating exchange rate regimes. The type of stickiness m atters not only for the volatility 
of consumption and exchange rates but also for the level once risk premia are taken into 
account. Since consumption is hedged from exchange rate risk under stickiness in con­
sumer prices, a floating exchange rate is always preferable as long as consumers are at 
least as risk averse as the risk aversion implied by log preferences. Instead, if prices are 
sticky in the producers’ currency fixed exchange rates are prefered as long as consumers 
are risk averse enough.
Bachhetta and van Wincoop (1998) use the introduction of risk premia under uncer­
tainty to discuss the link between exchange rate volatility and openess. Differently from 
most of the literature they use a nonseparable utility function in leisure and consump­
tion. Their key result under this assumption is tha t firms charge different prices in export 
and domestic sales. If consumption and leisure are substitutes as is usually assumed, 
firms charge a higher price abroad due to the increased risk premium. Thus exchange 
rate volatility causes less openess, which coincides with the traditional thinking rather 
than with the reasoning of the research of Hau (1998) mentioned above. If both channels 
are at work, i.e. openess is globally a negative function of volatility and volatility is a 
negative function of openess it is difficult to see how there could be an equilibrium other
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than tha t economies are fully closed. Thus, at least one of the relationships should be 
non monotonic.
P ersistence
Contrary to the data all the models imply tha t nominal prices are very volatile. They stay 
constant for one period and adjust to their new steady state values in the next. Therefore, 
the models are not able to account for the observed persistence of the impact of monetary 
policy. Chari, Kehoe and M cGrattan (1999) have improved the models by allowing for 
staggered price setting, developed by Calvo (1983) for closed economy models. In their 
model the opportunity to adjust prices arrives stochastically. Thus, in each period only a 
fraction of the producers adjust their prices and price adjustment is smoothed out. They 
show th a t for certain parameter values the model can create persistence defined as prices 
not being fully adjusted after all producers had the opportunity to do so. The reason 
why a producer does not adjust his price to the new steady state price immediately 
is tha t he has to take the prices of others into account. If others haven’t yet had the 
chance to adjust their prices, full price adjustment might be suboptimal as the loss 
in demand could outweigh the higher margin. Chari et al.show tha t only if producers 
charge constant mark ups over marginal cost and the marginal cost of production is 
rising in total production, prices are adjusted fully and there is no persistence, i.e. each 
firm adjusts its price only once. This has the consequence tha t models in which prices 
are fixed in the consumer’s currency rather than in the producers’ currency, staggering 
is only able to produce persistence if mark ups change. The reason is that if wages are 
flexible the cost of production is rising in the level of output.
Bergin and Feenstra (2000) have changed the assumption of CES utilities altogether 
and have instead assumed translog preferences, widely used in the real business cycle 
litterature. The advantage of these preferences is tha t expenditure on a specific good 
is inversely related to its price and the authors show tha t this allows production of 
persistence even under conditions under which there would be no persistence with CES 
preferences. Additionally they introduce intermediate goods by assuming tha t the final 
home good is produced from intermediate goods. This causes the cost of production
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to change with the price level and again this channel increases persistence because the 
mark up becomes variable. Thus, while it might be analytically difficult to produce 
persistence because translog utilities and the introduction of intermediate goods slightly 
complicate the algebra and staggered price setting is needed, there is no reason why price 
adjustment under sticky prices could not take much longer than the period in which all 
firms should have adjusted at least once. It appears easier to produce persistence in 
models tha t assume sticky prices in the producers’ currency.
C alibrating sticky price m odels
Kollmann (1998) shows that the addition of sticky prices and monopolistic pricing goes 
some way towards explaning international correlations of asset returns, output and con­
sumption. Calibrating a stochastic sticky price and wage model he finds tha t he can 
generate the strong observed positive correlation of asset returns and output. Further­
more he shows that in sticky price models, positive productivity shocks are much more 
strongly and positively transm itted to foreign output, concluding tha t sticky prices can 
explain some of the high positive correlation of output. Furthermore money supply 
shocks have a positive effect both on output and on equity returns, thus increasing the 
correlation between those two. He is also able to replicate a higher correlation for out­
put than for consumption, a puzzling feature in the data we mentioned before. In his 
baseline model tha t assumes sticky prices in the producers’ currency monetary shocks 
have positive spillovers on foreign output, differently from the original Obstfeld Rogoff 
model. The reason is twofold. First home output is produced using foreign intermediate 
goods (differently from Obstfeld Rogoff (1995). That is why a home expansion raises 
the demand for foreign output of intermediate goods. Second the fall in the exchange 
rate after a monetary expansion lowers the price of imports in the foreign country and 
therefore raises real balances which induces a fall in the real interest rate. This provides 
a further stimulus for foreign production. A positive productivity shock also raises for­
eign output despite the fact tha t Kollmann assumes (just like Backus et al (1992)) that 
productivity shocks filter through to the foreign country with a lag. W ith flexible wages 
an expected productivity increase in the foreign country would cause a temporary fall in
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output. W ith sticky wages this effect is overturned as labour is demand determined in 
the short run and the increased demand for foreign intermediate goods is strong enough 
to overturn the first effect. Assuming tha t prices are sticky in the consumers’ rather than 
the producers currency does not affect the correlation of output very much. Nevertheless 
it does lower the correlation of consumption even further and raises the variability of 
nominal and real exchange rates and exchange rate overshooting is stronger. All these 
are features reported by many empirical studies.
Bordo et al. (2000) calibrate a sticky wage model over the period of the great 
depression and find tha t it fits the actual dynamics of output and consumption very well. 
They therefore question the approach by others that claimed tha t financing constraints 
were the main driving force behind the severity of the recession. Nevertheless they 
find tha t the model is much less effective good in explaining the recovery afterwards. 
Therefore they disagree tha t it was a monetary expansion tha t was mainly responsible 
for the upturn.
International m onetary coordination
A general weakness of the literature on sticky price models is tha t it does not allow for 
an analyis of optimal monetary policy. The simple zero probability models (with the 
exception of Corsetti and Pesenti) make use of a log linearisations, which only hold close 
to the steady state. Furthermore after the linearisation the effect of monetary policy is 
monotone and there is no optimum. Despite these limitations it is instructive to analyse 
if the foreign and home money supplies are in fact strategic complements or substitutes 
because this largely determines if there is a need for international monetary coordination. 
Furthermore it is im portant to know the sign of the spillovers (Cooper and John(l988)). 
We have pointed out that the sign of the spillovers crucially depends on the assumption 
on pricing. If prices are sticky in the consumers’ currency spillovers are likely to be 
negative. On the other hand, if they are sticky in the producers’ currency they are likely 
to be positive (even though in the Kollmann setting they are positive). Strategically 
the two money supplies are independent in the Obstfeld Rogoff model. In the Corsetti 
Pesenti model, spillovers are also positive, but the strategic interaction depends on the
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of substitution between home 
and foreign goods. If the intertemporal elasticity is larger than the elasticity between 
home and foreign goods, monetary policies are strategic substitutes. If the home money 
supply is expands, the foreign central bank ideally reacts by contracting the money sup­
ply. This is because in this case the home nominal shock would raises foreign output, 
imposing an excessive cost of foregone foreign leisure. The optimal response by the Cen­
tral Bank is therefore to reduce foreign output by contracting the foreign money supply. 
If the elasticity between home and foreign output is higher than the intertemporal elas­
ticity, a home money expansion lowers foreign output and the optimal response of the 
foreign central bank is to raise the money supply. In tha t model the optimal outcome 
can only be obtained by coordination. Individually the central banks would not take the 
terms of trade effect into account when setting monetary policy and thus choose too little 
an expansion. Therefore in the Corsetti, Pesenti model, policy coordination could raise 
the inflation rate, a result that is contrary to widespread belief th a t policy coordination 
lowers the inflation rate. It is likely that this result again is reversed if prices are sticky 
in the consumers currency as the negative term of trade effect disappears. Thus, policy 
coordination in such a scenario is likely to lower the inflation rate.
An ad hoc way forward to analyse optimal policy rules may be to extend Kim et 
al (1999) to a two country model. They impose taxes onto the model such that the 
steady state is moved towards the outcome tha t a social planner would impose, i.e. the 
monopolistic distortions have no effect. Thus monetary policy shocks per se lower welfare 
and the optimal inflation rate is zero. Nevertheless monetary policy might be able to 
smoothen output if other demand or supply shocks hit the system and it is unable to 
adjust because prices are fixed. In such a model it should be possible to find optimal 
monetary rules for open economies.
2 .3 .2  L iq u id ity  M o d e ls  an d  S e g m e n te d  M a rk ets
For a long time economists have argued that some of the observed regularities in exchange 
rate and interest rate dynamics should be explained by frictions th a t lead to a temporary 
segmentation for trading of interest bearing assets and money (Baumol 1952, Tobin
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1956). A simple rationalisation is tha t people generally act through intermediaries in 
financial markets which involves substantial transaction costs.
M odels w ith  exogenous output and exogenous segm entation
The general idea in all these models is tha t either agents are not able to adjust their 
savings/consumption decision instantaneously (exogenous segmentation) or tha t not all 
agents are active at all times in financial markets (endogenous segmentation). The 
idea of a segmentation at the root of many puzzles found in the data was initially 
picked up by Grossman and Weiss (1983) and then by Rotemberg (1984) and finally by 
Lucas (1990) for closed economy models. Initially researchers in this area were looking 
for a rationalisation of the liquidity puzzle, i.e. the regulartiy found in the data that 
interest rates tend to fall initially after a monetary expansion. Grossmann and Weiss and 
Rotemberg study the dynamic response of interest rates in deterministic models with 
exogeneous segmentation and exogenous output. In addition they limit asset trade to 
noncontingent securities. On account of the last restriction on financial markets, money 
injections have complicated wealth affects in addition to liquidity effects which make the 
models relatively complicated and restrict the analysis to zero probability shocks.
Lucas (1990) gets around the market incompleteness by assuming that agents pool 
their resources and choose consumption according to a single budget constraint for the 
coalition as a whole, subjects to the exogeneous restriction on trade. Agents need to 
make portfolio choices of how much money they want to spend for consumption and 
how much they want to invest in financial market prior to the shock. Thus, there are 
effectively two cash in advance constraints. This time structure is a crucial assumption 
of the model tha t allows monetary shocks to effect real prices. Lucas considers the 
effect of open market operations. Since money balances available for bond purchases are 
fixed at the beginning of the period, an increase in the supply of bonds puts upward 
pressure on the nominal and real interest rates. This channel allows Lucas to increase 
the volatility of asset prices. Real asset prices are affected since the disturbance does 
not affect the future growth rate of money and expected inflation. As a result asset 
prices vary more than can be explained by their fundamentals. Furthermore, the Lucas
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model is able to replicate the liquidity effect, i.e. th a t following a monetary loosening, 
nominal interest rates tend to fall initially. Monetary models or the general equilibrium 
model of Lucas (1982) without liquidity effects are unable to  simulate this effect as a 
monetary expansion raises expectations of future inflation and thus interest rates and 
this is the only channel through which money effects interest rates. In the model with 
limited participation, the effect of higher inflationary expectations can be reversed due 
to the liquidity effect. An obvious shortcomming of the Lucas model is tha t liquidity 
effects last for only one period as agents are able to adjust their portfolio fully in the 
next period and therefore there is no persistence. A strong limitation of the model is 
tha t output is exogenous and monetary shocks therefore only affect the distribution of 
consumption but not production.
Grilli and Roubini (1992) extend the Lucas model to a two country world and show 
tha t the ’’excess” volatility results also apply to real and nominal exchange rates. In 
a follow-on paper Grilli and Roubini (1993) study the impact of capital controls and 
the structure of public debt. Since the demand for money in these models depends on 
the size of transactions in hnanciai markets, they show tha t a shortening of the term  
structure of debt, results in an appreciation of the exchange rate. The same is true 
for capital controls (taxes on foreign asset acquisitions) since it reduces the demand for 
foreign money for the purpose of asset transactions.
T he m odel w ith  endogenous output but exogenous segm entation
Fuerst (1992) endogenised output in the closed economy model. Instead of stochastic 
endowments as in Lucas (1990) he assumes tha t output is produced using labour and 
capital. Thus, production is endogenous and monetary shocks can affect ouput. Agents 
decide in advance how much they want to spend on goods and how much they want 
to deposit in the bank. Firms need to borrow from the banks for working capital. A 
money supply shock in this model is an injection of money into the banking system. 
Just like in Lucas’ model consumers decide how much to consume and how much to 
save prior to when the shock is revealed. If a positive money shock occurs in form of 
a liquidity injection into the banking system, the interest rate needs to fall given the
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demand for credit from the firms, which generates the liquidity effect. Subsequently, 
the firms borrow more and produce more temporarily. Monetary policy has an effect 
on output just like in sticky price/wage models but the effect comes from the supply 
side rather than the demand side. Note also tha t this makes the model observationally 
equivalent to sticky price models with respect to the impact of money shocks on domestic 
output. This is true even though money injections lower welfare in liquidity models while 
they raise welfare in the sticky price models, discussed above. The reason is tha t output 
is suboptimally low in the sticky price models due to the monopolistic distortions while 
it is at the optimum in liquidity models.
Again Grilli and Roubini (1991) have extended this work to the open economy. They 
show tha t monetary policy affects both nominal and real interest rates and exchange 
rates as well as output in the home and in the foreign country. The spill over from home 
money supply shocks on the foreign country are positive, differently from the Mundell 
Flemming model or the Obstfeld Rogoff model. Schlangesief and Wrase add stochastics 
to this model. In their model agents enter each period with a share in the domestic 
capital stock and some domestic currency. They allocate a part of the inherited currency 
for consumption purposes (which is added to income from labour) and deposit the rest 
with an intermediary, who only lends to domestic firms. The shopper trades money in 
a cash market to buy both home and foreign goods. In equilibrium the shopper never 
comes home with any cash. Only the intermediary who borrows or lends to produce 
comes home with some cash profit plus any cash leftover from the initial allocation. The 
worker provides labour inelastically.
The allocation decision for the shopper is made prior to the realisation of the shock 
while the trading in the money market for foreign and home consumption is made with 
full information. Thus the real exchange rate is always given by the marginal rate of 
substitution between home and foreign goods. Money supply shocks are modeled as 
persistent increases in the growth rate of money. The recipient of money injections 
are the intermediaries. Thus, a nominal shock raises the nominal balances in the fi­
nancial market and puts downward pressure on nominal interest rates. At the same 
time the persistence of monetary shocks leads to an increase in inflationary expectations
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putting upward pressure on the interest rate through the Fisherian channel. Thus these 
two channels work against each other. Furthermore higher investment demand (money 
shocks are effectively subsidies for investment) leads to an increase in the price level, 
working against the liquidity effect.
This is the reason why the authors additionally explore a variant of the model in 
which firms have to make investment decisions prior to the shock, thus picking up an 
idea of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) for closed economies. In their specification, 
the liquidity effect is reversed without the introduction of sluggish capital. They need 
sluggish capital investment to generate an impact fall in the interest rate after a mone­
tary expansion. The impact of a positive monetary shock in the model without sluggish 
capital adjustment is such that nominal interest rates abroad and at home rise initially 
due to anticipated inflation. As a result of the higher investment costs labour demand 
falls and output contracts. Lower domestic output leads to a real appreciation as less 
domestic goods are available which is counterfactual. Only with sluggish capital adjust­
ment does the interest rate move in the right direction, i.e. the liquidity effect is large 
enough to overturn the effect of anticipated inflation. Lower interest rates lower mar­
ginal cost and raise labour demand, since capital is fixed in the short run without putting 
additional pressure on prices. Output expands and the real exchange rate depreciates. 
A positive monetary shock always puts upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate 
as the money injections pass via labour income into the goods market.
The reaction of foreign output to a monetary expansion is positive just like in the 
model of Grilli and Roubini (1991). In the model with sluggish capital adjustment this 
happens because the foreign price level falls because of cheaper imports and output 
expands until the marginal utility of leisure equals the marginal utility of consumption. 
The authors conclude that their model with sluggish capital adjustment is best equipped 
to match the data. However they concede that in neither of the models do home and 
foreign output responses show any persistence. Calibrating their models the authors 
find tha t the volatility of nominal and real exchange rates and their autocorrelation, 
although larger than that of output, are far less than what they found in the data using 
VAR techniques. They claim that this is due to the real exchange rate being closely
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related to the marginal rate of substitution between home and foreign goods and thus 
to smooth consumption decisions. They conjecture tha t the results might be improved 
if they allowed for other motives for currency trades than  consumption.
Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum add quadratic costs between periods to  the infinite 
trading costs inside a period and show tha t they are able to increase the persistence of 
the liquidity effect.
E ndogenous segm entation  o f m arkets and exogenous ou tput
Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1998, 2000) have recently extended this literature. The 
model is a standard cash in advance model just like the models discussed before. Instead 
of assuming that portfolio adjustments are impossible inside a period, they assume that 
agents have to pay a fixed cost if they want to trade in the bond markets (1998,2000). 
This fixed cost causes agents to adjust their portfolios only infrequently. Households 
begin each period with some cash in the goods markets and than split into a worker and 
a shopper. Ouput is stochastic but exogenous and the worker only sells the endowment 
for cash. Agents’ endowments are determined by idiosyncratic shocks, which lead to 
agents having different amounts of cash balances when they sell the endowment. This 
has the implication that in each period only a fraction of the population is willing to 
spend the fixed cost in the bond market. The shopper decides to buy goods with just the 
current real balance or to pay the fixed cost to transfer cash to or from the bond market 
and then buy goods. Only shoppers with very high or low real balances are willing to 
pay the fixed cost to transfer funds. The agents with intermediate balances are inactive.
This leads to an endogenous temporary segmentation of the population and gives rise 
to the possibility of nonneutralities similarly to the models with exogenous segmentation 
discussed above. Only the active agents absorb the monetary injections into the asset 
market and only their marginal utility determines interest rates and exchange rates. 
The authors are able to give conditions under which the CIA constraints always hold. 
This is useful, since under that condition the decision of paying the fixed cost is static 
and affects only current consumption and bond purchases and not real balances in later 
periods. Because all agents are ex ante identical they adjust their consumption such
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that the intertemporal rate of substitution is the same for all active agents. T hat is also 
why all active household consume the same independently of their individual stochastic 
shock to the endowment. The consumption level of the active agents therefore only 
depends on money growth and not on individual wealth. A positive money shock raises 
consumption of the active agents since an inflation tax is levied on the inactive part of the 
population and these resources are redistributed to the active part. Higher consumption 
of the active population lowers their marginal utility in th a t period. As long as money 
growth is mean reverting, i.e. tomorrows money growth is expected to be lower, the fall 
in marginal utility in leads to a decrease in real interest rates.
For simplicity the authors assume that there is no trade in goods as agents only 
demand goods produced in their own country. In the asset markets they buy foreign and 
home currency denominated bonds. Trade in assets occurs through a world intermediary, 
i.e. if agents buy a foreign denominated bond they have to first exchange it for home 
cash before they can use it to consume. As a result of the restriction that there is no 
trade in goods, consumption inside a country only reacts to home money injections not to 
foreign ones. Therefore there are no spill over effects of monetary policy. The exchange 
rate is determined by the international arbitrage condition for bonds and, thus, the real 
exchange rate is effectively determined by the marginal utilities of the active population 
in the two countries, which is a different channel from tha t in Wrase et al.
The impact of a money shock on this marginal utility obviously depends on the 
degree of segmentation. W ith high trading costs fewer agents trade and more agents 
pay the inflation tax. Thus the marginal utility for the active few changes more and 
the model is able to generate volatile real exchange rates for low inflation countries. 
They show tha t in this way they can reproduce the strong correlation between nominal 
and real exchange rates for low inflation countries. The correlation disappears if money 
growth rises since the higher inflation tax induces more and more agents to become 
active in the bond market, thus the segmentation disappears endogenously and in the 
limit the real exchange rate is unaffected. The observation tha t the correlation between 
nominal and real exchange rates falls with the rate of inflation is well documented in the 
literature. Similarly while the volatility of the nominal exchange rate for low inflation
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countries is similar to that of the real exchange rate, the ratio rises for high inflation 
countries. Alvarez et al show that it rises from close to one for low inflation countries 
to almost four for countries tha t have a mean inflation rate of close to 100 if the period 
of 1970 -1999 is considered. Informally this behaviour has been often attributed to the 
dollarisation frequently observed in high inflation countries, which causes agents to set 
prices in dollars rather than their home currency.
The authors can generate persistent liquidity effects as found in the data differently 
from other models. Depending on the persistence of the change in the money growth 
rate they are able to show tha t the term structure can twist. Short term  interest rates go 
down on impact while long term  interest rates rise. As before, money injections change 
interest rates through two channels, the Fisherian channel and the liquidity effect. If 
the shock is persistent there is also a liquidity effect in the next period, thus the shock 
has an effect on the term  structure. W hether the expected inflation effect is larger than 
the segmentation effect depends on how responsive the marginal utility of an active 
household is to a money injection. The greater is this effect, the more persistent is the 
shock. If money growth is temporary, a given money injection will lead to a temporary 
increase in active households’ consumption and hence to a relatively large drop in the 
interest rate. As the shock becomes more persistent it leads to a more permanent increase 
in active households’ consumption and, hence, to a smaller drop in the real interest rate. 
They show that if money growth is an autoregressive process with mean reversion the 
model generates the dynamics of the term structure as first assumed and modeled by 
Vasicek (1977). If they assume a long memory process (more slowly decaying than an 
autoregressive one), they show tha t they can generate the twisting of the yield curve on 
impact, first noticed by Friedmann (1968). Short term  rates fall on impact of a positive 
shock while long term  rates rise.
To the best knowledge of the author there are no models in this field tha t discuss 
optimal monetary policy or the effect of monetary policy coordination. If there were 
they would most likely lead to different results from the sticky price models because of 
the fundamentally different welfare effects of monetary policy.
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2 .4  C onclu sion
Comparing the empirical evidence with the predictions of the theories it appears to be the 
case tha t models with stickiness in the consumers’ currency are better equipped to match 
the data than models that assume stickiness in the producers’ currency. Not only does 
a direct investigation of prices across countries seem to support this claim, the models 
also fare better with respect to several other points. They generate a higher volatility of 
real and nominal exchange rates, which is in line with the data. Furthermore they are 
better able to generate the cross country correlations of consumption and production. 
W ith respect to monetary shocks the simple models with stickiness in the consumers 
currency predict that output is positively correlated across countries while consumption 
is independent. W ith respect to supply shocks both consumption and production are 
positively correlated although consumption less so according to Kollmann (1998). On 
the other hand, Chari et al. have shown that models with sticky prices in consumers 
currency are less able to generate the observed persistence. To achieve persistence in 
those models it is necessary to introduce variable mark ups or use translog utilities.
The question of which price stickiness is relevant is of practical importance for inter­
national monetary coordination. If prices are sticky in the consumers’ currency, policy 
coordination would tend to lower inflation.
The evidence collected appears insufficient to distinguish liquity models from sticky 
price models. In fact with respect to the facts presented here they are observationally 
equivalent. In both models monetary expansions tend to lower interest rates temporarily. 
Nominal and real exchange rates depreciate, output and consumption increases at home 
and there is a positive spillovers to foreign production. This is true even though in 
liquidity models the output expansion occurs via aggregate supply and in sticky price 
models via aggregate demand.
It appears that to distinguish the importance of the two imperfections/rigidities we 
need to know output and consumption for less aggregated data. If we assume that 
agents inside a country are exposed to trade to different extents and agents are not able 
to pool the risk and we have data on production and consumption we might be able to
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distinguish the models. Liquidity constraints should not give rise to differences across 
sectors, while sticky prices might.
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Chapter 3
Contrasting Different Forms of 
Price Stickiness: Exchange R ate  
Overshooting and Beggar Thy  
Neighbour Policy
3.1 In tro d u ctio n
The Great Depression triggered policy interest in the impact of one country’s monetary 
policy on the neighbouring country’s economy and on the exchange rate. The term 
“beggar thy neighbour policy” was coined during that period. More formal analyses of 
such macroeconomic interdependence were only possible decades later after a Keynesian 
analytical framework was developed by Flemming and Mundell (1961, 1963), in which 
wages are assumed to be sticky. Models based on this framework predict that a domestic 
monetary expansion leads to a reduction in foreign output (e.g. Mussa (1979)). This 
occurs since a domestic monetary expansion triggers a depreciation in the home currency. 
This raises the price of foreign goods, thereby leading to a substitution away from foreign 
goods and a reduction in production abroad. However, the Mundell-Fleming framework 
lacks microfoundation and is static. Consequently no coherent welfare analysis can be
47
conducted. A static model also restricts the analysis to  comparative statics and does not 
allow to explicitly analyse the dynamic aspects of the current account and the dynamics 
of the exchange rate.
Until recently dynamic models either departed from a general equilibrium framework 
by ignoring income effects or they focused on competitive dynamic models where firms 
and individuals take equilibrium prices as given (e.g. Lucas 19??). Money is neutral in 
models with Motionless markets and rational individuals. In addition, price stickiness is 
hard to justify in a competitive environment.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) moved away 
from the price taking assumption by incorporating monopolistic competition to the in­
ternational finance literature. In contrast to the earlier partial equilibrium Keynesian 
models, their general equilibrium models also take income effects into account and pro­
vide a thorough microfoundation. This makes it possible to conduct a welfare analysis. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) implicitly assume a special form of price stickiness since 
they assume tha t the purchasing power parity always holds. Their extended model in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) is also restricted to a special form of labour market with pow­
erful trade unions. The importance of the form  of price stickiness and labour market 
imperfections have been largely ignored in the published literature.
Our chapter shows that the form of price stickiness and the structure of the labour 
market are crucial in understanding the impact of an unanticipated money supply shock 
on the international economy. We distinguish between two different forms of price stick­
iness in the goods market: a sticky retail price setting wherein prices are fixed for one 
period in the consumers’ currency and a sticky wholesale price setting where prices are 
sticky in the producers’ currency. We also examine the case of sticky wages wherein we 
show that the impact of a money supply shock is determined by the structure of the 
labour market.
Our model builds on Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and extends it in various ways. 
It describes a two country world, home and foreign, tha t is populated by workers that 
provide labour to firms. We depart from the simpler yeoman analysis in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995). In our model firms sell their output on the goods market and hire workers
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from the labour market. We assume market imperfections in both markets. This allows 
us to study price as well as wage stickiness. Each firm produces in only one of the 
two countries and is in monopolistic competition with firms both abroad and at home. 
Unlike Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), who assume that firms set the price only in their 
own currency, we assume tha t firms are able to price discriminate between countries.1. 
There are also frictions on the labour market. In Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Hau 
(1998) workers are represented by monopolistically competitive trade unions which hold 
the market power. While there is a relatively broad agreement among economists that 
a monopolistic market structure is an accurate description of the goods market this is 
much less the case for labour markets. To provide a contrast to  the existing models, 
we focus on the other extreme and assume tha t firms are monopsonists in the labour 
market.2
Finally, our model assumes that there is a complete home bias in the ownership of 
firms.
Given the distortions in both markets, prices are higher in our model relative to the 
social optimum. A positive monetary expansion has an immediate effect on the national 
economy. W ith sticky prices, nominal wages will adjust while real prices decrease. This 
leads to more production in the country tha t expands its money supply and suggests a 
current account surplus. The analysis illustrates that the size, the spillover effects and 
the dynamics of the world economics depend crucially on the form of price stickiness. 
Furthermore, if nominal wages are sticky, a money supply increase leads to higher prices 
and thus to lower real wages. This also affects the country’s output as well as its
1 We believe that price discrimination is a more realistic assum ption and it also allows us to study  
different sorts o f price stickiness. There is a significant amount o f evidence th at borders have a much
bigger effect on price disparities than for example transport costs, (E ngel and Rogers (1996))
2 M onopsonistic market power of firms is certainly an extrem e assum ption, but labour econom ists
have previously argued that it is realistic in many settings. For exam ple, it has been used to  explain 
positive employment effects of the introduction of minimum wages (Card and Krueger (1995), Manning 
(1995)), the positive relationship between firm size and wages (Green, Machin and M anning (1996)), 
and the persistent differences across firms in wages and vacancy rates (Boal and Ransom (1997)). In 
a recent empirical study of the labour market for nurses, Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (1999) also found 
significant market power on the side of the hospitals.
current account deficit. These effects can be either negative or positive depending on 
the structure of the labour market. If the labour market is dominated by trade unions 
as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), wages in the steady state equilibrium are too high in 
comparison to the social optimum. A money supply increase reduces real wages and thus 
leads to the same effects as in the sticky wholesale price setting. On the other hand, if 
firms hold the market power on the labour market, wages are already too low relative to 
the social optimum and an unexpected money supply shock has negative implications.
In an open economy, monetary policy decisions in one country affects the welfare of 
other economies as well. We show tha t both the size of spillover effects on foreign con­
sumption and production and their direction depends crucially on the type of nominal 
stickiness assumed. In the sluggish wholesale price setting, Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) 
result is confirmed even though we do not assume the law of one price. The spillovers 
are positive. On the other hand, if retail prices are sticky, the foreign country’s welfare is 
unambiguously negatively affected by monetary expansions at home. This reinstates the 
traditional Keynesian notion of “Beggar Thy Neighbour” policies. Foreign consumption 
is negatively correlated with money expansions at home whilst the equilibrium labour 
input is positively correlated with it. Under a sticky wholesale price setting, the cor­
relations with money supply of both consumption and production vary from the short 
to the long-run. While consumption is initially positively affected by a foreign money 
expansion, it is negatively correlated in the long-run. The opposite is true for production.
Under the sticky wage setting, the structure of the labour market determines the 
impact of a monetary expansion. The effects are either qualitatively similar to the case 
of sticky wholesale prices if workers are represented by powerful trade unions, or they 
are almost the mirror image of what happens under sticky wholesale prices. In the 
latter case, foreign production is negatively correlated in the long-run to home money 
expansions. Consumption abroad declines in the short-run but increases in the long-run.
Empirical evidence on the spillover effects appears to be inconclusive. McKibbin 
and Sachs (1991) argue tha t the spillover effects of monetary policy on real variables 
are small while Canzoneri and Minford (1986) claim tha t they are reasonably big and 
negative. It is im portant to understand the size and direction of spillover effects before
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one can discuss the need for international monetary coordination
The form of price stickiness also affects the exchange rate dynamics. In our model 
the nominal exchange rate moves immediately regardless of whether wages, wholesale or 
retail prices are sticky. Under sticky wholesale prices, it jumps by less than  the mag­
nitude of the monetary expansion and immediately reaches its new steady state value. 
In contrast, under the sticky retail price setting the exchange rate jumps by more than 
the monetary expansion and returns to the old steady state level in the long-run. This 
exchange rate overshooting is qualitatively different from the classical overshooting in 
Dornbusch (1976). For Dornbusch type overshooting to occur, the uncovered nominal in­
terest rate parity (UIP) and long-run purchasing power parity needs to hold. In contrast, 
our overshooting occurs exactly when the uncovered nominal interest ra te  parity (UIP) 
and short-run PPP  are violated. Our type of overshooting seem to be vindicated by the 
data. Rogoff (1996) has shown tha t periods of exchange rate overshooting coincide with 
periods of extreme violations of both PPP and UIP. If wages are sticky, the exchange 
rate moves more than the money supply but there is no overshooting. The exchange rate 
immediately reaches its new steady state as in the case of sticky wholesale prices. The 
volatility of the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative price of a consumption 
basket in the two countries, displays the same volatility as the nominal exchange rate 
in the case of sticky retail prices. This is in line with the empirical findings of Rogoff 
(1996). Under sticky wholesale prices and under sticky wages, the real exchange rate 
does not move at all because the law of one price always holds.
The empirically established J-curve effect shows that the trade balance is negatively 
correlated with current and future exchange rates while it is positively correlated with 
past exchange rates. In our model, the current account is initially positive if either of the 
two prices are sticky but turns out to be negative under wage stickiness. In the long-run, 
the sign of the current account is reversed and turns negative under sticky prices and 
positive under sticky wages. It is worthwhile to note tha t while the cross-correlation of 
the trade balance with the current exchange rate has different signs under sticky wages
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and sticky prices, the cross-correlation of the terms of trade and the trade balance is 
always positive. Even under sticky wages, where the exchange rate is negatively corre­
lated the prices move far enough to allow the terms of trade to be positively correlated 
with the trade balance. Our findings extend the findings of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland 
(1994) to monetary shocks. They found tha t while the J-curve effect can be reconciled 
with permanent productivity shocks, it is not possible to reconcile the negative correla­
tion with fiscal shocks. In our model the efficiency gain of monetary disturbances is also 
only short-term even though they lead to permanent effects due to international lending.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first to explicitly illustrate the im­
portance of different types of price stickiness as well as labour market imperfections.
The remaining chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and 
Section 3 analyses the steady state. Section 4 introduces nominal rigidities. Section 4.1 
discusses the effects of monetary disturbances under different kinds of price stickiness and 
illustrates a new form of exchange rate overshooting. Section 4.2 discusses the welfare 
spillovers of monetary expansions under different forms of price stickiness and the role 
of the labour market imperfections under sticky wages. Conclusions are presented in 
Section 5. Proofs not presented in the text are in the Appendix.
3.2 T h e M od el
3 .2 .1  C o n su m e r s’ P ro b lem
The world is a 1 x 1 square in our model. A fraction n  of the population fives in the home 
country and a fraction (1 — n) abroad. There is also a continuum of firms on the interval 
[0,1]. All firms produce different goods. A measure of n  firms produce at home and a 
measure (1  — n) in the foreign country. Home firms are symmetrically owned by home 
citizens and foreign firms by foreign citizens. Each inhabitant works in one firm located 
in his country but consumes the whole range of home and foreign produced goods. The 
group of potential workers for each firm is of measure one. All citizens maximise an 
additively separable utility function with a common discount rate 6,
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u  = Y Z i  ( i t j ) ‘ « ( c ? , $ , i ? ) .
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), the flow utility is Cobb Douglas in money and in the 
composite consumption good. The marginal disutility of labour is constant k .
u(Cf , $ , 1 ? )  =  In <?*(*) + Xl n ^  -  f i ? ( z ) 2 
The citizens derive positive utility from holding real money in their own currency. Hold­
ing more cash saves them trips to their bank. The flow utility exhibits constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) of p among the different commodities. The composite consumption
good is, therefore, given by
EslL p - 1
C t ( Z) =  fo Ct (k, Z) P dk 
and the price index is defined as
P ? = [ / o P f W H ] ^ -
The superscript h refers to the home country and /  to the foreign country.
The budget constraint for an individual agent of type z  is given by
P t c t +Pt J TFt B t + M t =  L t ( z ) w £ ( z )  + 7if + M^_1 + - p f r f ,
where r / 1 are real government transfers, denotes the face value of bond holdings 
between period t to t +  1. Given the interest rate rt the present value of the bond is 
. w is the nominal wage and 7r^ is the share of profits from home firms tha t the 
agent holds stocks of.
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), (1996) citizens are not allowed to trade their shares 
of the firms. However they can trade real bonds in order to smooth their consumption. 
Agents choose their labour supply, their consumption stream, their money holdings and 
their bond holdings.
The government’s revenue comes from seigniorage. We will assume throughout this 
analysis tha t the government balances its budget in each period .3
Vt* — M^_1 =  P(Tf
The consumption side is identical to the formulation used by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996).
3 We do not really have to assume this. As long as the government spends all its revenue on transfers 
or buys the sam e consum ption baskets as the econom y’s agents, Ricardian equivalence in the model 
ensures th at a temporary deficit or surplus has no effect.
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3 .2 .2  F ir m s’ P ro b lem
As in the standard framework, we assume that companies are monopolistic competitors 
in the goods market. Each good k is produced by firm k only. Furthermore we assume 
tha t each company is a monopsonist in the labour market. This is one crucial assumption 
tha t leads to very different dynamics in our model under sticky wages compared to 
the standard framework. The dynamics under sticky prices is largely unaffected by 
this assumption. We believe tha t there is empirical evidence suggesting tha t this is 
a reasonable assumption. The market power is typically with the employers rather 
than with the employees (Boal and Ransom 1997, Manning 1995, Staiger et al. 1999). 
Therefore, it can be misleading to shift the market power to the workers for modelling 
purposes.
For the price setting, we assume that producers can differentiate between foreign and 
home markets. The production function for an individual home firm k takes the simple 
constant returns form
yhh(k ) =  L hh{k) for the home market h and 
y hf (k)  = L hf ( k ) for the foreign (export) market / .
The firm k maximises its profit 7rh(k), which depends not only on the prices it sets but
also on the exchange rate E
max LhhtLhf irh(k) = ph{k)Lhh(k) +  Epf (k)Lhf{k) -  wh (L hh(k) +  L h f (k)),  
subject to
home goods demand: ph(k) = ph{k\ L hh(k)),
foreign goods demand: Epf (k)  = Ep?(k; L hf  (k)) ,
labour supply: wh =  wh(Lhh(k) +  L hf(k)).
In the next section we solve the consumers’ and producers’ optimisation problem
under the assumption that both prices and wages are flexible.
3.3 S tea d y  S ta te  A n alysis
We analyse the steady state by assuming that all prices are flexible. Maximising the 
consumers’ utility and the entrepreneurs’ profits in this setting leads us to a system of
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equations th a t determines the steady state equilibrium.
P roposition  1 The symmetric equilibrium of the economy is fully determined by the 
following eight equations and their foreign counterparts, (all variables are per capita)
Ct+i(z ) = C t (z) (consumption Euler equation),
2 ' Mt (z) =  } where 1 +  i1)  — (1 +  rt) (money demand),
P t  H  P t
3' L t -  k c f  ^  (labour suPPlv)>
4- Pt — \nP t(bl)1~P +  (1 — n)Pt'(/)1-p] l~p (price index),
5. C]) = L hh+ EPij ^  L hf  +  (budget constraint),
6. V (h =
P t  P t  l + r t
~ P ^  jh f  =  ( d i p )  (l —n)C(
(goods demand for home and export goods market),
P t { h )
lI T
7. Lfl =  Lf)h +  L (total labour demand),
8- I ?  =  (2 ^ y PnC?, L ht * = ( 2 ^ ^ )  \ l - n ) C {
(labour demand for home and export goods market).
This system of equations is almost identical to the system in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996). The only differences occur in the labour supply and demand equations as well as 
in the goods supply equation. We give entrepreneurs monopsonistic power in the labour 
market, thereby reducing the labour demand by a factor of 2p. The reduced supply 
enables the entrepreneurs to charge a mark up th a t is double the one tha t Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996) find. Additionally we allow firms to discriminate in prices between home 
and foreign markets, i.e. they can choose the labour input tha t serves the domestic 
and export markets separately. The consumers’ CES utility function leads to a simple 
mark up pricing by firms. A comparison of the goods and the labour demand functions 
(equation 6 and 8 ) shows that entrepreneurs always set prices tha t are higher by a factor 
of (2^jp) than the production costs. Since the costs of serving the two markets are 
determined by the home wage, the price firms charge in the two countries is the same.
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Effectively a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or a no arbitrage condition holds even 
though it has not been assumed (Epf (h) = ph(h)). This result is proven formally in the 
next lemma .4
Lem m a 1 Purchasing Power Parity (ph = E p f ) holds when prices and wages are flex­
ible, even though firms could price discriminate.
Proof. The firm’s profit maximisation problem is given by 
m&xLHtLHK L hhph(ti) +  (Lh -  Lhh)(pf (h)E) -  wLh 
subject to
(1) inverse goods demands in both countries 
Ph(h) =  (p n r )  " Ph and p f (h) =  ( j f a }  P p f  and
(2 ) labour supply function
wh =  i  L*Ph-
The first order conditions (FOC) are given by
(ph(h) - p ' ( h ) E )  + Lhh& $ - -  L h! E & $  =  0 
and
p f ( h ) E - w - L h^ = 0  
The assumption of the constant elasticity utility function ensures th a t the demand func­
tions are isoelastic.
dph (h) L hh _  T h f  p 9pf (h) L hf _  _ 1  
8 L hh p h(h) n  ^  8 L hf  E pf ( h )  p
Substituting these relations into the second and third terms of the first FOC shows 
that the relative price that ensures the optimal allocation between foreign and home 
market, is given by 
ph{h) = E p f (h).
As long as the first FOC holds, firms set the same price in both  markets. Since this 
holds for all individual prices it is also valid for the price indices. Hence, as long as prices 
are flexible, P P P  holds even though it is not assumed.■
However, we will see in Lemma 5 presented in the next section th a t purchasing power 
parity need not hold if certain prices are sticky.
4This result would hold for any utility function that gives rise to  isoelastic demand functions.
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In an international equilibrium the bond market has to clear, i.e. n B £ = (1 — n) B {  =: 
Bt- The international bond market can be thought of as follows. Consumers submit de­
mand schedules to an international intermediary. These schedules specify how many 
consumption baskets they are willing to lend or borrow for a given interest rate. The 
international intermediary determines the interest ra te  such that the bond market clears 
and collects and delivers the consumption baskets.
It is difficult to determine the steady state of the economy unless we assume that bond 
holdings are internationally balanced. Hence, we adopt the strategy of determining the 
symmetric steady state and later on log-linearise the system of equations of Proposition 
1 around this steady state.
P roposition  2 The symmetric steady state in which the bond holdings are internation­
ally balanced is given by
i fh    r /   ___ _ r if    f l  1 p—1
1  ■ ^ 0  ~  M ) — ° 0  — U 0 ~  y  K  2 p  f
2. r0 = S,
<Q fh  _  i_s_ _  M& -f
Vo -  x  jh  1+6 ~  M fPo>
4 -  W Q  —  2  p  P o  ~  ^ f W 0 ’
r  P  o
/? p . .  —  P a  —  ^ 0
5■ E° ~  Pi ~  ■
Proof. see Appendix. ■
The scale of production is reduced and the real wage is depressed due to  the market 
imperfections inherent in monopolistic goods market and monopsonistic labour markets. 
The real interest rate is entirely determined by the exogenous time preference of the 
agents and the exchange rate depends solely on the relative money supply. Money is 
neutral in this flexible price steady state and does not have any effect on real variables.
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The mark up pQ = 2- ^ j Wq in our model is twice as high as in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996). Because companies are able to use their market power to set wages, they set 
them too low. This in turn leads to a lower scale of production by a factor of y/2.
As mentioned earlier we log-linearise the model around the symmetric steady state. 
x  approximates the percentage change from the symmetric steady state. We drop the 
subscript t  from all equations which apply only within a period.
Lem m a 2 The log-linearized, system of equations around the symmetric steady state 
with B  =  0 is given by
n . h
1. C t + 1 =  C t +  ppp t^ (consumption Euler equation),
2. M f  — p ( = C t — (money demand),
3. L  =  — C + w h — ph (labour supply),
4- p 1 = nf f 1 (h) +  (1 — n)ph( /)  (price index),
5. C  -fp 71 =  L  +  nph(h) +  (1 — n) (p 1 ( / )  + £ ’')+  (budget constraint),\ / c 0
6. L  = ~ p  (ph(h) -pb^J + C  , L = - p  (pf ( f )  -  pf j^ +  C f
(goods demand for home and export market),
^-h  '~~hh ^ h f
7. L — n L  +  (1 — n)L  (total labour demand),
^ h h  - f t  - f t /  , ^ h  \  ^ - f
8. L  = —p (w — p J +  C , L  = —p (w  — p — E )  +  C
(labour demand for home and export market).
The log-linearisation allows us to understand the reaction of the economy to exoge­
nous wealth and money shocks. We will use the equations later in order to determine
the long-run effects of monetary expansions if either wages or prices are sticky in the 
short-term. For convenience we first determine the difference in the growth rates of 
domestic and foreign variables and only later determine the growth rates of individual 
countries’ consumption and production.
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The next proposition states tha t world output, i.e. the aggregate of home and foreign 
output, is independent of the intercountry wealth distribution in the steady state. Any 
change would have to come from a change in the real wages in the two countries. Changes 
in real wages affects the consumption leisure trade-off. However, any percentage increase 
in the home real wage increases production costs and also the foreign price index. This 
in turn  reduces the wage rate abroad. Foreign workers face the same leisure consumption 
trade off and thus they reduce their production. In short, a production increase in one 
country leads to an offsetting effect on output in the other country and thus the world 
production remains the same. This result holds as long as we assume tha t the wage is 
always a constant share of output. This is the case in our model because agents in both 
countries have the same preferences and they have CES utility function for different 
goods.
After an international redistribution of wealth is the distribution of leisure and con­
sumption changes. This is brought about by a change in the terms of trade. The indebted 
country’s products become cheaper abroad, which allow it to sell more goods to make 
interest payments.
P ro p o s itio n  3 A one time redistribution of the bond holdings by dB does not affect 
aggregate world consumption or production but leads to the following permanent changes 
in home consumption, home employment, exchange rate and terms o f trade.
■^w ^w
1. L = C  = 0,
t. = c “ + (i _ „ ) ( c ‘ _ g / ) = 1+ ^ 1 1 ,
^h  -- f
S. L  = L  + (1  - n ) { L  - L  ) = - \ l + r ™ ,
°0
4. E  = M h - M f 1+ p  1 6 d B2p n ( l —n) 1+6 ’
5. f (h) _  = ^ _ E - W f  =
P ro o f. see Appendix. ■
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Home agents consume more as a reaction to an exogenous wealth transfer towards 
the home country. The extent of the increase in consumption depends positively on 
the substitutability of home and foreign goods. Consumption does not change as much 
as the income from bond holdings since agents also choose to work less. The home 
wage rises relative to the foreign wage and the exchange rate falls to lower the price of 
foreign goods at home and to increase the price of home goods abroad. Thus the foreign 
country is able to repay its interest payments. Not surprisingly, an exogenous change in 
the money supply does not affect any real variables. The exchange ra te  moves according 
to the relative money supply in the two countries.
3 .4  T h e  E conom y under N o m in a l R ig id itie s
So far we have kept prices and wages flexible and have found tha t a money supply shock 
has no real effect. It only alters the nominal prices, wages and the exchange rate. In 
other words, with flexible prices and wages, money is “neutral” , and since a money shock 
does not change the dynamics, it is even “super-neutral” .
This result changes fundamentally if we assume tha t price adjustment is sluggish. 
W ith sticky prices a money shock will not only affect the short-run real variables but 
will also cause the economy to settle in a different steady state. We will look at a situa­
tion where in period zero the economy is in the symmetric steady state as described by 
Proposition 2 . A monetary supply shock occurs in period one and nominal wages/prices 
are held fixed for that period. In period two all nominal prices and wages adjust and 
the economy reaches its new steady state. The new steady state can be characterised 
by the new levels of bond holdings and money supplies (B, M h, M?).
We distinguish between three different types of price stickiness:
• nominal retail price stickiness,
• nominal wholesale price stickiness and
• nominal wage stickiness given certain labour market imperfections.
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Retail prices are the prices tha t are paid by the consumers in the two countries. By 
wholesale prices we mean the prices the producers charge in their own currency.
We follow the methodology developed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to derive the 
dynamic equilibrium with nominal rigidities. We log-linearise the system around the 
symmetric steady state to determine the short-term dynamics and to take into account 
the fact tha t certain prices are fixed between period zero and one. We denote the first 
order percentage change of a variable x  in the shock period by x.
The economy reaches its new steady state in period two. As in the previous section 
we denote the percentage deviation between the new steady state and the original sym­
metric steady state by x. After the money shock at the beginning of period one, agents 
adjust their net international bond holdings B  immediately. All variables stay constant 
from period two onward. Bond holdings do not change from period one to period two 
because agents hold their net wealth constant.5 Any steady state of the economy is fully 
characterised by the money supply and the international bond holdings (the only real 
state variables). Therefore, the steady state from period two onwards is the same as the 
steady state under flexible prices if
(1) the money supply changes in the same way, and
(2 ) the bond holdings are exogenously changed to the levels th a t endogenously arise 
under price stickiness.
If one knows the money shock and the endogenous redistribution of bonds, the change 
in period two can be fully characterised by the long-run relationships in Proposition 3.
Because of the intertemporal nature of the model, the short-run solution also involves 
the long-run changes in the variables consumption c, the price index ph and the interest 
rate f. The money demand depends on future price levels and agents want to smooth 
their consumption path. To determine the short-run changes we will hence need the
5 Unlike Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) we define Bt as the face value of the bond. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) denote the bond price by Ft . In their formulation Ft w ould jum p twice since the interest paid 
out in period 2 differs from the steady state interest payments. N evertheless, log-linearisation around 
F =  0 makes the difference of the interest paym ents in the first two steady state periods of second order. 
Hence, it does not enter the calculations in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
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long-run budget constraint and the linearised long-run money demand equation from 
Lemma 2 in addition to the equations in Lemma 3.
Lem m a 3 For a given form  of price/wage stickiness the log-linearized system of equa­
tions around the symmetric steady state with B  =  0 is given by
—h1. C  =  C h +  (consumption Euler equation),
2. M h — ph = C h — pp  ^ — P- (money demand),
3. L h = —C h +  wh — ph (labour supply),
4. ph = nph(h) +  (1 — n)ph( f )  (price index),
5. C h 4-ph = L h +  rvph{h) +  (1 — n) ^E  +  pf{h)^j — (budget constraint),
6. L hh = - p  (;ph(h) -  ph) +  C h, L hf = - p  (pf (h) -  pf )  +  C f  
(goods demand for home and foreign market),
7. L h = n L hh +  (1 — n) Lhf  (total labour demand),
8. (labour demand equations are replaced by equations which va ry  w ith  the fo r m  
o f  price  stickiness).
The labour demand equation in lemma 2 is replaced by ph(h) =  ph(f )  =  0 in the case
of sticky retail prices. Under sluggish wholesale prices, i.e. when prices are sticky in the
producers’ currency, the additional equation is given by ph{h) = p^( f )  = 0. Similarly, if 
wages are sticky, it is given by wh = w? =  0 .
The labour demand equation also varies depending on the form of price stickiness. 
W ith both forms of price stickiness, the monopolists always supply the goods demand 
as long as they earn a positive mark up. The monopolists need not be concerned that 
additional supply reduces the price. The labour demand, therefore, results directly from 
the goods demand equation. In the case of sticky prices, the labour demand is determined 
by the labour supply at this fixed wage.
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Note that the budget constraint in the short-run differs from the long-run budget 
constraint. Fixing the prices or wages leads to a temporary change in real income which 
agents smooth by saving or dissaving in the international bond market.
3 .4 .1  E x ch a n g e  R a te  O v e rsh o o tin g  a n d  U n c o v e r e d  In te r e st  R a te  P ar­
ity
This section illustrates the exchange rate dynamics, purchasing power parity and the 
uncovered interest rate parity under the different forms of price stickiness. The main 
focus is exchange rate overshooting under sticky retail prices, which is different from the 
classical Dornbusch-type overshooting.
The nominal interest rates are the same in period one regardless of the form of price 
stickiness. This is true because we assume a Cobb-Douglas relationship between money 
and consumption. This gives rise to a constant unit consumption elasticity of the money 
demand.
Lemma 4 also shows that the inflation rate from period one to period two has to be 
the same in both countries.
L em m a 4 Both countries always face the same ex ante nominal interest rate ih = i f . 
Furthermore, they experience the same inflation rates between period one and period two. 
That is
P i  p {
P ro o f. In the steady state, the nominal interest rate coincides with the real interest 
rate. Both countries always face the same real interest rate. This is also true in the 
shock period.
Since the real interest rate is identical in both countries and the consumption elas­
ticity is assumed to be unity, it follows tha t the ratio of the consumption levels is the
£jh
same in the shock period and the long run. That is, —^  This in turn implies that
C1 C2
the ratio of home and foreign real balances in period 2 and 1 only depends on relative 
nominal interest rates and not on consumption. Since in the long run both countries 
face the same nominal interest rate, the ratio of the real balances is given by (equation 
2 of Proposition 1 )
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p  ^   i  ^ 1+ i {
P2 M i p {  ~  l+»i i {
Furthermore, any difference in the relative nominal interest rates at home and abroad 
has to result from different inflation rates, because the real rates are the same. Suppose 
now tha t the inflation rate at home were higher than abroad. Because the money supply 
stays constant (M ^  = M %, M {  = M^),  this would mean tha t real balances at home fall 
relative to real balances abroad from period 1 to 2. The left hand side of the equation 
above would be smaller than one. At the same time the higher inflation rate  at home 
would induce a positive nominal interest rate differential in the short term  while the 
nominal interest rate is the same in the long run. This change in the relative interest 
rate would lead to a rise in the real balances held at home relative to  those held abroad 
because the opportunity cost of holding money would fall by more for the home agent 
than for the foreign agent. The right hand side of the above equation would be greater 
than one. This implies that the inflation rates and hence the nominal interest rates have 
to be the same in the two countries. ■
As pointed out earlier the last lemma is due to the assumed Cobb-Douglas utility function 
in money and consumption. The results would change smoothly if we assume a variable 
consumption elasticity of the money demand.
The next lemma analyses whether PPP, which holds under flexible prices, still applies 
when prices are sticky.
Lem m a 5 In the long-run, purchasing power parity (ph = Ep?) holds under any form  
of price stickiness. In the short-run, it still holds under sticky wholesale prices and under 
sticky wages but not under sticky retail prices.
Proof. In the long-run, firms can adjust their prices and the result th a t P P P  holds under 
flexible prices applies (Lemma 1). If prices are not flexible, the first order condition 
becomes irrelevant in the short-term. Nevertheless, it is true tha t P P P  holds under 
sticky wholesale prices. The argument is as follows. P P P  holds in the initial steady 
state because prices and wages are flexible. In the shock period, the relative price of 
the same goods in the home and the foreign market moves only with the exchange rate. 
Hence, the no arbitrage condition continues to hold for each good and, therefore, also
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for the price levels.
This is obviously not true under fixed retail prices because the exchange rate moves 
in the shock period (E  7  ^ 0). It is intuitively easy to understand why the exchange 
jum ps under sticky retail prices. Under sticky retail prices, the price of consumption 
stays constant in the shock period. There is no substitution between home and foreign 
goods. Hence, production is the same in both countries. Now, suppose the exchange 
rate would not move. This would imply tha t home and foreign agents have the same 
real income and, therefore, there is no international borrowing. Consequently, they both 
consume the same amount. Both also face the same nominal interest rates (Lemma 4). 
Given all these symmetries, they would demand the same amount of real money. This 
cannot be an equilibrium because the money supply differs. (For an explicit proof see 
Proposition 6 ). ■
Note tha t the result that monetary shocks would not lead to deviations from PPP  
under wholesale price stickiness is not restricted to our case of CES utility functions over 
the different goods. Only the result tha t PPP  holds in the steady state hinges on CES 
between different goods.
These two lemmas allow us to show tha t both interest rate parity and exchange rate 
overshooting depend on which form of price stickiness is assumed .6
P ro p o s itio n  4 While the exchange rate overshoots its long-run value under sticky retail 
prices, it immediately reaches its new steady state value under sticky wholesale prices as 
well as under sticky wages.
P ro o f. The proof of Lemma 4 states that the nominal interest rate is always the same 
in both counrtries. Using this fact and the equation for the relative change in real money 
holdings - as stated in Lemma 4’s proof - we get =  1- Since P P P  holds both in 
the long run and in the short run under sticky wholesale prices and sticky wages, this
6 B etts and Devereux (1996) also consider a model in which firms price discrim inate between home 
and foreign markets. However, their model is de facto static since th ey  do not allow international 
bond trading. T hey find a one-off jum p in the exchange rate but no overshooting. T he increase in the  
exchange rate exceeds the one in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). T he authors claim th at the difference is 
due to pricing to  market w hile we show that it is due to different forms of price stickiness.
65
equation implies that =  1 , i.e. the exchange rate jumps immediately to its long term 
level. If retail prices are sticky the equation implies that 1^ =  1- T hat is the long run 
exchange rate coincides with the short run exchange rate. ■
Intuitively, under sticky retail prices the exchange rate has to return to its original 
level since P P P  holds in both steady states and inflation from period zero to period two 
is the same in both countries. Prom period zero to period one, inflation is zero due to 
retail price stickiness. Lemma 4 shows that both countries experience the same inflation 
rate from period one to period two.
Both the result tha t the long term exchange rate is not affected by money supply shocks 
under sticky retail prices and that there is no overshooting if one of the other two 
prices are sticky depend on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas relationship between 
real money and consumption. If we instead assume a different consumption elasticity 
of money demand, both results would not hold with strict equality. Nevertheless the 
qualitative insights would still be the same.
P roposition  5 Uncovered nominal interest rate parity holds under sticky wholesale 
prices and sticky wages but is violated under sticky retail prices.
Proof.
The interest rate parity condition in the shock period is given by
i + * ? = % * - ( 1 + 4 )
The proof is self evident from Lemma 4 and Proposition 4. ■
The last proposition illustrates tha t our overshooting phenomenon under sticky retail 
prices also holds, even though the uncovered interest rate parity is violated. This is quite 
distinct to  the classical Dornbusch overshooting literature. UIP as well as long-run PPP 
is necessary for their overshooting result. In our setting the exchange rate overshoots 
exactly then when UIP is violated which is in line with empirical findings. Deviations of 
UIP are surveyed in Engel (1996). Faust and Roger’s (1999) VAR analysis shows that 
huge deviations from UIP occur when the exchange rate overshoots. This is exactly our 
outcome under sticky retail prices.
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3 .4 .2  W in n e r s  an d  L osers o f  an  U n a n tic ip a te d  M o n e y  S h ock
In this section we analyse the impact of an unanticipated money supply shock on the 
two countries’ welfare. As was outlined in the introduction we are specifically interested 
in understanding the spillovers of one country’s monetary policy on the foreign country’s 
welfare. The analysis in this section does not stop at pointing out, under which conditions 
countries could engage in profitable beggar thy neighbour policies. We investigate the 
various welfare responses of monetary expansions under different forms of price stickiness 
and different labour market structures. We focus specifically on the labour market 
because we believe tha t there is relatively broad agreement on how the goods market 
interacts with monetary policy shocks. The same can’t be said of the labour market.
Before we go into the discussion of the distribution of welfare it is useful to  analyse 
what causes the changes of aggregate world welfare after a monetary shock . In the 
flexible price equilibrium (steady state) the economy is not at the Pareto frontier. This 
is due to welfare losses caused monopolistic and monopsonistic distortions. These welfare 
losses can be viewed as the result of a coordination failure. A social planner would set 
wages equal to prices. The outcome would Pareto dominate the steady state outcome in 
Proposition 2. We will see that monetary policy under sticky nominal prices or wages can 
coordinate the agents such that the outcome is Pareto improved. Which monetary action 
is optimal depends on which prices are sticky and which real imperfection causes the 
flexible price equilibrium to be suboptimal. Furthermore we show tha t the distribution 
of the welfare gain or loss between the two countries depends crucially on the set of 
prices or wages which do not adjust. We organise the results as follows. In section
4.2.1 we compare the outcomes under sticky retail and sticky wholesale prices and in 
section 4.2.2 we compare the setting of sticky wholesale prices with the one under sticky 
wages. The reason for this is twofold. First the sticky wholesale price scenario turns 
out to be identical to the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) setting which we regard as our 
reference point in the literature. Second this division allows us to separate different 
issues. In the first section we see that depending on the nominal rigidity there are two 
different channels tha t influence the distribution of an aggregate welfare gain between 
the countries. In the second section we argue that the sticky wholesale price scenario is
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isomorphic to a setting in which wages are set by monopolistic unions. We compare that 
scenario with sticky wages in our economy where firms are the wages setters. We point 
out tha t the structure of the labour market has im portant implications for the welfare 
gains and losses after a money shock, if wages are sticky.
Sticky R etail P rices versus Sticky W holesale P rices
Under sticky prices world welfare is positively affected by an unanticipated positive 
money shock. The increased money supply reduces real prices. At lower real prices, 
consumers demand more goods and producers, having lost their price setting power, are 
willing to meet any demand they face, as long as the money shock is not too big. This 
leads to lower deadweight losses and higher consumer surplus. This is true under both 
forms of sticky prices. In actual fact - as Appendix A.3 illustrates - the response of world 
output is the same. We will see that what differs is the distribution of welfare gains.
Under sticky wholesale prices producers keep only the price in their own currency 
constant. This implies tha t price changes in the short-run are given by ph(h) = p^( f )  = 
0, pJ(h) = —E  ph{f)  = E.  The prices of exported goods change with the exchange rate. 
Under sticky retail prices firms keep prices fixed both in their own and in the foreign 
currency ph(h) = p^{h) = p f  ( / )  =  ph( f )  = 0. This implies tha t the relative price of 
foreign and home goods does not change in either of the two countries.
These differences in price adjustment imply tha t money shocks propagate through 
two different channels.
• If the wholesale prices are held constant and the exchange rate appreciates, home 
produced goods become cheaper relative to foreign produced goods, both at home 
and abroad. As a result consumers substitute home for foreign goods. Because the 
price is fixed in the currency of the producer the revenue per unit revenues for a 
firm are the same for sales abroad and at home.
• Under sticky retail prices consumers have no reason to substitute one good for the 
other since the prices they face do not change. Suppose the exchange rate de­
preciates immediately. Under sticky retail prices the depreciation allows domestic
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exporters to earn more in their own currency per unit exported than per unit sold 
domestically. They sell their products at the same foreign retail price and convert 
the revenues into the home currency at a more favourable exchange rate. Their 
unit price for exported goods increases in real terms as well since the domestic 
consumer prices do not change. For foreigners, who export to the home country, 
an increase in the exchange rate reduces their returns in the foreign currency and 
in real terms.
As we will see, these differing propagation mechanisms have im portant implications 
for consumption and production abroad and at home. Consequently, the welfare impli­
cations of a money supply increase differ substantially. To highlight the effects more 
clearly let us assume for the rest of this subsection that only the home country expands 
its money supply while the foreign money supply stays constant. Since we are mainly 
interested in the qualitative differences the explicit calculations are stated in the Appen­
dix A.4 and A.5. Instead we show in Figure 1 the impulse response function under the 
two different assumptions on the pricing behaviour.
The differences in short term  consumption rates can be easily understood if we keep 
in mind tha t the nominal interest rate has to be the same in the two countries to keep 
the money markets in equilibrium (Lemma 4). This implies th a t the difference in short 
term consumption growth rates must be entirely determined by the difference in the real 
money balances given the money demand equations. Under sticky retail prices home 
real money balances change by M h, while foreign balances do not change at all, because 
the consumption price indices do not change. Hence, home consumption goes up by as 
much as money and foreign consumption stays constant. In short, all the additional 
demand occurs at home. In contrast, under sticky wholesale prices the home price index 
rises due to the depreciation of the exchange rates, which makes imported goods more 
expensive. This causes real balances to rise by less tha t the money supply. That is 
why home consumption grows less than under sticky retail prices. Foreign real money 
balances increase because imports become cheaper. Hence while, foreign consumption 
stays constant under sticky retail prices it rises under sticky wholesale prices.
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The ordinate measures the respective % increase relative to the % increase in money.
Figure 3.1: Sticky Prices in the Consumers’ and in the Producers’ Currency: Impulse 
Response Functions.
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between home and foreign produced goods in either of the two countries means that the 
labour input has to increase by equal amounts in both countries. Under sticky wholesale 
prices home goods become cheaper in both countries and leads to an increase in home 
output relative to foreign output.
Under sticky prices the additional income which is necessary to afford the higher 
consumption comes from the reduced deadweight losses mentioned above. Having seen 
how production and consumption reacts in the two countries it is obvious tha t the 
distribution of the gains depends strongly on the exact type of price stickiness. Under 
sticky retail prices the real export revenues per unit increase for home and decrease for 
foreign residents for the reasons mentioned above. This enables home residents both to 
consume more than their foreign counterpart without working harder. Home residents 
lend to the foreign country, because their short term  income is higher than in the long run, 
while the opposite is true for foreigners. Under sticky wholesale prices the relative price 
of foreign and home produced goods can change which leads to  substitution as explained 
above. Relative income between home and foreign residents changes due to relative 
changes in per unit revenues per unit as well as changes in the quantity adjustments 
in production. For foreigners the real price of their imports per unit decreases. Hence, 
their real income resulting from their production activity, increases. This allows them 
to participate in the aggregate world efficiency gain. Although home residents earn in 
real terms less for each unit exported, their real income rises as well, since they increase 
their production by a lot.
The changes in the long run are essentially determined by the short term capital 
flows. Because money is neutral in the long run, all real variables only depend on the 
bond holdings in the two countries. Under both forms of price stickiness home citizens 
lend money to foreign residents because in terms of income the home country is always 
the main beneficiary of the monetary expansion. The effect is stronger under sticky retail 
prices than it is under sticky wholesale prices. In the long run the borrowing country 
will pay the interest on the short term  borrowing. To be less (foreign) or better (home) 
off in the long run has an effect on both labour input and consumption because agents 
equalise the marginal utility of leisure and the marginal utility of consumption. Foreign
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producers not only work harder to pay the interest but also consume less. Home citizens 
spend this additional (interest) income not only for additional consumption but they 
also work less.
W hat do these dynamics imply for the change in welfare? Since the impact of a 
money supply shock in our model under sticky wholesale prices is the same as the one 
in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), we find that agents in both countries are equally well off. 
Both experience the same welfare gain. Under sticky retail prices this is certainly not 
true. Foreigners consume always weakly less than before but work strictly more. Thus 
they must be worse off than initially. Home agents benefit from the increased consumer 
surplus fully. They are better off than  in the case of sticky wholesale prices.
In short, the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ strategy is surely optimal in a setting with 
sluggish retail prices.
T he R ole o f th e  Labour M arket under Sticky W ages
The effect of wage stickiness on the response of open economies to money supply shocks 
crucially depends on the structure of the labour market. We show that, if nominal wages 
are sticky, a monetary expansion can have either an expansionary or a contradictary 
effect on output.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) consider a labor market which is dominated by trade 
unions. In their model there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive trade unions. 
Each trade union represents a certain type of worker. Trade unions compete monopo­
listically with each other. The labor demand is determined by the production function 
of the firms that would like to employ a certain fraction of each type of worker. Firms 
are wage-takers, whereas trade unions have some monopolistic power. As Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996) pointed out, the effect of wage stickiness is analogous to the case of sticky 
wholesale prices, which we analysed in the Section 4.1.2. A model with monopolistic 
trade unions is identical to a model with monopolistic firms. Instead of firms which re­
strict the output in order to keep the goods price high, trade unions restrict their labour 
supply in order to keep the real wage rate high. More to the point the reaction to an 
unanticipated money shock of our economy under sticky wholesale prices is exactly the
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same as the reaction of the Obstfeld-Rogoff economy with sticky wages and monopolis­
tic unions. That is why in this section we interpret the outcome under sticky wholesale 
prices as a sticky wage economy, in which workers’ unions have the market power in the 
labour market.
As pointed out before we consider a description of the labour market as being dom­
inated by monopolistic unions at least questionable as an accurate description of how 
wages are set. In order to contrast this outcome and to highlight the importance of the 
labour market structure we deliberately chose the other extreme. In our setting, firms 
are monopsonists in the labour market, i.e. they take into account the fact tha t the 
wage rate increases if they demand more labour. Workers - who are now not represented 
by trade unions - just take the wage level as given. As pointed out before this kind of 
setting is often used in labour economics.
The response of an economy with monpsonistic firms and sticky wages are in sharp 
contrast to the outcome of monopolistic unions and sticky wages. The scale of the 
economy is not demand determined like it is in the case with monopolistic unions but 
restricted by the labour supply. The labour demand equation is replaced by an assump­
tion of fixed wages (wh = w? =  0). These equations together with Lemma 3 allow us 
to determine the dynamics explicitly. Since we are only interested in the qualitative 
differences we state the exact results in the Appendix A.6 . The im portant differences 
can be seen from Figure 2. It shows the impulse response functions to an unanticipated 
positive home money supply shock of consumption and production at home and abroad 
and of the terms of trade and the exchange rate. To highlight the importance of the 
labour market we plot for comparison the impulse responses of an economy with sticky 
wholesale prices - now interpreted as a sticky wage economy where trade unions set 
wages.
If firms set wages, increasing the home money supply causes upward price pressure 
at home. Due to the stickiness of nominal wages, higher consumer prices result in 
lower real wages. Workers substitute consumption for leisure and work fewer hours. 
The resulting contraction in the production of home-made products has at least two 



















  sticky wholesale prices ( monopolistic trade unions)
--------- sticky wages (monopsonistic firms)
The ordinate measures the respective % increase relative to the % increase in money.
Figure 3.2: Monopolistic and Monopsonistic Labour Markets: Impulse Response Func­
tions.
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income, they try  to borrow from abroad and, therefore, push up the interest rate. Second, 
home-produced goods become more expensive. Consumers substitute them for imported 
foreign products. Therefore there is more demand for foreign products and, hence, for 
foreign currency which results in a higher exchange rate.
Though a high exchange rate should make imported home-produced goods cheaper 
abroad, the opposite happens because the price ph(ti) skyrockets. The calculations of 
the terms of trade highlight this. Consequently, foreign consumers also substitute home- 
produced goods with foreign goods. Higher demand for their foreign products and higher 
prices for the imported goods increases their price index too. Foreigners reduce their 
consumption in favour of more savings. They lend a larger amount to the home citizens. 
The high real interest rates in period one makes it worthwhile for them to reduce their 
consumption but to keep their production constant, even though the real wages decline 
abroad too. This short term dynamics is in sharp contrast to impact on the money 
shock under sticky wholesale prices, which we have argued coincides with the dynamics 
with monopolistic trade unions. While the world output increases after a positive home 
money supply shocks if unions set wages, it decreases if it is firms which set wages. And 
while the short term  capital flow is from the home country to the foreign country in the 
first case, capital flows from the foreign country to the home country in the latter case.
Because the short term capital flows go into different directions and the real variables 
in the long term  are solely determined by the countries’ asset position, the long run differs 
substantially as well. If firms set wages, foreigners will receive interest payments in the 
form of home-produced goods from period two onward. Therefore, in the long-run, 
production at home has to increase whereas consumption declines. The opposite is true 
abroad. This is almost the mirror image to what happens in the long run if unions set the 
wage. Note that the monopsonistic labour market setting with sticky wages replicates 
the empirical regularity known as the J-curve effect. Empirically it is often found that 
after an exchange rate appreciation the trade balance becomes negative for a while 
before bouncing back and leading to a long-run trade balance surplus. In period one 
the exchange rate and the trade balance are negatively correlated. However the J-curve 
effect is also often claimed to be associated with a short term  negative correlation between
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the terms of trade and the trade balance (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994). In our 
model even if firms set prices this correlation is positive, because prices overcompensate 
the nominal depreciation. This causes the terms of trade to appreciate although the 
nominal exchange rate depreciates. In welfare terms both the home country and the 
foreign country are worse off after an unanticipated monetary expansion at home.
To understand why the two different structures of the labour market give rise to very 
different dynamics it is im portant to think about how the money shock changes real and 
nominal wages.
The overall impact of a money expansion depends on whether the steady state wage 
rate is above or below the wage rate in a world without any labour market distortions. 
In the economy with trade unions the real and the nominal wage level is higher than 
the non-distortionary wage. We define the non-distortionary nominal wage as the equi­
librium wage that would prevail if there were no imperfections in the labor market and 
both firms and workers were wage takers. This wage level is an im portant benchmark. 
A positive money supply shock raises the efficient non-distortionary nominal wage level 
while the actual nominal wage is fixed. In the setting with monopolistic unions, the gap 
between the paid nominal wage and the non-distortionary wage level, given the increased 
money supply, is reduced for one period. This leads to a more efficient outcome with 
higher output.
In contrast to the setting with unions the steady state nominal wage in a monop­
sonistic labour market is too low in comparison to the non-distortionary wage level 
defined above. A positive money supply shock increases the non-distortionary efficient 
wage level. Yet the nominal wage remains the same due to nominal wage stickiness. 
In other words, the gap between the wage level actually paid in the economy and the 
non-distortionary wage level widens. Consequently, output shrinks. This is the exact 
opposite effect to the one obtained in a setting where the labour market is dominated 
by trade unions.
Instead of looking at ‘nominal wages relative to  total money supply, the difference 
between both settings can also be illustrated using the real shadow price of leisure.
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This shadow price reflects the marginal unit of consumption necessary to compensate 
the worker for an additional marginal disutility of labour. In a world without trade 
unions, this shadow price coincides with the real wage rate. Specifically, we define the 
non-distortionary real wage as the wage that would prevail if there are no distortions 
in the labour market. In a setting with trade unions the real wage is higher than the 
non-distortionary shadow real wage. A positive monetary shock increases the price of 
consumption, while the nominal wage is fixed and thus it lowers the real wage. The real 
wage comes closer to the non-distortionary real wage. This leads the economy closer 
to the efficient level, to more production and higher welfare. On the other hand, in an 
economy where firms are monopsonists, the real shadow price of labour coincides with 
the real wage and is lower than the non-distortionary wage. A positive monetary shock 
again raises the price of consumption and leads to lower real wages. Since the real wage 
was already too low, the economy moves even further away from the non-distortionary 
level and output contracts.
This discussion highlights the point that in any labour market setting the effect of a 
money supply shock on output depends crucially on whether the steady state real wage 
rate is above or below the non-distortionary wage rate.
3.5 C onclusion
The main message of this chapter is that the form of price stickiness matters. Given the 
empirical regularities like the violation of PPP  in the short-run and of the uncovered 
interest rate parity etc., it seems plausible that the stickiness of retail prices is very 
important. Retail price stickiness leads to the large spillover effects and reinstates the 
“beggar thy neighbour” policy. This analysis also provides an argument for an inter­
national coordination of monetary policy to prevent monetary authorities from getting 
into a race of competitive devaluations. In our setting sticky retail prices also lead 
to exchange rate overshooting even though the UIP is violated. Therefore it provides a 
qualitatively different explanation of exchange rate overshooting from Dornbusch (1976).
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This chapter also illustrates tha t the effect of a monetary expansion on the world econ­
omy depends crucially on the structure of the labour m arket if wages are sticky. It 
suggest tha t if wage stickiness is im portant than we need to think carefully about the 
structure of the labour market. While there is widespread agreement tha t firms enjoy 
monopolistic power in the goods market, there is much less agreement how to model 
the labour market. Some further extensions are left for future research. It would be in­
teresting to extend the analysis to a setting where monetary shocks occur with positive 
probabilities. An analysis along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) seems promis­
ing. We did not cover the case of asymmetric forms of price stickiness, such as when 
wholesale prices are sticky in the home country while abroad retail prices do not adjust. 
Some interesting insights might emerge from such an analysis. Introducing productivity 
shocks bundled with a certain form of price stickiness might lead to slightly different 
results, especially when the monetary policy cannot adjust immediately and lags the 
productivity shocks. Another worthwhile extension would be to  find an appropriate em­
pirical test that allows us to discriminate between different forms of price stickiness and 
to empirically estimate their relative importance.
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Annex A
A .l  P roof o f  P roposition  2
Let us assume that labour and consumption are identical in the two countries. The 
consumption Euler equation as usual determines the real interest rate 
r = 8.
The budget constraint in the symmetric steady state is given by
C h _  Ph{h) L h h +  E p f ( h)  L hf
ph ph
Since the no arbitrage condition holds, it simplifies to 
C h - ? ^ L h.p n
The labour market equilibrium and the world goods market equilibrium imply 
L h h  +  L h f  =  L h  =  L f  =  L f f  +  L f h
and
L h h  +  i l ^ p l L f h  =  C b  =  C f  =  L f f  +  j J 2- ^ L h f .
The last two equations imply that 
n L hf =  (1 -  n ) U h.
Since the capital account is balanced by assumption the current account has to be 
balanced
n L hfEp f (h) -  (1 -  n ) L fhph( f )  =  0. 
which implies tha t the terms of trade are zero 
ph( h ) - p f ( f ) E  = 0.
This implies for the price index tha t
p h ,  _  ph(h).
The labour supply equation together with the mark up formula and the budget constraint 
implies the scale of production
Lh = s J W f = v .
The money demand equation is given by
n h _  M h l s  
p  x  L h l+<5
Dividing this by the foreign equivalent leads to
rp _  _  p h ( h )  _  m ^l m
p f  p f  (/) M f  '
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A .2 P roo f o f P roposition  3
Taking the differences of the linearised equations of home and foreign variables allows 
us to write these as a function of the exogenous wealth transfer dB.
o /or   /nr   1+P 1 S_ dB
°  °  ~  2p n ( l - n ) l + t f ^ J >
3. L h -~L  =  1 52 n ( l - n )  ’
M h ~ M f _  1+p 1 g dB
2p n ( l - n )  l+<5 ^  ’
Adding the labour supply functions weighted by the country size and using the price 
levels leads to
'■'W ^  f
L  := n L  +  (1 -  n)L  = - n C  -  (1 - n ) C  = - C  .
Since world production and world consumption has to be equal it follows tha t
^  W
L = C = 0.
The changes of consumption and labour are derived from
h  ^  i n  ^  h  ^  f
C = C  + (1  - n ) ( C  - C  ) =
t  = T  + (1 -  n)(L  -  L )  = ■
A .3 P roof for Short-term  W orld C hanges
Adding the consumption Euler equations weighted by the country size leads to
rmi  _  S ~
°  “  1+6r -
Calculate the world long-term and short-term money demand functions 
M w := n M h +  (1 — n ) M f  = C  + np +  (1 — n)p  (long-term),
M w +  |  (nph +  (1 — n)pQ  — Cw =  (nph -f (1 — n)pf'j — (short-term).
Substituting the long-term relationship into the short-term one leads to 
(«±1) M » -  c» =  (« f i)  (nph +  (1 -  n) f f )  -  ^ .
This relationship can be used to determine the short-term growth rates of world 
consumption in the three cases.
• sticky wages
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Use the labour supply to replace the short-term price changes 
(ff±i) M w - C w =  (£±±) [ ~ C W -  L w) +  
and finally since C w = Lw,
C w = - M w.
sticky retail prices
retail prices do not change in the short-term, hence 
( ^ ) M W - 
Cw = M w.
C w = ^  or
•  sticky wholesale prices
( m )  r  -  < >  =  (£±i) (nph +  (1  -  n)pf) +  
and, hence, again
cw = m w. m
A .4 D ynam ics u n d e r  S ticky  R e ta il P rice s
P ro p o s itio n  6 Under sticky retail prices, money supply shocks give rise to an endoge­
nous change in international net bond holdings given by
d B  2 p ( l +6 )
c %  ( i + p ) s
n (1 - n ) M h - M f
Changes in each country’s consumption, production, exchange rates and terms of trade 
are given by
• in the short-run 
C h = M h,
L h =  M w — n M h +  (1 -  n ) M f ,
E -  ( 1 +  ( l i f e )
Wh -  E - W f  = — TT~f~
M h  - M f
M h -  M f(i+p)6
r = -  M w,
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in the long-run
C  =  (1 - n )
'h
M h - M f
M h - M fL  = - ( 1 ^ ( 1 - " )
f  =  0,
p 1 {h) - E  ( f )  = p l(h) - f { f )  = M h - M f
 1 * j p   J __w — E  — w = l +p M h - M f
ph = n M h +  (1 — n ) M f .
Proof. We first subtract the foreign short-term equilibrium equations from their home 
counterparts using Lemma 3. We do not impose sticky retail prices at this stage because 
we will use these equations in the proofs for sticky wholesale prices and sticky wages. 
Therefore, we have
L h -  i / )  =  - p  {(ph -  pr ) +  [p! {h) -  ph( f  ))] (demand),
1 dB
n) l+<5 c £ —ph( f ) +  pf{h)  +  E  (budget constraint), 
(^Mh — Mf ' j  — (iph — p f)  =- |'C h — Cf' j  — j;(ph —p?) +  \( f ih —p*) (money demand),
^C h — Cf^j = ^ C  — C  ^ (consumption Euler equation),
(ph — pf )  = — ( c h — Cf ^  — ^Lh — L f j^ +  (wh — w f)  (labour supply).
Additionally we need the difference between the long-term budget constraints and 
the long-term money demand equations for the reasons outlined in section 4. We use
the fact that PPP  always holds in the long-run (Lemma 1). Thus
i h - A  ( ~ h
C - C  -  L  - L  - S dBn ( l - n )  l+<5 C q
straint),
^M h — Mf^j  — E  = ^ C — C  ^ (money demand)
—ph( f )  +  E  + p*(h) (budget con-
L  - L  = - p —pH(f)  +  E  +  ~p (h) (long-term demand).
Under the sticky retail price scenario, we know from the proof of Proposition 5 that 
the exchange rate does not change in the long-run (E =  0). Prom the long-run money 
demand equation and the consumption Euler equation, we conclude that the change in 
both periods consumption is proportional to the change in the money supply
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( c *  -  c Q  =  ( c h -  C-f) =  ( M h - M f y
Substituting this last equation and the long-run demand equation into the long-run 
budget constraint we arrive at
=  (1 - P )  [ - ? * ( /)  + ^  +  $ , (h) .
Using the expression for the long-term change in the terms of trade that is given in 
Proposition 3, we can derive the change in net international bond holdings.
Substituting this equation into the equations of Propostion 3 we can calculate all the 
long-run changes of the variables.
For the differences in the short-run, we see from the short-term demand function 
that under sticky retail prices their is no substitution between foreign and home goods. 
Thus,
(L h -  V )  =  0.
Using the relative short-term changes in consumption, price levels and production it 
is easy to see from the labour supply that
(wh - w f ) =  (.M h - M f ).
We can now derive the short-term change in the exchange rate given the short-term 
budget constraint .
Having derived the differences in short-run changes abroad and at home we use the 
change in world aggregates, given by Appendix A.3 to calculate the changes in the 
individual countries. The methodology is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3. ■
A .5 D ynam ics under Sticky W holesale Prices
P roposition  7 Under sticky wholesale prices money supply shocks give rise to an en­
dogenous change in international net bond holdings given by
d B  _  2 ( p - l ) ( l + S ) n (i - n ) M h  - M f
Changes in each country’s consumption, production, exchange rates and terms of trade 
are given by
• in the short- run
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C h = P { S ( P + i ) + J n } - ( l - n ) [ ( l  + P)S] ^ h + ( 1 _  n) 2P + ( P + %  M f ,  
P [(/° + 1 ) ^  +  2] p [{p +  1)5 +  2]
<1 <i
L h = ^ ( P + l )  +  2n] +  ( l - n ) [ 2 P2] f i K  _ (1 _  n)  2 T-l ) --  M f ,
p [(p +  1)5 +  2] (/? -1- 1)5 +  2
  <5(p+l)+2p
P ( ( l + P ) ^ + 2 )
> 1
M h — M f
<0
= E,
ph( h ) - E - p f ( f )  = - E ,
w — E  — vjf = 2^ 2 (6+i)+(p- i)£
p((p+ i )<5+2)
M h - M f
C w = L W = M w, 
f  =  -  (1±*) M w,
• m the long-run 
-h
■   j _________________________
p (p+l)<5+2 M h - M f
(p+l)<5+2
-  E - f f ( f )
~E =  (  ( p + 1 ) 6 + 2p  A 
Vp((p+1)<5+2) /
—- TJJ ' - 'I D
C = L  =0 .
M h  - M f
^  % —fw — E  — w _  (p-i)g p((p+l)^+2) M h - M f
M h - M f = E,
P ro o f. We again use the differences of the short and long-run changes derived at the 
beginning of the proof for sticky retail prices. Under sticky wholesale prices, we can 
make use of the results tha t PPP  also holds in the short-run and th a t the exchange rate 
immediately reaches its long-term value (E = E).
Substituting the goods and money demand equation into the budget constraint, both 
for the long and short-run we derive
M h _  M f  \  _  E  =  (p -  1)E -  T,()'_n) (short-term budget),
V  -  M f )  -  E  =  (long-term).
From these two equations we derive the change in the international bond holdings 
and the change in the exchange rate.
P  _  (  S (p + l )  +  2p \  T y r h  j yr f
E  ~  [ p ( ( 1 + p)6 + 2 ) )  M  M
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dB _  2 ( p - l )  (1 x
Cfr ~  (p+l)<5+2 v M h -  M f  (1 +  5).
Just like in the sticky retail price scenario we can derive all the long-run changes 
using Proposition 3.
We can derive the short-term difference in production from the short-term demand 
equation using the expression for the exchange rate. Thus,
Lh - B  = ( t S )  [ B h ~  M f  .
The short-term difference in consumption can then be read from the short-term 
budget constraint.
C h _ C f  = ( M h - M f\P((l+p)^+2)
Finally, the relative change in wages can be calculated using the labour supply equa­
tion.
M h - M f
Having derived the differences in short-run changes abroad and at home, we use 
the change in world aggregates, given by Appendix A.3 to calculate the changes in the 
individual countries. The methodology is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3. ■ 
A .6  D y n am ics  u n d e r  S ticky  W ages w ith  M o n o p so n is tic  F irm s
P ro p o s itio n  8  Under sticky wages money supply shocks give rise to an endogenous 
change in international net bond holdings given by
dB _  2 (p - l ) ( l+ g )  ( , _
c£ \ P ~  r ) ( \  _  ^(l+p)<5+2 n VA n ) M h — M f
Changes in each country’s consumption, production, exchange rates and terms of trade 
are given by
• in the short- run 
Ch = — ^ n  +  (1 — n) P ~  1 (P +  1)5
p (p +  1 ) <5 +  2
M h- (  1 - n ) ( l -  ^ ^  M>,  
K > \  p {p + l ) S  + 2 )
<0 <0
L h = —M h,
E = { ^  + eT - ^ ^ ) [ M h - M f  
Ph( h ) - E - p f {f) = ± \ M h - M f
= E,
M h - M f
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L w =  c”  =  —M “ , 
f  =  ( i± i)  M »,
in t h e  l o n g - r u n
i h = £ $ r ^ - n )
M h - M f
E  — ( 14- £iT_f£±U£_\
*  -  \ L +  p ( P +1 )S + 2J
ph(h) - E - f f {f)
L  = C  = 0 .
M h - M f  
M h - M f = E,
(p - 1 )
p ( p + l ) 6 + 2 p
M h - M f
P ro o f. We again use the differences in short-term changes tha t have been derived at 
the beginning of the proof for changes under sticky retail prices. Just like under sticky 
wholesale prices, we can make use of the facts that P P P  holds in the short-run and 
that the exchange rate does not overshoot (Proposition 5). The crucial difference under 
sticky wages is that the scale of production is determined by the labour supply rather 
than by the demand.
Using the differences in the long-run money demand equation and the short-run 
labour supply equations, we can derive the short-term change in labour. Thus,
[ M h Mf ' j  = [o'1 -  cf ] +  E  = -  ( L h -  I / ) .
The short-run terms of trade change can be read from the difference in the short-term 
goods demand equation. Thus,
(m a - M l ) = p  (ph{h) -  E - p t ( f ) ) .
The difference between the two short-term budget constraints leads to 
(<> -  C l )  =  - e ?  (M 1* -  M l )  -  ■
The difference between the long-run budget constraints can be w ritten as 
■~h - A
C - C \ =   L S dB
2p n ( l - n )  l+ £  ‘
We derive the change in the bond holdings and the change in consumption, by sub­
stituting the last two equations into each other. Thus,
djs _  2 ( p - l ) ( l + S )  \
c £  ~  { i + p ) 6 + 2  n ) M h - M f
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P s + 2 j + i
M h - M f
Just like in the sticky price scenarios, the long-term changes can now be calculated 
using Proposition 3.
The change in the exchange rate can be read from the long-run money demand 
equation using the change in consumption. It is
E =  1 + £zl.p 5+2
p + i
M h - M f
Having derived the differences in short-run changes abroad and at home, we use 
the change in world aggregates, given by Appendix A.3 to calculate the changes in the 
individual countries. The methodology is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3. ■
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Chapter 4
W inners and Loser o f M oney  
Supply Shocks in Open  
Econom ies
4.1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter investigates the welfare effects of unanticipated monetary shocks on dif­
ferent agents in an open economy. Agents differ not only because they live in different 
countries, but also because they have different esposures to foreign trade. While all of 
them have the same preferences for consumption some agents draw their income from 
activities tha t produce tradable goods, while others draw their income from activities 
that produce nontradable goods. Most research in the literature assumes that agents 
are able to pool risks inside a country. In contrast we assume the reverse in this chapter 
i.e. agents cannot pool risks across sectors.
Monetary shocks affect the trade balance and the exchange rate. How the shock 
affects different agents, depends on the agents’ exposure to trade. This link to the inter­
national price of a currency often gives rise to debates inside countries about the optimal 
monetary policy. This is true both in developing countries and in OECD countries and 
the importance seems to depend only on the openness of the economy. Americans in
general appear to be happy with a strong dollar, while in Britain the industrial lobbies 
always argue for a weaker exchange rate. Most industries maintain that they are sub­
stantially hurt by a high exchange rate and put pressure on authorities to change the 
terms of trade.
Lobbying efforts about the exchange rate are usually directed towards the central 
bank rather than  the government, even though the government might actually have as 
much influence on the exchange rate through its fiscal policy. Central Banks are under 
constant pressure to raise or to lower interest rates to influence the exchange rate. The 
task of monetary policy makers is not made easier by the fact tha t they have to form 
their assessment of monetary conditions based partly on forward looking indicators that 
rely on information provided by exactly those lobby groups. It is therefore important 
to understand the motivation of different interest groups and how movements in the 
real exchange rate affect them. This chapter is a first step in tha t direction. It traces 
the impact of monetary shocks on the welfare of two different sectors of the economy, 
the producers of tradable goods and of nontradable goods. Other groups that might be 
interesting to analyse would be agents tha t draw their income from labour and agents 
that draw their income from capital holdings.
The analysis uses an adaption of the two country sticky price model, developed by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The assumption of sticky prices in the short run allows 
monetary policy to have real effects which is crucial for the topic of this chapter. As in 
the original Obstfeld and Rogoff paper, this analysis too has an im portant shortcomming 
- money supply shocks are assumed to occur with zero probability.
However, the model in this chapter departs from the classic model in two ways. 
Firstly it assumes tha t there are goods which are inherently nontradable and secondly 
it does not assume that each country has a representitive agent. Instead it assumes 
that agents either draw their income from activities th a t are tradable or activities that 
are nontradable. We also assume tha t agents are unable to pool the risk of monetary 
shocks across sectors as well as across countries. In the core part of the investigation 
we assume th a t agents are never able to change the sector in which they are working. 
In addition we to not allow agents to diversify the sectoral risk through asset holdings.
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Obstfeld and Rogoff on the other hand only assumed tha t agents could not pool their 
risk internationally. The assumption tha t agents can never change the sector they work 
in is certainly extreme. To analyse the robustness of the results we allow agents in the 
last section to switch sectors in the long run.
There are some econometric studies that have analysed the impact of sectoral shocks 
on employment. These studies are not directly related as they don’t distinguish between 
sectoral shocks such as technology shocks or changes in tastes and macro shocks that 
might differ in their impact on sectors. Furthermore they usually concentrate on the 
impact of the sectoral reallocative shock onto aggregate employment. Still, the evidence 
sheds some light on frictions in the labour market as it suggests tha t movement between 
sectors is far from smooth. Lilien (1982) constructed the time series of the standard 
deviation of rates of change in employment across eleven sectors for the US economy and 
showed th a t this timeseries is highly poitively correlated w ith unemployment for postwar 
United States. This work was extended by Davis (1987) with similar conclusions. Times 
of high unemployment seem to coincide with times of high dispersion in employment 
rates, suggesting that labour mobility across sectors is not instantaneous. Topel (1986) 
also argued that much of the adjustment in labour markets occurs on the entry side of the 
labour market. Newcomers to the labour market are much faster to respond to sectoral 
shocks than incumbants. This suggests that there are considerable costs involved for 
workers who switch sectors, once they have built up a reputation and experience inside 
a sector. Jovanovic and Moffit report much higher mobility of workers across sectors 
looking at gross flows but find tha t most of this mobility is probably related to match 
specific factors rather than to sectoral shocks. They aggregate the economy into only 
three sectors. Much of their mobility might hence also be agents moving between similar 
kind of jobs in different sectors.
There are actually surprisingly few studies on the impact of real exchange rate move­
ments on employment levels in different industries and basically none that study the im­
pact on consumption of employees in different sectors. Branson and Love (1988) study 
the response of US manufacturing employment and output to exchange rate movements 
and conclude tha t the impact is significant, despite the US being a relatively closed
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economy. Campa and Goldberg (1998) in contrast find th a t real depreciations or ap­
preciations have little impact on employment in the US but instead trigger a response 
in real wages. Their study is based on relatively aggreagated data  (2digit industries) 
and this aggregation might conceal some of the employment movement. Revenga (1992) 
uses im port prices on selected three and four digit US manufacturing industries and con­
centrates on import competing sectors. She finds large employment effects. According 
to her estimates, a roughly 40% real appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and 1985 
lowered employment in import-competing industries by 4.5%-7.5%. Gourinchas (1998) 
studies the exchange rate response of US manufacturing gross job flows at the four digit 
level. The results are actually not directly relevant for the issue addressed in this paper 
because Gourinchas studies the effect of exchange rate shocks tha t he can’t  attribute 
to supply or monetary shocks while this paper is concerned with the effect of monetary 
shocks. Using industry specific real exchange rates the author identifies employment 
semi elasticities from the cross section of industries and compares the result for export, 
import competing and nontraded manufacturing industries. The results indicate a 0.3% 
increase in tradable employment growth in the two quarters following a 1 0 % real appre­
ciation. He also shows tha t in terms of net employment there appears little difference 
between the impacts of exchange rate changes on tradable and nontradable sectors. Sur­
prisingly in his specification monetary shocks have no significant impact on employment 
levels in any sector, which is at odds with much of the literature on monetary shocks, 
that has been done on less disaggregated data (see chapter 2). In a subsequent paper 
Gourinchas (1999) studies similar questions for France, a much more open economy with 
less flexible labour markets. According to that study a 1 % appreciation increases job 
destruction by 0.24% and decreases job creation by 0.71% resulting in a loss of 35 000 
jobs in the tradable sector. Just like in the US the author finds tha t import competing 
industries are more affected than exporting industries. Little is known about the impact 
on employment in nontradable sectors. This is probably because the effect is less direct 
as it is not working through a change in the competitive position but through changes 
in aggreagate demand. This transmission is therefore more difficult to identify.
While the empirical research has focussed solely on employment the ultim ate aim of
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this chapter is the analysis of the welfare effects of money supply shocks on tradable and 
nontradable industries. Conventional wisdom has it tha t it is the tradable producers 
who benefit the most from competitive devaluations brought about by money supply 
expansions. This chapter argues that this perception could be misplaced. Instead it 
depends on the type of nominal rigidity that prevails in the economy, i.e. whether it 
is prices or wages which don’t adjust to changes in the money supply. Moreover it 
also depends on the degree of sectoral mobility. If wages or prices in the producers’ 
currency are sticky and there is little mobility across sectors, nontradable producers 
might actually gain more from a competitive devaluation. This is because the monetary 
expansion has a larger effect on domestic demand than on foreign demand and as a result 
benefits the nontradable producers in the home country more than the tradable ones. 
Furthermore the wealth effect that is smoothed over time leads to a permanent change 
in terms of trade, which benefits the nontradable producers more than the tradable 
producers. This additional distributional effect depends crucially on sectoral mobility. 
If mobility across sectors is costless, this effect disappears. Thus for economies with 
higher mobility, tradable producers gain relative to nontradable producers. If prices are 
sticky in the consumers’ currency rather than in the producers’ currency, producers of 
tradables always benefit the most from an unanticipated money expansion.
Another issue is developed in the chapter as an add-on. We investigate how the fact 
that different groups in a society can’t pool the risk to exchange rate movements across 
sectors affects the reaction of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks. Thus 
the chapter explores the research of Hau (1998) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) further. 
Hau (1998) showed that the size of the impact of monetary shocks on the exchange rate 
can be falling with the degree of openess of the economy. The main intuition is tha t 
for a given change in the capital account after a money supply shock, needed to  ensure 
equilibrium in the money market, the exchange rate has to move more for less open 
economies to create the required offset in the current account. This is because with 
fewer goods available to be exported or imported the price of these tradable goods has 
to move more to create the price incentives that instigate the required higher changes 
in volumes of trade flows of a single good. In contrast other authors have argued that
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exchange rate volatiltiy causes many companies to refrain from international trade, thus 
emphasizing the opposite causality. If both of these channels were at work globally - 
strengthening each other - it is difficult to see how there could be an equilibrium short 
of a closed economy. The analysis in this chapter shows tha t the sign of the impact of 
openess on exchange rate volatility is nonlinear and can be positive or negative. This 
nonlinearity depends on the fact tha t different sectors inside an economy are unable 
to pool the risk of exchange rate volatility. As a result the effort to produce higher 
volumes as a reaction of exchange rate changes is put in by fewer agents as only the 
tradable producers are exporting. Since the labour supply is not inelastic this creates a 
counteracting force to the effect in Hau as wage pressure in the tradable sector build up. 
Which of the two effects is larger depends on openess. For a large range of parameters 
the exchange rate movement is actually negatively related to openess.
Being able to distinguish between the reaction of the tradable and nontradable sectors 
could potentially be im portant to distinguish between liquidity models of exchange rates 
and sticky price models. As has been argued in the introduction these models are 
observationally equivalent as long as the analysis does not distinguish between tradable 
and nontradable sectors.
4.2  T h e m od el
The model is an adaptation of the Obstfeld/Rogoff (1995) model. The world comprises 
of two countries and for simplicity we assume th a t the two countries are of equal size. 
The world is inhabited by a unit measure of agents. Agents in the home country are 
indexed by h € [0, while foreign agents are indexed by /  € (^, 1]. In each country 
there exist a measure of \  +  77 firms, of which 2r] firms produce goods that can’t be 
internationally traded while the output of the other \  —rj firms can be ex- and imported 
without restrictions or trading/transport costs. Nontradable firms in the home (foreign) 
country are located on the intervall [0, 2rj\ ([1,1 + 277]). The param eter 77 <  ^ measures the 
openess of the two countries. Each firm is owned by exactly one agent but agents, who 
own firms th a t produce nontradables always own two firms while agents who produce
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tradables only own one firm. This assumption is done for simplicity such tha t agents who 
produce nontradables are not disadvantaged compared to tradable producers because of 
a smaller market. The elasticity of substitution between different tradable (nontradable) 
goods is the same as between a tradable and a nontradable good.
The agents’ utility is given by
utility U%3 =  E £ * ( r b ) M cl  U ),  * € {/> h}.
where 6 denotes the discount factor, c\ consumption of an agent in country i, M  is 
his money holding, p the price index and L  his labour input.
The flow utility is given by 
u =  l n c j + x l n H  -  f  (L j)2, 
where
ch =  (Jq1 ch(k)1~pdk)T~p.
As is common in models with symmetric CES utility functions over all consumed 
goods, we define the price index ph as
Ph =  (Jo Ph(k)1~pd k ) ~ .
It measures the minimum price of one unit of utility. Given the structure of the 
model, the consumption basket and price index for the foreign agents is given by 
c? =  ( /21T?+2r? cf {k) l ~pdk) l~p and
p f  = U ^ 2r] Pf ik Y ~ Pdk) ~ p
Each agent consumes a unit interval of goods. Home agents consumes the goods 
produced by firms situated on [0,1] while foreign residents consume the goods produced 
by firms with an index inside [277,1 + 277].
Agents can save in an internationally traded nominal bond B,  which is, without loss 
of generality, assumed to be denominated in the home currency. Since agents might hold 
different amounts of bonds depending on if they live in the home country or the foreign 
country and if they produce tradables or nontradables we need to be careful with the 
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Figure 4.1: The Model
For the bond market to clear it must be that 
(± -  v)(B*(T) + B { (T)) +  ti(B((N)  + B{(N))  =  0
A similar notation is adopted for money holdings. Agent enter the period money 
holdings M ^ ^ K ) ,  K  € {N,  T}, i € {h, /} . The proceeds from seignorage are redis­
tributed in the form of type specific transfers t z( K )  such th a t no consumer spends real 
resources on holding money. Seignorage is not used to redistribute wealth.
Agents inside a country do not differ with respect to their preferences. They do 
differ instead with respect to the source of their income. Thus there are four groups of 
producers to keep track of
• producers of tradables in the home country
•  producers of nontradables in the home country
•  producers of tradables in the foreign country
•  producers of nontradables in the foreign country
The reason why we have to keep track of them separately is tha t they face different 
budget constraints because they draw their income from activities tha t are differently
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affected by changes in relative prices. We assume th a t agents cannot diversify the risk 
of being a tradable or nontradable producer. Even more restrictive they cannot change 
the sector they draw their income from. Nontradable producers always work in the 
nontradable sector and tradable producers work in the tradable sector. Each agent 
draws income from working in his firm.
Production occurs according to a constant return to scale technology with labour 
being the single input. Because of the symmetry between the two firms a nontradable 
producers owns and works in, it is clear tha t he divides his total labour input L l(N) 
equally among the two firms, i.e. production occurs according to y l (N) = L where 
i E {/i, /} . Both goods get sold for the same price pl(N).  We do allow tradable producers 
to price differentiate between home and foreign markets. Thus we need to distinguish 
between home and foreign sales. Home (Foreign) tradable producers divide their total 
labour input L%(T ) into L hh(T) { L ^ { T ) ) hours spent producing for the home (foreign) 
market and L hf  (T) (L^h(T))  hours spent producing for the export market. Thus total 
production in a tradable firm is given by yl (T) = L%(T ) =  L %f  (T) +  Lth(T). Home 
(foreign) tradable producers charge ph(h)(pf  ( /) )  for output sold in the home (foreign) 
country and p^(h)  (ph( f )) for output sold in the foreign (home) market. The nominal 
exchange rate is denoted by E.
Given this notation the budget constraint for these four groups of agents can be 
w ritten as
• producers of nontradables in the foreign country
< 4 W  = ~  Mlp + n f (N)  + b U ( n ) -  T^ b { ( n )
pi pi Pt Em
producers of tradables in the foreign country
4 { T )  =  ^ P t ( f ) + ^ ^ + !~ 7 n - M{ P + ' r tf ( T ) + ^ j  \b U ( T )  -  - ^ kB {(T )
PJt " * w ' ' Pt Et  Pt Pt ° ' ' E tPt
• producers of nontradables in the home country
c?(N) =  ^ P ? ( i V )  +  _  M m .  +  r h(N )  + i. [ ^ ( A T )  -  j ^ kB ^ N )
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•  producers of tradables in the home country
4 ( T )  =  ^ p i ( h ) + ^ E t/ t ( h ) + ^ ^ - ^ p + r th(T )+ j f
All agents maximise their utility given their individual budget constraint. Addition­
ally they take the demand for their output into consideration because each agent is a 
monopolistic competitor in the output market.
The first order conditions are easily derived. The profit for a nontradable producer 
is given by Lh(N )ph(N )where the price depends on how much he supplies and how 
much his output is in demand. Substituting the profit into the budget constraint and 
maximising the utility function, taking the budget constraint into consideration allows us 
to determine the equilibrium conditions. Similarly we proceed for the tradable sector. It 
is easy to  show tha t tradable producers actually choose not to price discriminate between 
foreign and domestic sales, due to the specific form of the utility function chosen1. That 
is why we can write the first order constraints in the total labour input L l(T). Let again 
i E {/, h} denote the country, the agent is living in and K  E {iV, T }  the sector, he is 
working in. The first order condition for all the agents can then be written as.
• the labour consumption tradeoff
Li(K ) = l e7 k rt$ ) ci(K) ; i € { f , h } , K & { N , T }  
the money demand equations
p p  =  x 4  (K)  (foreign)
M‘1 K  ^ =  xd t{K )  P ; - 1  ^(home)
Pt
the Euler equation
t+i (K)  = (K)  (foreign)?w p { +1
r.h
c t + i ( K ) =  (h o m e )
Together with the budget constraints, these equations allow us to determine the 
equilibrium. The equations are very similar to those Hau obtained with the important
1 For a formal proof see chapter 3.
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difference tha t the agent’s income in the consumption leisure tradeoff and the budget 
constraint depends on the type of good, an agent produces rather than on the price of a 
basket of the goods produced in his country. The money demand and the Euler equation 
differ for the two countries because the only available bond is denominated in the home 
currency. This assumption is of no consequence in what follows. It does not add any 
asymmetry between home and foreign agents. The shocks tha t we study occur with zero 
probability and we assume tha t they occur in a state, in which no country is a net lender 
or borrower to  the other country.
In a first step we determine the symmetric steady state which is uniquely defined by 
the assumption tha t none of the agents has any positive bond holdings.
P ro p o s itio n  9 The symmetric steady state is given by:
count factor 
i = 6 =: r
P roo f, see annex ■
The model is build such tha t both labour input and consumption are the same as in 
the model of Obstfeld and Rogoff. Furthermore, labour input and consumption in the 
steady state do not depend on the type of activity performed by an agent. Thus the 
steady state would prevail even if we allowed for mobility across sectors or countries. The 
steady state is independent of the openess parameter 77. In what follows we will analyse 
the reaction of this economy to an unanticipated expansion in the money supply. As we 
will see, this will brake the symmetry between tradable and nontradable producers as 
their exposure to the exchange rate differs.
4.3  A sy m m etr ic  exp an sion s o f  th e  m o n ey  su p p ly
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact of an asymmetric money supply 
shock on this model economy. To allow for real effects we need to introduce some nominal
The nominal interest rate equals the real interest rate and is determined by the dis-
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rigidity into the economy. While there is no broad consensus on what kind of nominal 
rigidity is the most relevant in reality, the two that are most often used are rigidities 
of nominal prices or wages in the producers’ currency and nominal price rigidities in 
the consumers’ currency. It is well known by now that the type of nominal rigidity has 
a substantial influence on the welfare effects of money supply shocks. Just like in the 
original Obstfeld/Rogoff analysis we assume in this section tha t prices are sticky in the 
producers’ currency but we will contrast the results with the assumption that prices 
are sticky in the consumers’ currency in section 4.1. Assumptions on the timing and 
persistence of price rigidities are again arbitrary. And ideally one would want prices to 
adjust smoothly assuming some form of staggered price setting. Nevertheless, to keep 
things tractable we make instead the ad hoc assumption tha t prices are pre-set by one 
period but freely adjustable. To keep notation to  the bare minimum we abstract from 
the general time subscript and instead assume tha t timing will be as follows:
• period 0 : the economy is in the symmetric steady state
• period 1 : an asymmetric permanent zero probability money supply shock occurs 
at the beginning of period 1 . Agents are not adjusting the price for their output, 
set in their domestic currency, foreign prices for their output instead move with 
the exchange rate. There is perfect exchange rate pass through.
• period 2 : agents adjust the prices freely and the economy reaches a new steady 
state.
We assume tha t the home (foreign) unexpected gross money supply growth is given 
by x h = (1 +  M h) (x f  = 1 +  M-f) and proceed by first determining the impact of a 
money supply shock on the interest rate. The assumption tha t the money demand is 
linear in consumption has im portant implications for the model economy, such as th a t 
the nominal interest rate is actually not affected by the money supply shock.
P ro p o s itio n  10 The nominal home interest rate is constant in time and solely deter­
mined by the discount factor. That is i \  = 8, Vt.
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P ro o f. Using the Euler equation we can write the long term  money demand as 
x hM S = p \ x ^ f d {
A comparison with the short term  money demand equation
x hM% = Phl X <^ S Lc1
l t
gives us the result. ■
W ith a Cobb-Douglas utility in money and consumption unanticipated monetary 
shocks have no impact on the nominal interest rate. Any upward pressure on the nomi­
nal interest rate from increased inflationary expectations after a money shock are offset 
exactly by the downward pressure on the real interest rate th a t stems from the expan­
sionary real effect of the money supply shock. Notice tha t this result doesn’t depend on 
how prices in period one adjust, i.e. this would be true no m atter what type of nominal 
rigidity we assume. W ithout knowing anything about the real sector, this is also enough 
to ensure that there is no overshooting.
P ro p o s itio n  1 1  Given that the utility is Cobb-Douglas in consumption and real money 
holdings, there is no overshooting.
P ro o f. Given the utility function the money demand equation is linear in money and 
consumption and can be easily aggregated in the two countries across different agents. 
f  =  XCt/ ^ ± ^ r  (foreign)
= X C ?^r^ (h o m e)
where c{ and are the aggregate consumption levels in the home and the foreign 
country and M h and M?  are the two aggregate money supplies.
Dividing the home money demand by the foreign money demand in the short run 
and in the long run, we arrive at 
E0\ 
and
r{ _  x*
'P\ ci xk
x£_ P2   c2
E 0P{  c \
These two equations give us a relationship for the intertem poral consumption choices
which is consistent with the equilibrium in the money market.
— p( P* 1+t*~g? d1,
c{  P2 p {  c{
1 0 0
The term  tha t relates the two consumption ratio has to  be solely determined by the 
relative short term  real interest rate.
The ratio of the home and foreign Euler equations allows us to write the consumption 
differential as
£sl —
C<2 p{ P2 cf
Comparing the last two we see tha t the exchange rate change and the interest rate 
has to be related by
E± _  gi
E2 i^
to ensure tha t the money markets are in equilibrium and the intertemporal choices 
are optimal. Since the nominal interest rate is given by the discount factor, the relation 
implies that there is no overshooting. Again we haven’t used any assumption about how 
exactly prices adjust in the shock period. Thus the result holds no m atter if prices are 
sticky in the consumers’ currency of the producers’ currency or a mixture of both.
Note that the fact tha t there is no overshooting implies that not only the home 
nominal interest rate is time invariant but also the foreign nominal interest rate. ■
This is as far as we can proceed in the analysis without log linearising the model. 
Money shocks do have current account effects in this model, which causes the budget 
constraint to become nonlinear. We will show in section 4.1 th a t if prices are sticky in 
the consumers’ currency, there are actually no current account effects and the model can 
be solved without linearising.2
Since the lay out of the model requires tha t we have to keep track of four different 
groups - nontradable and tradable producers in the two countries - we will proceed step 
by step to keep the analysis as tractable as possible. In a first step we will calculate the 
relative changes for tradable and nontradable producers inside a country as a function 
of the relative changes in the national aggregates. We proceed by doing the same for 
the two tradable sectors, i.e. we calculate the relative changes for a foreign and a home 
tradable producer as a function of the changes in the national aggregates. After having
2 If retail prices are assumed to be sticky it should then be possible to  depart from the assumption of 
zero probability shocks w ithout assuming Cobb Douglas preferences across hom e and foreign goods as 
is assumed in Obstfeld Rogoff 1999.
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determined the distribution of changes among different groups we proceed by calculating 
the national aggregates and determine the impact of the shock on national consumption, 
production and the exchange rate. In a last step we will then determine the distributional 
effects inside each country. To keep the notation as tractable as possible we adopt the 
following convention. A hat on top of a variable denotes the relative change of that 
variable between period 0 and period 1 (the short run). If a varible has additionally a 
bar on top, it denotes the change in that variable between period 1 and 2 (the long run). 
The symbol A in front of the variable indicates that the variables are the difference in 
growth rates either
• between tradables and nontradables if the variable has a superscript h  or f, e.g. 
i \ c h = ch(T) — ch(N)  denotes the relative percentage change of consumption of a 
home tradable producer compared the a home nontradable producer in the short 
run.
Similarly A c 1 = b* (T) — (N)  denotes the relative change in consumption of these 
two groups in the long run.
• between tradables at home and abroad if it is indicated by (T), e.g. Ac(T) =  
ch(T) — £f (T ) denotes the change in relative consumption of a tradable producer 
at home and abroad in the short run while Ac =  (T) — (T) denotes the same
difference for the long run or
• between the aggregates if it has none of the top, e.g. Ac =  c71 — &  denotes 
the relative change in national consumption in the home country and the foreign 
country in the short term. Again Ac =  c — c denotes the same difference in the 
long run.
In determining the equilibria (intra country, tradable, aggregate) we proceed as al­
ways in this type of models by calculating the binding FOC for the long and the short 
run. These differ because in the short run firms are unable to adjust their prices. In 
the short run output as a result is demand determined as the firms loose their control of 
prices and are willing to move the output closer to the outcome under perfect competi­
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tion. In the long run the firms can adjust their price and behave again like monopolistic 
competitors.
4 .3 .1  T h e  in tra  co u n try  eq u ilib r iu m
First we analyse the equilibrium inside the two countries. This is much simplified because 
nontradable and tradable producers necessarily face the same cost of consumption and 
therefore also the same real and nominal interest rates. Nevertheless, since the money 
supply shock produces current account effects we need to  log linearise the model, as the 
budget constraints become nonlinear. The model is then solved by calculating the ’’long 
run” equations which govern the economy after prices have been adjusted and the ’’short 
run” equations for the shock period when prices are not optimally adjusted. Most of the 
algebra in what follows we state in the annex as it would obstruct the tractability of the 
chapter.
Let dB h(K) := — B q(K )), K  G {h, /}  denote the relative change in the
c 0 P q
bondholdings of the tradable and nontradable producers. We do not have to distinguish 
between the long run and the short run for the change in bond holdings, as agents only 
adjust their bond holdings once, after the money shock is revealed in period 1 . Since 
there is no uncertainty or unanticipated shock thereafter, there is no additional wealth 
effect and thus no need to adjust bond holdings twice. After going through the algebra 
we can write the long term relative growth rates of consumption and production for 
tradable and nontradable producers as a function of their relative bond holdings and 
aggregate demand conditions.
L em m a 6  The long term differences in labour and consumption for tradable and non­
tradable producers is given by
= -2(3TFj(dB h(T) ~  dB*(N ))
A *  =  -  d B h(N))  -  i A f -  i ( A p - S )
P ro o f. see annex ■
In the long run the difference in work efforts depends only on the income differential 
that arises from different wealth levels. The difference in consumption on the other hand
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depends both on the difference in wealth and on demand conditions and price levels in 
the two countries. Thus the difference in wealth levels is used partly to enjoy more leisure 
and partly to consume. The difference in earnings due to different demand conditions 
is spent entirely. Nontradable producers at home benefit from a permanent increase in 
domestic demand more than tradable producers because they sell all their goods in the 
home country while the tradable producers depend also on demand in the foreign country. 
The term  enters with a factor one half because the tradable producers sell approximately 
half their output abroad. The nontradable producers also benefit from the change in 
price levels. If the home country gains wealth as a result of the money supply shock, this 
will build up wage pressures in the economy through the labour consumption trade off. 
As a result home goods will become more expensive compared to foreign goods. Since 
tradable producers have to compete to a bigger extent with producers abroad, they will 
be affected by competitiveness pressures to a larger extent. This explains the last term 
in the consumption differential.
The expressions for the short term relative changes differs from the long run changes. 
Since producers are unable or unwilling to adjust their prices, output is demand deter­
mined rather than being determined by the consumption leisure trade off..
The change in relative price levels in the short term is easily determined as the only 
prices tha t are changing are
• the prices of home produced tradables sold abroad (these fall with a rise in the 
exchange rate E ) and
• the prices of foreign produced tradables sold at home (these rise with a rise in the 
exchange rate E ).
Given tha t the share of nontradables in total consumption is 1 — 2rj it is not surprising 
that the relative change in the price index in the short term  is given by 
A p =  (1 — 2rj)E.
Using the first order conditions we can again write the relative changes in consump­
tion and production for tradable and nontradable producers as a function of their relative 
bond purchases and national aggregates.
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L em m a 7 The relative growth rates of consumption and production for tradable and 
nontradable producers in the short run are given by 
A c h  = prjE — I  A c -  -±-r (dB h(T) -  dB h(N))
A L h = £ { -A p  + E ) - \ A c
Proof. see annex ■
Relative consumption in the short term depends on the exchange rate which governs 
the substitution between tradable and nontradable goods. A higher change in the ex­
change rate lowers the price of tradable goods abroad and thus raises demand for them 
in tha t market. Similarly higher aggregate consumption at home than abroad raises 
demand for nontradable home goods more than for tradable ones because they sell all 
their output in the home market. These two effects on the demand for the products are 
partially offset by the difference in bond purchases. The factor one half in the difference 
in labour inputs comes from the fact that half of the output of tradable producers is 
sold in the same market as tha t of nontradables. In the home market relative prices 
are not changing between home produced tradables and home produced nontradables. 
Thus there cannot be any difference in demand. The change in relative levels of de­
mand comes solely from the fact that tradable producers sell approximately the other 
half abroad where market condition could be different both  with respect to aggregate 
demand and with respect to prices foreign producers charge for their output.
The long run consumption differential together with the short run consumption differ­
entials allows us to make a first conclusion about relative bond holdings, which simplifies 
the calculation of the equilibrium substantially.
P roposition  12 Bond holdings of the two tradable and the two nontradable sectors 
balance each other separately, i. e. 
d B h(T) = - d B h(T) =: - B ( T ) 
d B f  (N) = - d B f ( N )  =: - B ( N ) .
Proof. see annex ■
This result does depend on the symmetry of the two countries. The tradable sector 
has the same size in both countries. The same is true for the nontradable sectors.
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The result might very well not hold if the degree of openess differs between the two 
countries. Nevertheless, it is convenient for the purpose of solving the model. It allows 
us to characterise the steady state by only two state variables, e.g. aggregate national 
bond holdings and bond holdings of the tradable sector. Furthermore the symmetry 
tha t manifests itself in the last proposition makes the differences between growth rates 
for different groups much more tractable. As we will see in the next section, using the 
above proposition, we can solve for the distribution of the bond holdings as a function 
of the aggregates from looking at the two tradable sectors. This in turn  will allow us to 
determine the aggregate changes in the economy.
4 .3 .2  T h e  tw o  tra d a b le  sec to rs
Unlike the two nontradable sectors the tradable producers of the two countries compete 
with each other in the same markets. The home bias in consumption in the models solely 
stems from the presence of nontradable goods. The relative demand for the output of 
a tradable producer abroad and at home thus only depends on the relative price, not 
on aggregate demand conditions in the two countries. As in the last section we proceed 
by calculating the long term relationsships and the short term  relation ships separately. 
Putting them together by using the Euler conditions tha t govern intertemporal choices 
and using proposition 6  of the last section we will be able to determine the bond holdings 
of the tradable producers solely as a function of national aggregates. Thus and propo­
sition 6 will allow us to solve for all the disaggregated changes once we have solved for 
the national aggregates in the next section.
As mentioned before in models with Dixit Stiglitz type utility functions firms always 
price according to a constant mark up over costs. Since the costs are the same no 
m atter if the home or the foreign market is serviced this has the consequence tha t 
tradable producers don’t price discriminate between the home and the foreign market, 
i.e. pricing to market is of no consequence. Again we use the first order condition for 
the long run to determine the relative growth rates of the two groups as a function of 
relative bond holdings and aggregate variables. In doing so we use the result that the 
bondholdings of tradable producers abroad and at home are of opposite sign and equal
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size.
L em m a 8  Relative growth rates of consumption and production of domestic and foreign 
tradable producers in the long run are given by 
AX(T) =  - p ( A p ( T ) - f )
A2 (T) = l ± e _ r _ B ( T ) - ( A p - ^ )
P ro o f. see annex ■
In contrast to the last section the long term  change in the relative consumption 
growth rates depends now on the change in price levels because the two groups live in 
different countries. Facing a higher price level compared to the change in income causes 
producers to work less and substitute into leisure. The relative demand on the other 
hand is simple because both entrepreneurs operate on both markets with equal weights. 
This implies tha t the change in the competitive environment from other goods and the 
change in the scale of the market affects the entrepreneurs to the same degree. That is 
why the demand for their products depends effectively only on the price they set but not 
on the relative consumption levels in the two countries. T hat P P P  might not hold in 
the long run, has an influence on the relative consumption levels. If the home countries’ 
real exchange rate appreciates, meaning the price of nontradables has risen relative to 
the price of tradables, home consumption is going to be lower. Agents start substituting 
into leisure. The level of consumption does not directly depend on the relative aggregate 
demand conditions in the two countries.
Similarly we can derive the same for the relative changes in the short run.
L em m a 9 The relative growth rates of consumption and production of the tradable pro­
ducers at home and abroad are given in the short run by 
A L(T)  =  pE
Ac(T) = { p - ( l - 2 r i ) ) E - £ - rB(T) .
P ro o f, see annex ■
Just like in the long run relative aggregate demand in the two countries does not 
m atter for output, since tradable sectors at home and abroad are exposed to the same
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markets. Relative output only depends on the change in the relative price in the two 
markets which is determined by the exchange rate. Consumption depends additionally on 
the exchange rate because the price level in the two countries changes with a depreciation 
or appreciation.
Changes in the relative bond holdings do not only depend on the relative wealth 
effect but can also differ because the two countries might face different real interest rates 
in the short run.
Subtracting the two Euler equations for the two tradable sectors we see tha t the 
relative change in consumption changes from the short to the long run, which is different 
from the original Obsfeld/Rogoff modell. The reason is tha t the presence of nontradable 
goods causes the real interest rate to differ to differ in the two countries in the short 
run. If 77 was zero the differential would be the same in the long run as in the short run, 
because PPP  (Ap — E  = 0) would necessarily hold.
AS(T) =  A c(T) -  (Ap 2r)E
We are now ready to determine the bond holdings of the tradable sector solely as a 
function of the impact the monetary shock has on the exchange rate.
P roposition  13 The relative savings of the two tradable producers is given by
B{T) _  p ( p - l )  , p
1+r  — 2p+(l+p)r —
Proof. Use the Euler equation together with the long run consumption differential to 
find an expression for the relative short term  change in consumption and compare with 
the short term relative change in consumption derived abov. ■
Thus, the change in the exchange rate is enough to determine the relative change in 
the bond holdings of tradable producers. No additional information about the distribu­
tion of bond holdings among the nontradable producers needs to be known.
Not to loose the argument, it might be useful to summarise what we have shown so 
far. In the last two sections we have derived the relative change for the different groups 
in the countries as a function of the change in national aggregates. Thus we have solved 
for the distribution as a function of the aggregate variables. If we denote the average
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aggregate bond holding (1 — 2rj)B(T) +  2rjB(N)  by B  we can write the differences in 
growth rates of consumption for the tradable and nontradable producers at home and 
the tradable producers in the two countries as
•  tradable vs nontradable producers 
A c h =  pr)E -  jA c -  i ( A xE  -  j f ; )
^  if? )  -
•  tradable producers at home vs tradable producers abroad 
A c(T) = ( p - (  1 -  2rj) -  2X1)E
A§(T) =  ^ r \ i E  -  (Ap -  % .
Before we come back to looking at this distribution we first solve the model. So 
far we have ignored the aggregate variables and the money demand. The results stated 
above will not only allow us to solve for the national aggregates in the next section but 
they will also eventually allow us to solve for the relative welfare changes.
4 .3 .3  A g g r e g a te  D y n a m ics
So far we have analysed the relative changes for different groups in each country. While 
this will allow us ultimately to determine the welfare effects on these groups, which is 
the main purpose of this chapter, we need to solve for the national aggregates to do so. 
The reason is tha t the money supply shock is a national shock and thus has an effect 
on national aggregates and only triggers differences in the distribution because of its 
effect on national demands and the exchange rate. Furthermore we need the aggregate 
equations to make sure that the bond market is in equilibrium. For tha t reason we need 
to determine the relative changes for the national aggregates in the short and long run. 
Since the technicalities in deriving these expressions are not adding much to the intuition 
for the model we have suppressed them to the annex and only state the results in the 
next lemma.
L em m a 10 The relative changes o f the consumption levels in the home and foreign 
country are given by.
109
Ac =  (long term)
Ac =  (p +  p2rj — 1 )E  — (short term)
P roof. see annex ■
The long term  consumption differential does not only depend on aggregate bond 
holdings. It also depends on who owns those bonds. The distribution of the bonds 
m atters because of its effect on the relative price level. W hen the nontradable sector 
hold the bonds, the cost of consumption increases because nontradables become more 
expensive as the producers substitute into leisure. This is not true, if the tradable sector 
hold the bonds as tha t hits both countries to the same extent. Thus, bond holdings 
by the nontradable sector have a smaller effect on the difference between consumption 
levels in the two countries than bond holdings of the tradable sector. This effect does 
not appear in the short run, because in the short run prices are not adjusted and output 
is demand determined rather than by the labour supply. T hat is why in the short run 
the relative consumption changes only depend on aggregate variables.
To be more explicit we can derive the deviation from long term  P P P  by using the 
demand equations and the changes in the relative labour supplies.
$?B(JV)+A§)
The deviation depends on the substitution elasticity between goods, the aggregate 
demand conditions and the relative savings of the nontradable producers. Additionally 
it depends on the share of nontradables. For a given change in savings and aggregate 
demand the deviation from PPP  is rising in the share of nontradables as more goods 
might deviate from PPP  and it is falling in the elasticity of substitution.
The deviations from PPP  also plays a role for the intertemporal equilibrium. Since 
nominal interest rates are constant and identical in both countries any differences in 
the real interest rates can only come from the difference in the inflation rate. Since we 
already know tha t the exchange rate does not change between the long and the short run, 
the difference in inflation in the two countries is the same as the change in the exchange 
rate deflated by the consumer price index. The relevant Euler equation is given by 
Ac =  —(Ap — Ap) +  Ac.
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Using the expressions for the short and long run deviations from PPP  we can write 
the Euler equation as
(! +  ^ ) ) A ? =  A£ -  ( A ?  -  B (T )) -  W .
where we have used the defining identity for the aggregate bond holdings to replace 
bond holdings for the nontradable sector.
Thus, we have derived expressions for the long and short run relative changes in 
national consumption rates and the Euler equation tha t relates the two as functions of 
the exchange rate and the national and tradable sector bond holdings. Since we had 
shown that the tradable sector bond holdings only depend on the exchange rate, we have 
effectively determined the system as a function of national bond holdings.
The last equation we need to determine the equilibrium is the short term money 
supply equation. It is given by
M h -  M f  =  (1 — 2rj)E +  (c* -  c*)
where we use the fact that in the short run prices only change for the imported goods 
when the exchange rate changes and the fact tha t the nominal interest rate is constant 
in time both at home and abroad. Using the changes for short and long run relative 
changes from lemma 10, the Euler equation and the short term  money demand we are 
now in a position to calculate the equilibrium. In a first step we determine the impact 
of an asymmetric money supply shock on the exchange rate.
P roposition  14 The change in the exchange rate and the aggregate bond holdings 
after an asymmetric money shock is given by
£  — ___________ 2p+r[(p+l)-2r?(p-l)]___________
p(2+r(p+l))+2q(p-l)r[l- p(2f f i f f p)r) ~2r?(p~l)]
B  =  (l-2r?)(p-l)____2 p ( 1 + 2  r/)+-p-(^ (P ^ r)r)_____________________ ^
1+r 2 p(2+r(p+l))+2r?(p-l)r[l- J p)r) -2ry(p-l)]
Proof. By eliminating the short term consumption from the second equation in lemma
10 using the money demand we find
p    AM | [2 t? ( p — l)+p] rpr-D —  o I------ o &( l+ r ) ( l—2ry)  2 ^  2
which is upward sloping in the change of the exchange rate and has a negative 
intercept.
I l l
A second equation in B  and E  can be obtained from the Euler equation, the short 
term  money demand and the long run consumption differential.
(1 +  =  AM -  (1 -  2VJ ? ; » l ; )r))E
or
(l+r)(l-2r/)-® =  (p(l-2r?)+l+2r?)r [A M  -  ( l  -  2 V p ( 2 p + ( l + p ) r ) ) ^ \
which is downward sloping from a positive intercept. Thus the equilibrium always 
exist, given that both equations are linear. Substituting the two equations into each 
other gives the result. ■
Using the expression for the exchange rate we can state one of the results stated in 
the introduction. Unlike in a world where nontradable and tradable sectors can perfectly 
pool the risk or there is perfect mobility between the sectors, it is not always true that 
the impact of money shocks on the exchange rate is falling in the param eter that governs 
openess.
C orollary 1 The size of the impact a money supply shock has on the exchange rate de­
pends on openess in a nonlinear way. For relatively open economies, the impact becomes 
smaller the more closer the economy is. For relatively open economies the opposite is
true. The threshold is approximately (r = 0) at
2pM p-1)
^ 2p (p—1)
Proof, see annex ■
Thus, the result obtained by Hau that more open economies experience less exchange 
rate volatility as a result of asymmetric money supply shocks, does depend crucially on 
the fact that agents can diversify inside a country against the risk of the assymetric effect 
the shock has on different sectors. The threshold for p =  2 is r f  — | .  Thus, for any 
reasonable interest rate the impact of a monetary shock on the exchange rate is falling 
in 77 meaning the more closed the economy is, the less a monetary shock affects the 
exchange rate. This is the opposite effect of the one Hau finds. Instead if the elasticity 
of substitution is lower (p is higher) Hau’s result prevails for relatively closed economies. 
For p = 4 the threshold is already lower than |  or a degree of openess of 40% and the 
effect of a monetary shock on the exchange rate rises with more openess for relatively
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closed economies.
Having determined the impact of the monetary shock on the exchange rate and the 
average bond holdings, we continue by calculating the relative growth of consumption in 
the two countries in the long run. We need this information in order to  understand the 
aggregate demand conditions in the two countries, which is an im portant determinant of 
the relative welfare for nontradable and tradable goods. The knowledge of the exchange 
rate and the change in aggregate consumption is enough to return to the distribution.
/ \9  — (1 _  2r7l r(p~1)(p+1+ 2T?p) p  o r
LAC { i  ZTJ) ( 1 + p y + 2 p _ 2 r i r ( p - l ) - Cj OI
A §  =  ___________ ( l - 2 r }) r (p - l ) [ (p+ l )+2 'np \___________
p(2+r(p+l))+2r/(p-l)r[l- p{2l+(i+p)T) ~2t?(p~ 1)1
The differential is falling in the share of nontradable goods.
Using the expression for consumption we can write the long run deviation from PPP
as
Ap — E  =  2r] i i 2(l+r)(p+l+2r?p)"r  (l+ p )r+ 2p -27 jr(p -l) E.
The deviation is rising in 77, which is not very surprising. The larger the share of 
nontradables the larger can be the deviation from P P P  in the long run.
4 .4  T h e re la tive  w elfare o f th e  tra d a b le  and  nontradable  
prod ucers
This section addresses the central question of the chapter - an analysis of the relative 
impact of an asymmetric money supply shocks on the welfare of nontradable and tradable 
producers. We will linearise the utility function around the symmetric steady state and 
keep the analysis tractable we abstract from the effect real money holdings have on 
welfare. We do not believe that this is really limiting the analysis since we believe that 
the impact of real money holdings on welfare is small, i.e. the parameter x  ls likely to 
be very small. Thus, the welfare measure we use is given by 
dUh(T, N) = -  ^ i [ A Lh +  iAX]-
Here we have used the fact tha t the consumption differential for nontradable and 
tradable producers is the same in the long and in the short run, because both necessarily 
fact the same real interest rate. Again we proceed in steps. We first determine the
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relative changes in bond holdings, consumption and labour input. It turns out that for 
all of them  the sign of the relative growth rates for the tradable and nontradable sectors 
depends on the parameters. Nevertheless, when we calculated their impact on utility we 
will see tha t it is always the nontradable sector th a t is better off.
L em m a 11 The relative change in bond holdings of the tradable and nontradable agents
after an asymmetric money supply shock depends only on the impact o f the shock on the 
exchange rate and long term aggregate demand conditions in the two countries.
B(T)  < B ( N ) if A§ > 2rjpE
B ( N )  < B(T)  if  Ad < 2r]pE
The treshold is given by
A ? < 2 r)pE ^ n > Vt := ^ 4 ?2 p r-r+ 2 >
P ro o f. see annex ■
When the effect on the long term  consumption difference between the two countries 
is larger there is a permanent increase in demand for the nontradable goods’ producers 
output compared to the tradable goods’ producers output in the country that gained 
more from the money expansion. Furthermore the change in the real appreciation is 
bigger and the nontradable sector benefits more from the long term relative increase in 
prices of their output while the tradable producers loose. Thus the nontradable producers 
don’t have as many incentives to save as the tradable producers. On the other hand 
the tradable producers benefit more, the more the exchange rate depreciates in the first 
period, because they can sell more of their products. This is because consumers in 
the other country are substituting more in the short term  into the temporarily cheaper 
tradable goods of the country tha t expands its money supply. Looking at the threshold 
it is clear tha t for realistic shares of nontradables the tradable producers bond holdings 
are going to be higher. As we will see this is not the same as concluding that the tradable 
producers have more to gain in welfare terms as we will see.
Before we look at the total change in welfare we first look at the change in consump­
tion and leisure separately.
L em m a 12 The change in the labour inputs does only depend on the relative impact of
114
the money supply shock on the exchange rate and the aggregate demand conditions in 
the two countries. But unlike for the bondholdings short term consumption changes also 
play a role.
A L =  — § (i+p)r+2p &r)pE — A3)/o7* the long run and
A L h = ^ (2pr}E — Ac) for the short run.
The sign o f the changes is ambigous. Depending on the openess of the economy there 
are three possible cases.
• A L h < 0, A L  > 0 <==> 2rjpE < Ac <J=^ > rj* > 7 7
The output of nontradables rises more than that o f tradales at the initial impact, 
but in the long run tradable output rises relative to nontradable output.
— h  ~
• A L h < 0, A L < 0 Ac > 2ppE >  Ac r f  > 77 > r f
The output of nontradables rises more both in the short and the long run.
•  A L h > 0 , AL  <  0 <=$> Ac < 2r)pE <=> 77 > 77**
The output o f tradable output rises more than that of nontradables in the short run
while in the long run the ouput of nontradables rises more than that of tradables,
where ri** := \ -n— . > 77*.
2 2 o + r ( o —i  '1 2p+(1+p)r;
P ro o f, see annex ■
Looking at the previous lemma we learn tha t the relative impact only depends on 
the relative impact of the money supply shock on aggregate consumption in the two 
countries and the exchange rate. Loosely speaking if the money shock mainly affects the 
exchange rate, the tradable sector is the main beneficiary, if it affects aggregate demand 
than it is the nontradable producers, tha t might gain more. Who works more in the long 
term depends solely on who safes more in the short term. If there is a difference in per 
unit returns for nontradable and tradable producers doesn’t m atter for their long term  
labour input. The reason is the linear leisure consumption trade off, which implies tha t 
changes in the long term labour input only depend on bond holdings bu t not on returns 
to labour. Earning a unit more in real terms implies consuming a unit more rather than 
working less.
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In the short term this is not true. Since consumption in the short term  rises more 
at home than abroad, labour input in the nontradable sector tends to rise more. Thus 
a deviation from absolute purchasing power parity leads to a bigger expansion in the 
nontradable sector than in the tradable sector. Given the size of the thresholds, which 
are close to zero, it appears that in most relevant cases tradable producers work more 
in the short run and save while nontradable producers work more in the long run and 
make up for their lower savings.
The effect on consumption is also ambiguous. While it depends on the relative 
savings of the two groups, it also depends on the demand for their goods. If more is 
consumed in the home country than abroad, the demand for nontradable products rises, 
which benefits the consumption of nontradable produces. The nontradable producers 
are helped by deviations in purchasing power parity because a deviation just means that 
they have a higher average return per unit on their goods than  the tradable producers.
L em m a 13 The relative change in consumption is given by
A ^ 1 _  r ( p - l )  [ _ /  . 1 \ . 2(p—l)(p+l+2qp)
^ C — 2((p+l)r+2p) l )  +  ( l + p ) r + 2 p - 2 r i r ( p - l ) E
The relative growth rate of consumption of the tradable and nontradable sector cf1 =
t
iff
Ac depends on the degree of openess. The agents in the tradable sector consume more
>  „*** _  l p+1 2+(p+l)r *
v ^  v 2 p - i  2 p + (p + iy  ^p - 1 2p+(p+l)r
P ro o f. see annex ■
Thus for relatively closed economies, it is true th a t agents in the tradable sector 
consume more, for relatively open economies the opposite is true. The threshold only 
becomes relevant for relatively high elasticities of substitution. For relatively low rates of 
substitution, it is always the nontradable producers tha t consume more. Thus for p =  2 
it is always true tha t nontradable producers consume more. Thus in most relevant cases 
it is true tha t while nontradable producers save less in the short rim after the initial 
impact and thus work less in the short run, they still manage to consume more than the 
tradable produces. In a way producing nontradables, which are sold in the country that 
experiences a permanent increase in demand allows them  a second way of smoothing
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their income other than bond holdings. In fact we will see th a t under the conditions of 
the model, they are always gaining more in welfare terms.
P ro p o s itio n  15 An unanticipated asymmetric money supply shock raises welfare of the 
nontradable producers more than welfare o f the tradable producers. The difference in 
welfare gains is given by
r 1 T T h ( T    (P2~t)[~2p-(l+p)r+2r?r(p-1)] f )
au  , i Vj  -  2/9((p+1)r + 2 p)((p+ l)r + 2 p ) - 27?r ( p - l ) ) jC/ ^  U
P ro o f. see annex ■
Thus, even though the tradable producers are able to benefit from the short term 
gain of a real depreciation and sell more goods abroad, in the long run they do not gain 
as much as the nontradable producers. The reason is tha t the wealth effect which raises 
consumption at home and lowers it abroad benefits the nontradable producers which are 
not depending on foreign demand. This result is quite the contrary from the popular 
belief tha t it is tradable producers that gain from a competitive devaluation and suffer 
the most from an appreciation. In the next section we will look at the robustness of the 
result.
4 .5  R ob u stn ess
In the previous section we showed that, if prices are sticky in the producers’ currency and 
there is little mobility across sectors, nontradable producers gain more from asymmetric 
money supply shocks than tradable producers. This section investigates the robustness 
of this result against the two main assumptions.
• It is well known in this type of model tha t the type of price stickiness is crucial for 
welfare results. That is why we contrast the stickiness in the producers’ currency, 
which is close to wage stickiness (Grafe et al 1999) with tha t of stickiness of prices 
in the consumers’ currency. The main difference in this type of pricing is that 
producers of tradable goods enjoy an advantage, which is tantam ount to a straight 
transfer from producers abroad. When the exchange rate depreciates in period one, 
prices in the export market stay constant unlike under stickiness in the producers
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currency. This allows tradable producers to earn a higher return per good sold 
without loosing any of their competitiveness, since prices of all other goods stay 
the same as well. This effect is usually strong enough to overturn many welfare 
effects (Grafe et al 1999)
• We have made the strong assumption that agents can’t change the sector they 
are working in and can’t even invest in the other sector. The latter assumption 
is of no consequence for relative welfare changes and only done for convenience. 
We could allow the owners of a company to differ from the workers, such that 
there would be capital rents. As long as ownership would be pooled inside a 
country across sector, this would not change the sign of the relative welfare change 
between tradable and nontradable producers. It would only change the size. Only 
if we were allowing agents to reduce their risk by diversifying income actively 
across sectors, i.e., agents that work in the tradable sector hold mainly shares in 
the tradable sector and vice versa would the results change. The assumption that 
agents can’t change the sector they work in is more problematic. Clearly the results 
depend on this assumption. If there was full mobility across sectors without any 
cost, it would not make a difference in which sector an agent is originally located 
in. Furthermore the change in the relative welfare of tradable and nontradable 
producers is unlikely to depend linearly on mobility. More mobility is benefiting 
the tradable sector as some of the gains for the nontradable sector are spread over 
time, due to permanently higher demand in the country tha t expands its money 
supply while the gains for the tradable producers all occur in the shock period.
We will analyse both these issue in this section more formally, starting with an 
investigation of the results under stickiness in the consumers’ currency.
4 .5 .1  S tick y  P r ic e s  in  th e  co n su m e rs’ cu rren cy
In this section we show tha t if prices are sticky in the consumers’ currency tradable 
producers gain more from the unanticipated money supply shock. The analysis is greatly 
simplified by the fact that under this condition money supply shocks have no impact on
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the current account. Thus most of the analysis can actually be done without linearising 
the system..
L em m a 14 The ratio between long and short term consumption levels is always the
same for tradable and nontradable producers inside one country. Furthermore nominal 
expenditures are the same in the long and short run for each agent.
P ro o f. Agents who live in the same country necessarily face the same real interest rate 
and the same cost of consumption. The only price tha t might differ between nontradable 
and tradable producers is the price for their output. The Euler equation implies tha t all 
agents have the same nominal expenditure in period 1 and 2
and that the ratio of long and short term consumption is the same for nontradable
and tradable producers.
<£Cr) =  c£(N) u  
cf(T) cf(N)
This also implies that the relative level of money holdings is not going to change for
tradable and nontradable producer after the first period 
m H t ) =  m £ ( n )
M ^ { T )  (N)
Because the aggregate money supply is not changing after the first period, this implies 
that each agents money holdings are not changing after the first period.
P ro p o s itio n  16 As long as retail prices are sticky there is no effect on the current 
account. The exchange rate is given by E 2=E\ = •
Short term consumption and production levels are given by
In the long run the economy returns to the steady state of proposition 1.
3This implies that we could relatively easily w rite a stochastic version of the m odel along the lines 
of the O bstfeld/R ogoff 99 m odel w ithout having to  make the assum ption of a different substitution  
elasticity for a home and a foreign good as opposed to  two hom e goods.
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P ro o f. The only thing to show here is tha t the short term equations are consistent with 
B  = 0. The balanced bond holdings imply tha t in the long run all agents consume the 
same. Since the real interest rate is the same for producers of tradables and nontradables, 
the short run consumption must be the same for these groups as well (Euler equation), 
cf (T) =  c?(iV)
Because they also face the same nominal interest rate they must also hold the same 
amount of money in period 1 (money demand). The ratio of consumption for tradable 
and nontradable producers stays constant from period 1 onwards and hence the same is 
true for money holdings. The growth rate of consumption and money holdings for the 
agents is given by nominal money growth in period 1.
The 4 short term  budget equations are given by 
cf (T) =  L hh(T) + % L hf (T) 
c{(T)  =  U f ( T )  + f I / h(T) 
and
cf (N) = 2Lh(N)  
c{(N)  =  2 ] J ( N )
The demand equations imply tha t the demand for home (foreign) exports is the same 
as the demand for foreign (home) domestic sales.
Using this in the budget constraints we conclude that
L { f (T) =  Eq_ =  c' ( N )  c{  (t )
L \ h(T) E \  C$( N)  cf(T)
Using the fact that the growth rate of consumption from period zero to one is given
by money growth we find that
m £m £ _  L*th(T) _  E±  
m (  M q ~  L { f {T) ~  Eo
which implies for the first period exchange rate that (proposition 1)
£ i =  4 .
m [
This proves that there is no overshooting and the claim of the proposition. ■
If retail prices are sticky both consumption and labour input of the nontradable sector 
are independent of foreign monetary policy. In the tradable sector only consumption is
independant while labour varies with the weighted average of the two money supply
increases.
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P ro p o s itio n  17 A nontradable producer gains less than a tradable producer from the 
expansion of the money supply in his home country. Nevertheless both do benefit from a 
money supply expansion in their own country. A money expansion in the other country 
hurts tradable producers but does not affect nontradable producers. The reason is that 







1 I Mf_ -  1
P ro o f. Use the expression for consumption and labour derived in proposition 18 and 
substitute them into the expression for the utility. ■
4 .5 .2  T h e  ro le  o f  la b ou r m o b ility
The model in the chapter makes an extreme assumption about labour mobility - workers 
are never able to change the sector. Furthermore agents live forever and thus, the dis­
parity in income across sectors is not even equalised over time by new entrants into the 
labour market. The welfare results obtained obviously depend on this assumption. The 
purpose of this section is to confront the model with a world where there is labour mo­
bility although not complete. Full labour mobility would be trivial since there wouldn’t 
be any differences across workers. We assume instead tha t agents can only change the 
sector they draw their income from one period after the shock has occured. In fact this 
binds sectoral immobility to the persistence of price stickiness. The only justification 
for this assumption is that it facilitates the calculations significantly, since it allows to 
continue with the strategy of considering only a ’’short” and a ’’long” run.
In fact we do not even have to reconsider the short run, since the equations that 
govern the shock period are unaffected. Furthermore the long run equations are much 
simplified since full mobility in the long run implies the same hourly income for all agents 
inside a country and thus the same price for all home goods, no m atter if tradable or 
nontradable. The only difference for welfare changes across sectors arises from the short 
term gains, workers in these two sectors can realise.
Price changes in the long term  are now characterised by
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p ( N ) = f ( T ) - , i € { h , f }  
Ap* =  2r)Aj>'(T) +  (1 -  2rjj%
Using as before the budget constraints, the labour supplies and the goods demands, 
it is straight forward to confirm long term aggregate consumption levels.
^ = - 1 T - r B  ^
A f ( T )  =  -± A Z  +  f
Combining these new long term  equations with the short term  equations and the 
Euler equation derived before we can easily determine the change in the international 
bond holdings and the exchange rate after an asymmetric change in the money supply
_   1_____ ( l - 2r j ) ( l+p) r+2p  a iff
l-2r? p[(H-p)7"+2]+2r7r(p2- l )
and
B  _  (p-l+2?7p)(l-277)p^;
1+r (l-277)(p+l)7-+2p
The relative consumption levels for tradable and nontradable producers in the long 
run are given by 
&  =  
and
Not surprisingly this depends just on the relative bond holdings. Half of the relative 
gain is spent on consumption, half on foregone labour income as before.
The relative welfare gain for the two sectors depends now only on the relative benefits 
for the two groups in the short run. As before, in the short run this is governed by 
the relative strength of two effects. After a positive money supply shock at home the 
nontradable producers benefit from the relative change in demand abroad and at home 
while the tradable producers benefit from lower prices and thus higher demand for their 
goods abroad due to the depreciation. It is easy to show tha t the relative welfare gains 
can now be written as
dU(T, N ) =  £  j g  [2pn% -  Ac] =  -  (p -  \ )E
where we have used in the second step the expression derived for short term  con­
sumption changes in section 2.1. Using the expressions for the bond holdings, it is easy
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to show that
dU{T, N ) > 0 ^ r , >  -2[(/ ^ 2>,|
Thus for most relevant ranges of openess, the tradable sector producers gain more 
under this form of labour mobility. Again this result is not surprising given that the 
main advantages of the nontradable producers under no labour mobility arise from the 
long term. The reason is tha t the demand is permanently higher in the country that 
expands its money supply and permanently lower in the other country. Nontradable 
producers benefit more from this assymmetry in demand because tradable producers 
sell partly abroad.
4 .6  C onclu sion
The analysis in this chapter shows tha t if there is no labour mobility across sectors, 
prices are sticky in the producers’ currency and monopolistic competition is an important 
feature of the economy it is agents in the nontradable sectors that benefit the most from 
an unanticipated money supply shock. This result contradicts the popular belief that it is 
always the tradable sectors that benefit the most from the trade effects of devaluations, 
that come about by monetary losening. The reason is tha t people tend to look at 
employment and production of the sectors rather than welfare. While it is true that 
tradable production tends to increase more in the short run than nontradable production, 
the relative employment effect in the long rim tends to be the other way around, as home 
consumption is permanently increased compared to foreign consumption. As a result life 
time income of nontradable producers rises more than that of tradable producers. This 
effect is the stronger the more open an economy is.
We are aware that the assumption that there is no mobility across sectors and that 
there is no risk sharing across sectors is rather extreme and the analysis in the last 
section has demonstrated tha t the results will change if these assumptions are given up. 
Nevertheless the results are going to change smoothly. Who will gain more will then 
depend on the parameters of mobility, the time preference, the degree of risk sharing 
and the elasticity of substitution between foreign and home goods.
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The result also depends on the type of pricing. If prices are sticky in the consumers 
currency it is the tradable sector tha t gain most. The reason is tha t their short term unit 
return in the export markets rises while unit returns in the home market stay constant.
There are two ways in which this type of analysis could be extended. First it could 
be used to try to move towards a kind of political economy of monetary policy. In order 
to do so we would need to move to a framework in which monetary policy shocks do 
not occur with zero probability but are unticipated. This could be done in the way 
Henderson et al (2000) have proposed for a closed economy. In this respect it would be 
interesting to do a similar analysis to the one in this chapter with respect to workers 
and agents tha t earn their income from investments.
This type of analysis would be particularly interesting with respect to the setting 
of the permanent exchange rates for countries joining another currency block, like a 
country wanting to join the European Monetary Union. The entry exchange rate for 
country can clearly not be market determined as any exchange rate would be perfectly 
credible. Instead it will be at least partially determined politically with different lobbies 
wanting different exchange rates. It is not inconceivable tha t this game will result in 
cross country coalitions arguing for a low or high exchange rate.
Another way in which this type of analysis could be extended is empirically. Broadly 
speaking there are two competing types of international economy models, in which money 
is not neutral, liquidity models and sticky price models. The second chapter of this thesis 
argued that they are observationally equivalent unless one distinguishes different sectors 
in the economies. Since the analysis in this chapter does trace the impact on different 
sectors, it should be possible empirically to learn something about the relevance of the 
two underlying market imperfections/nominal rigidities of these two models.
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Annex A
A .l  P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  1
Given that the bond holdings are zero the budget constraints 
simplify to
4 W  = i e  { f , h }
4 ( T )  = ^ v i i f ) +
<$(T) = +  ^ E t v i i h )
Pt Pt
For the nontradable producers the leisure consumption trade off implies tha t
p H n ) i  , P
p h L i ( N)c i (N)  p - 1
Using the budget constraint we conclude that
 I — b S -
Li ( N ) L i ( N )  ~  K p - 1
or
L *(N ) =  ( ^ £f 1) 2
As mentioned before it is easy to show tha t due to the isoelastic demand functions
for goods, firms do not price discriminate between domestic and export markets (see
Grafe et al. 1999). They always set the price such that
p( ( f )  =  ^  
pj‘(/i) =  Et'p{ (h)
Substituting this result into the budget constraints for tradable producers and using 
the first order conditions we see that
L i( T ) = ( ^ ) i
Hence the tradable and nontradable producers work equal amounts of hours in the 
symmetric steady state. Since the demand for each producer’s output is the same and 
the supply is the same they all charge the same price 
ph(h) =  E p f ( f )  = ph(N) = Ep f ( N)  = p h = Ep f  
The interest rate can be obtained from the Euler equation 
i = 6 r
The exchange rate and the relative prices follow easily from the money demand 
equations.
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P/  =  i (* V )  2 T+?M / =  Po(foreign)
p,> =  x ( l  2 =  P o (h o m e )
and
7 7  ___   7 7b  — Mf —• ^0
This concludes the calculation of the steady state. ■
A .2 P ro o f o f Lem m a 4
We start with the long run. Linearisng the long run budget constraint we see that
the relative change in consumption for tradable and nontradable producers in the home
country Ac is given by
&c A L 1 + Ap1 + j ^ { d B h{T) -  dBh(N)).
The costs of consumption drop out because all agents inside a country face the same 
consumption price index. Income of the tradable producers moves with the price of 
tradables, income for the nontradable producers moves with the price for nontradables. 
The relative price change is given by Ap . Furthermore the two groups might work 
different amounts of hours. Depending on the difference in the wealth effect of the 
two groups they might also have saved different amounts. In the long rim the scale of 
production is ultimately determined by the trade off between leisure and consumption. 
The difference in the linearised labour supply equations is given by
A  A  A  — ^A L  = —A c  +  Ap .
Again the price of consumption drops out and the trade off is only dependent on
the relative change in the price tha t tradable and nontradable producers earn on their
output. Adding and subtracting these relationships we learn that
= - m v ( dBh(T ) -  dBh(N ))
and
A t  =  A f  +  ^ ( d B ^ T )  -  dBh(N))
In the long run the difference in work efforts depends only on the income differential 
that arises from different wealth levels. The difference in consumption on the other hand 
depends both on the difference in wealth and on the difference in unit prices earned. Thus 
the difference in wealth levels is used partly to enjoy more leasure and partly used to
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consume more. The difference in earnings per hour is spent entirely.
The price differential between nontradable and tradable output is given by the de­
mand equation
A L  = —pA ph — \A c  — |  (Ap — E)
The relative demands for home tradable and nontradable goods is not only depend­
ing on the change in the realtive price charged for the tradable and nontradable goods 
Ap^but also on the relative demands in the two countries and on the competitive pos- 
tition in the two markets as indicated by the relative price levels in the two countries 
Ap — E. If the demand abroad is higher, the nontradable producers sell more. The same 
is true if the price level abroad is higher.
These three equations can be used to determine the consumption differential as a 
function of aggregate national variables and the relative borrowings. Note that due to 
presence of nontradables there is no reason that absolute PPP  (Ap — E  = 0) holds in 
the long run.
= (^)m+r){dBh{T) -  -  KA? -  %
A similar equation holds for the two sectors in the foreign country. ■
A .3 P roo f o f Lem m a 5
The difference in the budget constraint of tradable producers and nontradable pro­
ducers in the short run stems from two factors. While revenues per unit for all goods are 
constant in the home currency given that prices are held fixed, profits may differ because 
of different volumes sold. This translates into different wealth shocks for tradable and 
nontradable produces that might induce them to save different amounts.
A ch =  A L h -  j ^ ( d B h(T) -  dB h{N ))
Unlike in the long run the amount produced is determined by the demand for the 
two goods. The change in the demand for goods depends on the change of prices of 
competing goods in the respective markets and the scale of the aggregate demand shock 
in the home and foreign market.
ALh =  | ( —Ap + E) — |A c
The factor I comes from the fact tha t half of the output of tradable producers is 
sold in the same market as that of nontradables. In the home market relative prices are
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not changing between home produced tradables and home produced nontradables. Thus 
there cannot be any difference in demand. The change in relative levels of demand comes 
solely from the fact tha t tradable producers sell approximately the other half abroad 
where market condition could be different both with respect to aggregate demand and 
with respect to prices foreign producers charge for their output.
Using the last equations and the expression for the change in the price level we can - 
just like in the long run - determine the relative consumption levels as a function of the 
relative bond holdings and aggregate national variables.
A ch = prjE -  I  A c -  j ^ ( d B h(T) -  dBh(N))
■
A .4 P ro o f o f Proposition  6
Because both groups inside a country necessarily face the same real interest rate 
the consumption differential has to be the same in the long and the short run. Thus it 
follows from the short and long run consumption differentials tha t
~ dBh(N )) -  -  i )  =
pnE  -  1 Ac -  & ( d B h(T) -  d B h(N))  
for the home country and
(* ? )  W ^ i d B l (T ) ~  d B , (N))  + a AS +  i(A ?  -  f ) =  
-p rjE  +  5  Ac'* -  ^  (dB' (T)  -  d B s (N))
Adding the two implies that
(dBh(T ) ~  dBh(N ) + d B ,(T ) -  d B f (N))  =
- j ^ ( d B h(T) -  dBh(N)  +  dBf  (T) -  dBf (N))
which immediately implies that
(dBh(T) -  dBh(N)) = —(dBf  (T) -  dBf (N))
i.e. the relative change in the bond holdings in the home country need to equal the 
negative of the relative bond holdings of the foreign country. Additionally we know tha t 
for the international bond markets to balance it must be that 
r}dBh{N) +  ( i  -  ti)dBh{T) =  -  ((1 -  v)dBf (T) +  rjdBh( N ))
Using the last two equations it is easy to see th a t the bondholdings of the tradable 
and nontradable sectors have to to balance each other individually. ■
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A .5 P roo f o f Lem m a 7
The long term  budget constraint is given by 
A%{T) =  At (T )  +  A$(T) - A $  + 2 ^ B ( T )
where we have used the result that the bondholdings of tradable producers abroad 
and at home are of opposite sign and equal size. Just like in the intra country equilibrium 
the consumption differential depends on the labour input and the price charged for the 
output but additionally it also depends now on the difference in the price of consumption 
as the two agents are living in different countries.
In the long run the labour supply is binding and determines the scale of production. 
The relative change in the labour supplies of tradable producers at home and abroad is 
given by
AZ(T) =  Af(T ) -  A f -  A§(T).
Again the difference now also depends on the relative price levels. Facing a higher 
price level compared to the change in income, causes producers to work less and substi­
tute into leisure.
The relative demand is simple because both entrepreneurs operate on both markets 
with equal weights. This implies that the change in the competitive environment from 
other goods and the change in the scale of the market affects the entrepreneurs to the 
same degree. That is why the demand for their products depends effectively only on the 
price they set but not on the relative consumption levels in the two countries.
AZ(T) =  -p(A$(T) - f )
These last three equation allow us to write the long term  relative change in consump­
tion as a function of the change in the relative price levels and the bond holdings. 
A?(T) =  i±£T^ B ( T ) - ( A ? - S )  ■
A .6 P roof o f Lem m a 8
In the short run output again is demand determined. Since demand for the two 
tradable producers only depends on relative price changes and relative prices only change 
with the exchange rate in the short run, the relative demand can be written as 
A L{T) = pE
Using this expression in the relative short term budget constraint we can derive the
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relative change in consumption for tradable producers in the home country and in the 
foreign country
Ac(T) = ( p - ( l - 2 r ]) ) E - 1^ B ( T ) .
■
A .7 P ro o f o f Lem m a 10
Since we already calculated the difference in the growth rates for the tradable sectors, 
the easiest way to proceed is to calculate the same for the two nontradable sectors and 
then to aggregate.
Using the long term  labour supply, the long term  budget constraint and the long term 
demands and the price level identities we find the relative growth rate of consumption 
of the two nontradable sectors 
A5(iV) =  fi±iI^:i?(iV) +  iAS.
The difference in long run consumption for the nontradable sectors is driven by their 
relative savings and the relative permanent change in demand caused by the money 
supply shock. Since the two nontradable producers are producing for different markets, 
aggregate demand conditions are important. In is instructive to compare this with the 
long term  consumption differential of the two tradable sectors.
A%(T) =  e f ^ r r B ( T ) - ( A $ - E )
The long run consumption of the tradable sectors is driven by their relative savings 
but there is a counteracting force. If there is a long run deviation from PPP caused by 
different nontradable prices, agents have to pay more for their consumption which works 
against the increased consumption through savings. This factor does not play a role 
for nontradable producers because they also earn more due to the deviation from PPP. 
These two equations will be im portant in determining the relative welfare of tradable 
and nontradable producers. Prom them it is apparent th a t it is not only the short term 
savings that are im portant but also the change in demand and price levels that are 
initiated by the money shock.
Calculating the average consumption differential from the differences in the growth 
rates in the nontradable and tradable sectors we arive at
(1 -  2rj) (a ? (T )  -  ^ B ( T ) )  + 2rj (AZ(N)  -  =  ^ r B ( T )
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where we have used the expression for the long term  deviation from PPP.
The term  on the right hand side is the average national consumption financed by 
labour income and the long run average consumption differential is given by 
A 5 = £ - rB  + l ^ $ B ( T ) .
Thus the long run differential does depend on the distribution of the savings, ac­
cumulated during the money supply shock. The change in the savings of the tradable 
sector has a larger effect on the consumption differential than the change in the savings 
of the nontradable sector, because the change in the nontradable sector savings has the 
additional effect that it raises prices (deviation from PPP) which depresses the effect 
on consumption. If there wasn’t any nontradable sector the long term  consumption 
differential would be given by 
A%= l-fr  p
which is the same as the one tha t Obstfeld and Rogoff find.
The aggregate consumption changes in the short run can be calculated similarly. 
Just like in the long run we calculate the short run difference in the budget constraint 
for the two nontradable sectors
A c(N) = (p( 1 -  2rj))E +  Ac -  (1 -  2V)E -  ^ - B ( N ).
In the short rim the price obtained for nontradable output does not change. The first 
two terms reflect the relative change in the demand for nontradable goods. The change 
is given both by the changes in aggregate demand in the two countries (Ac) and by a 
substitution effect. If the exchange rate appreciates the price of foreign tradable goods 
increases in the home country and agents substitute into home tradable and nontradable 
goods. Again we state the equation for the two tradable sectors for comparison.
Ac(T) = p E - {  1 -  2rt)E -  & B ( T )
The first term  in the last two equation captures the price effects for the two groups 
of producers. If the exchange rate depreciates the home nontradable producers’ relative 
price compared to foreign tradables in the home market falls. These foreign tradables 
account for a share of — rj) of all goods sold. At the same time the relative price 
for nontradable goods abroad rises against imported tradables. The effect on output 
depends on the elasticity of substitution. For the producers of home tradables, the
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price falls against the foreign tradables in the home market which account for ( |  — 77) of 
the goods sold and falls against all foreign produced goods in the foreign market which 
account for +  77) of all goods sold. Since they sell approximately half in each market, 
the price of their output changes in average compared to half of all the goods sold. 
For the foreign tradable producer the effect is in the opposite direction. This explains 
the difference in the first term  on the right hand side of the last two equations. The 
difference in the short term consumption rates for nontradables has the additional term 
which depends on aggregate demand conditions in the home and the foreign market 
Ac. O utput is demand determined in the short run. Thus any difference in aggregate 
demand conditions in the two markets is fully served and adds to income. The effect 
doesn’t appear for the tradable producers because they are selling in the same market. 
The last two terms in the two equations above represent the change in the price of 
consumption, which is the same for tradable and nontradable producers and the option 
to save some of the short term gains.
Using the last two equation we can calculate the difference in the average growth 
rates of consumption abroad and at home in the short run.
A c = ( p  + p2r) -  1 )E  -  ■
A .8 P roo f o f corrolary 12
Differentiate the equation for the exchange rate with respect to 77
The sign of the derivative is determined by
d E  >  f)
dr) <  U
2 ( p - i ) - 4 p  ( l - v ( p - i ) )  _  r ^ p  +  _ ! _ ( ! _  2 r j ) ( p  -  1 ))  +  4 r ] 2 ( p  -  l ) 2}  |  0
The threshold is given by
V ■■= 2 ( ^ { - Le±% ±M + l({e±^ ±M)2 -  +  (/>+!)(2 + ( p -  ! )) ]h
The exchange rate is rising in 77 as long as 77 > rj ■
A .9 P ro o f o f Lem m a 13
We already calculated the borrowing of the tradable sector as a function of the
exchange rate.
m i l  =  (p-i)p el+r (l+p)r+2p
The borrowing of the nontradable sector is easily calculated by using the short and
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long run budget constraints derived in the proof of lemma 10. In the short run budget 
constraint we can replace the short run consumption changes of the nontradable and the 
national aggregates by the long run changes, because for all agents inside a country the 
change in the real interest rate is the same. Thus 
A c 1 -  A ch = Ad(N)  -  Ac(N).
Using this fact and the long and short run budget constraints from the section on
the intra-country equilibrium we can write the savings of the nontradable sector as
B(N) —  e. (p-1) /^  I fl _ 2rd El+r (l+p)r+2p p * Tl ) ( i + p ) r + 2 p r j '
Thus, the difference in savings is given by 
dBh. — (p-!)p (2nE — — 1l+r (l+p)r+2p' ' p >
or
d B h _  (p-1) 277(p((l+p)r+2p)+(p-l)r)-r(p2- l )  p
l+r (l+p)r+2p ((l+p)r+2p)-277r(p-l)
■
A .10 P ro o f o f Lem m a 14
The expression for the long term change in labour inputs follows immediately from 
lemma 4 and lemma 13. The expression for the short term  changes in labour inputs is 
easily seen from lemma 5 and the expression for the change of the relative price levels 
derived in section 2 .1 .
The thresholds can be easily calculated using the expressions for consumption and 
bondholdings derived in section 2.3. ■
A .11 P ro o f o f lem m a 15
The expression for consumption is derived by using lemma 4 and lemma 13. The
threshold can be derived using the expressions for aggregate consumption changes and
exchange rate changes calculated in section 2.3. ■
A .12 P roo f o f proposition  16
Using the last expressions for the change in consumption and labour derived in lemma 
14 and 15 the relative change in utility can be written as
dUh(T ,N )  = i  \ % PX v dBh + ^ ( a S -  Ae)l -  5  \ ^ B h + e ^ ( A d - A S ) '( p - i ) r
welfare change th rough  consum ption welfare change th rough  labour
or
dUh(T, N )  = i  -  A£)
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Thus, as mentioned before, the difference in welfare is not only depending on the 
relative savings tha t the two sectors make in the short term  B h but also on the change 
in real interest rates abroad and at home. Because the nominal interest rate is constant 
in both  countries the change in the real interest rate is proportional to  the change in 
absolute PPP.
f h — r? =  ^jr-(Ap — Ap)  =  - ^ ( A c  — Ac).
The second term in the welfare change is thus capturing the fact tha t nontradabe 
producers have additional gains. The difference is rising in 77. The more nontradables 
exist, the bigger the difference becomes. (Ac — Ac =  2rjE +  (Ap — E)).  The first term 
is the short term  deviation from PPP, which arises because the nontradable goods don’t 
change their price. This term makes consumption in P P P  terms cheaper at home. The 
second term  is the long run change in PPP. Because the home country has non labour 
income, they work less, which raises the price of the nontradables. Thus in the long run 
the home country is more expensive in PPP  terms. The relative welfare is determined 
by
dUh(T, N )  = ^  +  (r  +  P)(A§ -  AS)'
The second term  is given by
(Ac — Ac) =  — (Ap — E) +  (Ap — E)
As said before, it equals the change in absolut P P P  and can be expressed as
(Ac — Ac) =  —2r) ( p — 1 ) 7(p+l)r+2p 1 +
2(l+r)(p+l+27?p)
( l + p ) r + 2 p —2r]r(p—l) + 1 E
or
(Ac — Ac) =  —2 7) 2(l+r) ((p+l)r+2p)p+(p2-l)r(p+l)r+2p ( l + p ) r + 2 p —2rpr(p— 1) E
The term  is obviously negative and the reason why welfare of the nontradable sector 
often rises more than that of the tradable sector despite the fact tha t the sector saves 
less.
The relative savings are given by
d B h (p-l) 277(p((l+p)r+2p)+(p-l)r)-r(p2- l )  p
l+r (l+p)r+2p ((l+p)r+2p)—27)r(p—1)
Substituting these two terms into the expression for welfare gives us the result. ■
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Chapter 5
The Real Exchange R ate in 
Transition Economies
5.1 In trod u ction
The role of the exchange rate in the early phase of transition remains a source of debate 
among analysts and policymakers. At stake are im portant issues like the need to peg 
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to control inflation, the risk of overvaluation, the 
effect of a real appreciation on structural changes, the proper evolution of the current 
account, the reaction to capital inflows, speculative attacks and, more generally, the 
conduct of monetary policy. Most analyses used in these debates are based, explicitly 
or implicitly, on theories developed for non-transition economies. Some argue tha t the 
relevant framework should be based on the experience in developing countries which have 
in common with transition fairly underdeveloped financial markets and trade barriers. 
Others observe that capital mobility is de facto quite high and trade barriers quite low, 
so that the proper reference must be based on theories tha t fit developed economies. Yet, 
the behavior of the exchange rate in transition economies exhibits some unique features 
which warrant separate theorizing.
In particular the transition process presents two original characteristics. First, quite 
independently of the chosen exchange rate regime the real exchange rate steadily ap­
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preciates once the economy is liberalized (Halpern and Wyplosz 1997). Second, there is 
no apparent link between the evolution of the nominal and real exchange rates. Figure
5.1 shows cumulated nominal and real appreciations for nine countries for which data 
is available. Russian nominal (3000%) and real appreciation (1800%) dwarfs the other 
observations, but the conclusion stands: excluding Russia the coefficient of partial cor­
relation between the nominal and real exchange rates depicted on Figure 5.1 is -0.15. 
This observation is not sensitive to the choice of real exchange rate. When the real 
exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the CPI to  the P P I (meant to be a proxy for the 
non-traded to traded good price ratio) correlation is also -0.15 and it is 0.03 when we use 
the average dollar wage. Taken together, these two characteristics make the transition 
countries stand apart.
Developed countries do not exhibit trend appreciation. Fast growing developing 
countries do tend to have an appreciating real exchange rate, which is often seen as a 
manifestation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964) which occurs in presence 
of rapid productivity gains. When the gains are higher in the traded good than in the 
non-traded good sector, and if wages are equalized across sectors, the real exchange 
rate appreciates. Yet, if transition, indeed, is largely a story of accelerated productivity 
gains, the Balassa-Samuelson effect does not look like a promising start. Support for 
this effect is not readily found in the data for a good reason: productivity gains in the 
non-traded good sector must have been very large since services were non-existent or 
very underdeveloped under central planning, while the traded good sector has undergone 
a collapse in output with only limited labor shedding.
The absence of any link between nominal and real exchange rate changes stands in 
sharp contrast with the evolution observed in most non-transit ion economies. ’Normal’ 
countries typically display very high short term correlations between the nominal and 
real exchange rates. This is commonly understood as an indication of price stickiness. In 
high inflation countries prices are known to be quite flexible but the nominal exchange 
rate depreciates roughly at the speed of inflation so tha t the real exchange rate changes 
little. This is not the experience of transition countries, even those tha t have suffered 
high inflation.
136
Real =  deflated by CPI
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Figure 5.1: Correlation of Nominal and Real Exchange Rates.
In transition economies there seems to be enough price flexibility to cut the link 
between nominal and real changes. Consequently, the real exchange rate can be largely 
seen as a variable in its own right. Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) show that, to some 
extent, the real appreciation corresponds to a correction following the initial excessive 
nominal and real depreciation which accompanied the launch of most price liberalization 
programs. This effect is not enough, however, to fully explain the observed behavior. 
Their results point to the role of various structural factors. W hat these factors are, and 
how they operate, remains largely unexplained at this stage.
As far as we know, there is not yet any paper which proposes a theory of the real 
exchange rate in transition economies. Such a theory must start form the defining 
characteristics of the transition process. We have already mentioned a high degree 
of price flexibility -  and this concerns wages too -  so tha t we need to focus on real 
shocks and/or market imperfections to explain movements in the real exchange rate. 
The persistence of an unproductive state sector is a primary suspect. In addition, much 
recent evidence shows that the expansion of private activity in Eastern Europe is less
impaired by labor market frictions than by a shortage of capital (OECD 1995); (Konings, 
Lehmann and Schaffer 1996) and tha t budget constraints remain quite soft (EBRD 1995), 
(Cornelli, Portes and Schaffer 1996). Case studies confirm tha t investment is almost 
entirely financed out of retained earnings (Aghion and Blanchard 1994).
The theory tha t we propose here must be considered as a first exploratory step. We 
focus exclusively on the real side of the economy and abstract from any non-neutralities 
•which could contribute to explaining the evolution of the real exchange rate. This 
may be too strong an assumption but it allows us to  explore the two-way linkages 
between structural changes and the real exchange rate. Our simple model is designed 
to capture the transformation process as initially described by Aghion and Blanchard 
(1994), Blanchard (1997) and Atkeson and Kehoe (1993). It emphasizes the role of the 
old and inefficient state sector as well as the lack of adequate financing for the emerging 
modern corporate.
Traded goods are initially produced by a state sector meant to capture the large 
manufacturing base tha t most transition countries inherited. This sector is gradually 
replaced by a new private sector that is slowed down in its emergence by a financing 
constraint. To keep the model tractable we assume full employment. As the old state 
sector gradually declines, it relinquishes labor which can flow into new more productive 
activities. Although the new sector is more productive, it cannot immediately absorb 
all workers from the old sector, because capital accumulation is financially restricted. 
To that effect, we assume that financial markets are absent so tha t investment has to 
be financed by current profits. The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of 
nontraded and traded goods. We take the extreme view th a t the nontraded good sector 
only requires labor as factor input. This sector did not exist beforehand; as it does not 
need to accumulate capital, it can jump into existence at the start of the reform process. 
The relative price of traded and nontraded goods turns out to be directly related to the 
real wage. For this reason it controls the speed and the success of the transition process 
described as the gradual elimination of the state sector and its replacement by the new 
traded and nontraded good sectors.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 looks at the behavior of the real ex­
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change rate at the outset of liberalization, assuming an instantaneous big-bang. Section 
4 explores the subsequent evolution, from big-bang to the steady-state which is described 
in Section 5. The last section concludes.
5.2 T h e M od el
We consider an economy with three sectors:
• i) the old state sector that produces an internationally tradable good;
• ii) a modern private sector that also produces an internationally tradable good;
• iii) a modern private sector that produces not internationally tradable services.
5 .2 .1  T h e  s ta te  sec to r
A common inheritance of all transition countries is a large, often inefficient, industrial 
sector. The technology used in the sector is mostly outdated and inefficient compared 
to modern equipment from abroad. The countries were either financially unable enough 
to import western technology or restricted from doing so because of cold war politics 
(restrictions on technology transfer etc.). Furthermore marginal products of labor and 
capital vary a lot across and within industries because the market forces that usually 
equate them under perfect capital and labor mobility were not allowed (Castanheira and 
Roland 1996). We model this fact explicitly as follows. The old state sector comprises 
a continuum of firms which operate under a Leontief technology: 
y s(j) = m m ( a i K s( j ) ,a2( j)Ls(j)) (l)
i.e. capital is specific to each production line j and allows different levels of output per 
worker. Since competitive forces were not at work prior to  transition, there is no reason 
to believe tha t even companies tha t produced identical goods were equally productive. 
We order the production lines such tha t labor productivity is rising in j ,  i.e. we assume: 
3a > jb = >  <*2(jo) >  a2(jb)-
State firms only take the decision to operate a production line, setting a2( j )L s(j) = 
a \ K s( j ) or to abandon it. The assumption tha t capital productivity a\ is the same
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across firms plays no role in what follows as we will consider tha t capital is redundant 
in this sector so tha t effectively y3( j ) = a2( j )L 3(j). Employment L(j)  is assumed to be 
uniformly distributed over [0, 0,2max] i.e. production lines are all of the same size.
We capture the continuing existence of soft budget constraints in the state sector by 
assuming tha t profitable firms subsidize those which face losses. As a whole, therefore, 
the state sector just breaks even. Post-redistribution, profit is exactly nil in all state 
firms and there is no further investment. Inherited capital is just a sunk cost so tha t 
the only cost to the state firms are labor costs. Workers are homogeneous and wages 
are taken to be the same throughout the sector. This assumption is natural given the 
system of cross subsidies in firms steeped in the equalitarian tradition of the communist 
regime, but is not essential to the analysis. It implies tha t the wage is equal to average 
labor productivity in the state sector.
We further assume the existence of non pecuniary benefits in the state sector (e.g. 
low effort) as well as the opportunity costs of leaving the sector (harder effort, relocation, 
loss of state employment privileges such as tenure, social services, housing, etc.). The 
resulting fixed cost F of moving out of the state sector drives a wedge between wages 
there and the modern sector. Such a limit to labor mobility is often blamed for the 
slow emergence of a private sector (Burda 1993); (Aghion and Blanchard 1994). This 
assumption is not essential for the dynamics of the model but it allows for interesting 
comparative static results.
5 .2 .2  T h e  N e w  S ecto rs
The two other sectors did not exist under central planning. They become latent at 
the outset of transformation. The traded good sector produces industrial goods with a 
Leontief technology as well: 
yT = min(&i K T, b2L T) (2)
To capture the fact tha t the new modern sector is more efficient than the state sector 
we assume tha t the most efficient state firm is just as efficient as firms in the new sector: 
a2max =  b2 (3)
The non-traded good sector uses only labor. The extreme assumption tha t no capital
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is needed in the production of non-traded goods could be relaxed, but the model would 
be much less tractable. The only assumption tha t is really needed for the effect we want 
to study is tha t the production of non-traded goods is less capital intensive than the 
production of industrial output, which is less controversial: 
yN =  c L n  (4)
All technical coefficients are constant. This assumption permits us to limit the 
sources of growth to just two factors:
• the accumulation of capital in the traded good sector;
• sectoral adjustment as workers from the nontraded sector into the traded sector.
Adding technological progress would certainly improve the realism of the model but 
is not needed for our purposes. We already know tha t technological progress affects 
the real exchange rate if it is biased towards a particular sector along the lines of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. Since such a channel is well-known and is not specific to 
transition economies, we simply acknowledge its existence and look for other sources of 
real exchange rate changes.
5 .2 .3  L ab or M ark et
Free entry into the non-traded good sector implies tha t firms in th a t sector earn zero 
profits. Wages are then set to be: 
wN =  cp (5)
N
where p is the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods {jp = ^ - )  
and wN is the real wage in terms of the traded good price. Throughout the paper p is 
our definition of the real exchange rate (and increases when there is real appreciation).
W ith perfect labor mobility across sectors, wages are equalized up to the fixed cost 
F of leaving the state sector: 
wT = wN = ws  +  F  (6)
W ith wages flexible and free entry into the non-traded sector, there is no open un­
employment. Therefore the total labor force is:
L = L s  +  Lt  +  Ln  (7)
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5 .2 .4  F in a n c ia l M ark ets
When transformation starts unexpectedly, all labor is in the state sector. The service 
sector starts to operate immediately since no prior capital accumulation is required. In 
contrast the modern traded good sector needs first to invest in physical capital, which 
raises the issue of financial markets.
W ith very few exceptions, firms have not been able to raise outside money. Banks 
typically do not lend to firms and stock markets have yet to provide capital for more 
than a few blue chips (EBRD 1995). This motivates our simple assumption tha t neither 
firms nor households have access to financial markets. Investment is entirely financed 
through retained earnings. If wT is the real (in terms of traded goods) wage in the 
traded good sector, investment is therefore:
_  wt l t ^  > o (g)
=  0  otherwise
The same could apply to the state sector but our assumption tha t it does not operate 
profitably implies tha t it will not invest. Note that, for simplicity, there is no depreciation 
of capital. Capital keeps its value forever unless it is abandoned, as will be the case in 
the state sector. When capital is abandoned its value drops immediately to zero. The 
emerging modern private industrial sector can be seen as growing out of new greenfield 
investment projects, a feature that does not appear too far from the truth.
5 .2 .5  G o o d s  M ark et
Consumers consider the traded good - itself perfectly substitutable w ith foreign goods - 
and the state sector good as perfect substitutes. This assumption is not realistic as state 
goods are mostly of very low quality but we keep it because it makes the solution more 
tractable. None of the substantial results are affected by this assumption even though 
imperfect substitutability allows for some further results mentioned in the last section.
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas type preferences over the two categories of goods, 
traded plus state sector goods, and non-traded. Personal disposable income is labor 
income wTyT +  ws ys  +  wNyN = cpL — F L s iphis net transfers from abroad Z\
C T = a(cpL -  F L S +  Z)  (9a)
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pC N = (1  -  a)(cpL -  F L S +  Z) (9b)
Profits are not distributed to shareholders, rather they are entirely used to finance 
productive investment and therefore do not affect spending. Note tha t the fixed costs of 
moving out of the state sector F  reduce disposable income. This formulation clearly em­
bodies the efficiency costs of maintaining the state sector, measured by the opportunity 
cost F L S of moving workers to the modern sector.
W ith little commercial lending, residents are not able to use the current account 
to smooth out spending. Furthermore, in the early phase of transition, private capital 
inflows are predominantly loans and transfers from institutional lenders and direct in­
flows, most of them associated with privatizations (Calvo and Vegh 1995). The proper 
description of the situation would probably involve credit rationing for households and 
firms. We take a shortcut: financing is only made possible through foreign transfers. The 
amount Z  of foreign transfers is exogenously set and remains fixed forever. Unless the 
transfer is a grant, and grants do not last forever, this formulation violates the country’s 
intertemporal budget constraint. This is the price to be paid to avoid a more complex 
model.
The two good market equilibrium conditions are:
Z  + yT + y s  = <?+*&- (10a)
pC N = p Y N (10b)
where we assume tha t investment goods are the same as traded goods. Obviously, 
one of these two equations is redundant because of W alras’ law.
5 .2 .6  E m erg e n c e  a n d  G ro w th  o f  th e  M o d e r n  S ec to rs
Economic transformation is described as the development of the modern traded and non- 
traded good sectors described by (2), (4) and (8 ). Given the full-employment assumption 
(7), the other side of the coin is the decline of the state sector. Which production lines 
are closed first? The new sectors will be drawing workers out of the state sector by 
offering them continuously growing wages. This will be made possible through capital 
accumulation in the traded good sector and by rising relative prices in the non-traded 
good sector, which brings us back to the setting of wages in the old state sector. Labor
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shut down by time t still operating at time t
0 x(t)=2(cp-F)-b2 a2max=b2
Figure 5.2: Productivity in the State Sector
market equilibrium (6 ) requires that wages also grow in the state sector. For this reason, 
productivity must also rise in the state sector and this implies closing down the least 
efficient production lines first.
We have already made the following assumptions: workers are identical but produc­
tion lines in the state sector, while of the same size, are heterogeneous and ranked by 
labor productivity. The state does not claim dividends and profitable firms subsidize 
loss-making firms with the state sector just breaking even as a whole. This set of as­
sumptions determine the size of the state sector since it implies tha t the wage is equal 
to average labor productivity. Let x(t) be the productivity of the marginal produc­
tion line still in operation at time t, as shown in Figure 5.2. Average productivity is 
5-2 (t) = and ws — a2 (t). By closing down the least productive lines, average
productivity increases over time as x ( t ) rises and more workers switch to the two new 
sectors.
The labor market equilibrium condition (6 ) along with (5) implies:
=  cp(t) -  F, 
which gives: 
x  = 2 (cp -  F) - b 2 (11)
where we have dropped the time subscript. The low productivity state sector shrinks 
when the real exchange rate, henceforth defined as the ratio of non-traded to traded good 
prices p, appreciates.
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This feature can be seen as a Balassa-Samuelson effect in reverse. The standard 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is driven by the supply side (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). Here 
it is driven by the demand side. In order to meet higher demand for its output, the 
under-developed nontraded good sector must raise its relative price to raise wages and 
attrac t workers. The state sector works under an aggregate budget constraint; in order 
to maintain its labor force, it must improve its aggregate productivity which is achieved 
by closing down the least efficient units. Over time there could be investment in modern 
equipment. While this is entirely possible, we assume that state firms which invest are 
reclassified in the new traded good sector, and offer the correspondingly higher wage. 
Allowing state firms to invest would not change the results. Note tha t the higher is the 
wage gap F the larger is the state sector.
Employment and output in the state sector are:
L s  =  i & z H l  ( 1 2 )
y s  = a2Ls  =  2(cp -  F ) ^ ~ C^ L , (13)
Quite clearly ys  >  0 since the fixed cost F  cannot exceed the real wage in the new 
sector wT = wN = cp. Otherwise transition never takes off. As long as 62 > FP equations
(2 ), (6 ) and (8 ) along with the assumption tha t the traded good sector is run efficiently 
(no redundant capital or labor) imply that:
=  (62 - c p ) L T (14)
As the modern traded good sector accumulates capital, it can expand and hire work­
ers away from the state sector. Since (2) implies that yT = b \K T = 62LT, we have:
=  SL(b2- c p ) L T . (15)
Hiring in the new sector depends negatively on the real exchange rate. When em­
ployment in the new sector is low, i.e. at the outset of reform, a successful transition 
can only occur if the real exchange rate is sufficiently low.
5.3 B ig  B a n g
We now characterize the situation on day one of the transition. We assume a big- 
bang policy which instantaneously establishes market conditions, frees prices, wages and
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trade, and allows firms to be created. The only remaining legacy of central planning is 
an inefficient state sector which continues to operate with soft budget constraints even 
though there are no net subsidies from the rest of the economy. Initially, there is no 
capital in the new sectors. The tradable sector first has to invest and cannot immediately 
produce goods. The non-traded good sector, which does not need capital, immediately 
starts to produce. Its size is determined by demand. The initial situation is described 
as follows:
L t  = 0; (16)
b2L s = 2(b2 - c p  + F)L- 
L n  =  l _ l s
(1  - a ) ( Z - F L s ) ( 1 7 )
CP ~  ( a L - L s )
The link between employment (or output) in the state sector and the real exchange 
rate is represented in Figure 5.3, with two possible configurations. In both  cases, the LL 
line which describes the labor market conditions (16) is downward sloping. It corresponds 
to the reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect discussed above: to hire more workers from the 
state sector the non-traded good sector must raise the real wage and therefore its relative 
price p.
The curve NN represents the good market equilibrium condition (17). When Z  > 
a F L  the NN schedule is upward sloping: the real exchange rate increases with the size 
of the state sector. Indeed a large state sector implies tha t output in the non-traded 
good sector is in short supply. For a given level of demand, a reduced supply translates 
into a higher relative price. The level of demand, however, is also affected by the size 
of the state sector because of larger efficiency losses which depress disposable income 
and demand. When the inefficiency associated with the wage gap F is large enough (i.e. 
when a F L  > Z),  this second effect dominates and the NN schedule is downward sloping.
The situation at the time of big bang (t = 0) is at the intersection of the two schedules. 
Figure 5.3 shows the instantaneous birth of the non-traded good sector. Employment in 
the state sector (L s ) falls below its initial value L which makes room for employment in 
the non-traded good sector (LN > 0). Pent-up demand for the non-traded goods tha t 
were not provided by the old state sector is instantaneously satisfied. This is a standard
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Figure 5.3: The situation after Big Bang
feature of the early days of transition when kiosks, snack bars and other trades suddenly 
appeared along the streets of many Eastern European cities.
Figure 5.3 also helps to understand the role of the economy’s structure and of exoge­
nous factors. Only two productivity factors matter. First, the higher is labor produc­
tivity in the non-traded good sector (c) the less the real exchange rate (p) appreciates. 
This illustrates the main feature of the model embodied in (5) and (6 ): the function of 
the real exchange rate is to determine the real wage and therefore the size of the state 
sector. The higher is the real wage the more productive must the state sector be in 
aggregate, and therefore the more it must shrink under the assumption that the least 
productive product lines are first closed down. To achieve a given size, the non-traded 
good sector must offer the corresponding real wage. This wage is equal to the real value
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marginal (and average) labor productivity, a combination of volume productivity c and 
relative price p.
The second productivity that matters is 62 in its role as the highest labor productivity 
in the state sector (a2max = 62) which determines the sector’s average productivity. A 
higher 62 leaves the NN schedule unchanged while the LL schedule shifts to the right. If 
the state sector is more productive, the non-traded good sector must offer a higher real 
wage to displace workers and this requires a higher relative price.
Quite intuitively, an increase in foreign capital inflows (Z)  results in a more appre­
ciated real exchange rate. Foreign financing does not affect the labor market so the 
schedule LL in Figure 5.3 remains unaffected. As Z  rises the NN schedule shifts down 
in both panels. The state sector shrinks because the additional flow of foreign currency 
increases disposable income and raises demand for both goods. The additional demand 
for traded goods is satisfied through additional imports as the current account deterio­
rates. On the other side, the demand for non-traded goods has to be met by domestic 
production. The relative price of non-traded goods and the real wage in that sector 
increases as a response. The state sector responds to higher wages abandoning more 
production lines and freeing labor. The laid-off workers join the non-traded good sector 
and increase the supply of non-traded goods.
A higher wage gap F is also accompanied by a more appreciated real exchange rate. 
Graphically, in Figure 5.3 the LL schedule shifts to the right because labor exit out of the 
state sector is reduced, forcing the non-traded sector into a higher relative price to offer 
a higher real wage. The NN schedule shifts to the left because the wage gap inefficiency 
rises, reducing disposable income and demand for both traded and non-traded goods. 
The figure, confirmed by Appendix 1 , shows that the real exchange rate always rises, i.e. 
that the first effect dominates the second. The reason is tha t a larger wage gap reduces 
the demand for both goods, while it reduces the supply of non-traded goods (LN goes 
down) and increases the supply of traded goods (L s  goes up). Inevitably, therefore, the 
relative price of non-traded goods has to rise.
The effects of the two exogenous factors F  and Z  are finked, revealing an interesting 
complementarity. Starting from a situation where no foreign financing is available [Z —
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0), and holding F  constant, imagine that Z increases. Eventually, when passes the 
threshold a L , we switch from the right-hand side to the left-hand side panel in Figure 5.3. 
At tha t stage L s  falls below aL: the share of labor employed in the nontraded good sector 
becomes less than  the share of spending on output from tha t sector. This illustrates 
the fact tha t foreign financing allows to overcome the inefficiency cost associated with 
the wage gap: by providing them with means to purchase foreign goods; international 
financing reduces the dependence of consumers on the distorted trade sector. This 
raises an incentive issue not captured in our model: foreign grants which make domestic 
distortions less crippling may result in less energetic efforts to introduce hard budget 
constraints in the state sector. This has profound effects on the transition process that 
follows.
5.4  T ransition  d ynam ics
Once it starts operating, the modern traded good sector invests its entire profit margin 
into productive capital. As indicated by (15), this happens when the real producer wage 
is lower than labor productivity (wT = wN =  cp <  62). This requires that the relative 
price of non-traded to traded goods, the real exchange rate p, be sufficiently low. From 
(17), we see that at time t = 0 this condition is not necessarily satisfied. If the wage gap 
F  is large relative to foreign financing Z  and labor productivity 62 the modern industrial 
sector does not take off, a sort of transition trap. Equally well it is possible tha t foreign 
capital inflows increase the demand for goods to the point where the whole labor force 
is employed in the nontraded good sector. This effect can be interpreted as a form of 
Dutch disease. Only when the capital inflows are reduced or labor mobility is increased 
can the economy transform itself successfully. We further discuss the possibility of such 
traps in more detail in the appendix.
The evolution of the economy after big bang is described in Figure 5.4. The path of 
the economy is found by combining (7), (12) and (10b) to obtain:
lT  = aL ~ {j;)[-cV + A + %\ (18)
with A  = 62 +  2 F  +  (1 — at)F
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Figure 5.4: Transition.
B  = { \ -<*)[&£- F f r  + F))
which is unambiguously upward-sloping for the possible values of the real exchange 
rate ^  +  F  < pc < 62 (see Appendix 1). The real exchange rate will always exceed 
^  +  F,  because ^  is the wage level paid to state workers if all production lines in the 
state sector are still operated. Because the demand for non-tradable goods is non zero 
by assumption, a nontraded good sector has to emerge. It can only attrac t workers by 
paying more than ^  +  F. If the real exchange rate exceeds 62 transition cannot start 
either because the modern traded sector does not even begin to accumulate capital as 
pointed out above. The schedule = 0 corresponds to (15) and only considers the 
case of a successful transition, i.e. cp(0 ) < 6 2 -
Point A in Figure 5.4 represents the initial situation where the modern traded good 
sector has not yet started to operate. It is enough tha t some arbitrarily small amount 
of financing be made available to tha t sector for capital accumulation to start and for 
employment L T to grow. The figure reveals that, along the way, the real exchange 
rate appreciates. The reason is not productivity gains or other familiar interpretations 
from the growth literature. In the zero steady-state growth economy depicted by the
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cp(ti) =p(t2>ti) b2
Figure 5.5: The Hiring in the New Sector
model, the absolute amount of capital that needs to be accumulated gradually declines. 
Consequently, retained earnings progressively decline and this allows the real wage to 
rise. It is the real exchange appreciation which allows the real wage to increase(see (5) 
and (6)).
Hiring in the traded good sector (measured by changes in employment LT) initially 
rises, then it peaks and eventually levels off as productivity in the state sector converges 
to productivity in the modern sector. By assumption the production lines that are closed 
down as the state sector shrinks are the currently least productive ones. The process 
continues until the last remaining line has the same productivity as the modern state 
sector less the wage gap (a2 =  b^  — F). Hiring is proportional to the size of the rectangles 
shown in Figure 5.5. High foreign financing and relative low obstacles to labor mobility 
help the new traded sector initially to emerge without a strong appreciation.
The evolution of the size of the non-traded good sector is ambiguous. It depends on 
the relative size of the wage gap and the amount of foreign financing. The non-traded
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good sector tends to decline the more abundant is foreign financing and the lower are 
the barriers to labor mobility. To understand why, suppose, tha t the wage gap F is zero. 
The non-traded good sector is not financially restricted at t  = Oand jumps to a point 
such that a share a of disposable income Z  +  Lpc is spent on a supply cLN of non-traded 
goods at a relative price p. Goods market equilibrium then implies: 
a ( Z  +  Lpc) = pcLN
This equilibrium condition implies that employment in the non-traded sector must 
decline as the real exchange rate p appreciates. Why? Given the technology of the 
non-traded good sector as described by (4) and the no-profit assumption, the real wage 
measured in terms of the nontraded good remains constant and equal to c. In the 
absence of a wage gap, by (6 ), the same holds for all real wages. The real exchange rate 
appreciation implies that disposable income measured in terms of the nontraded good 
Lc declines because the amount of foreign financing is not adjusted to  compensate for the 
decline of the relative price of traded goods. Thus both substitution and income effects of 
the change in the relative price p act towards reducing the demand for nontraded goods. 
This effect can be overcome if labor income in terms of the nontraded goods is increasing 
during the transition period. The wage gap does just that. Labor income in terms of 
non-traded goods cL — ^ - i s  rising during the transition. The aggregate efficiency loss 
associated with the wage gap decreases in line with the declining employment in the 
state sector and the appreciating real exchange rate. This effect raises employment in 
the non-traded sector because it is proportional to disposable income measured in terms 
of the price of non-traded goods. In the end the evolution of the number of workers in 
the non-traded sector depends on the relative size of these two effects.
5.5 T h e S tea d y  S ta te
The steady state is characterized as follows:
(2 0 a) cp = &2 (2 0 a)
(20b) Ls  =  f f  L  (20b)
(20c) LT = a L - ( l -  a ) g  -  [1 -  (1 -  a ) (g ) ]L s  (20c)
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(20d) L N =  (1  -  a)L  +  (1 -  a ) f  -  (1 -  a ) ^ L s  (20d)
Eventually opportunities to earn non zero profits in the new traded good sector 
disappear and the economy converges towards it steady state. At tha t stage the relative 
price of traded goods is not held up by the finance constraint anymore and the real 
exchange rate equals the relative productivities in the traded and non-traded good 
sectors, as in any normal Leontief economy. It is neither affected by foreign financing 
nor by the wage gap. Yet, the presence of the wage gap preserves the state sector 
from complete extinction and therefore reduces the size of the modern sectors. Finally, 
external finance Z increases disposable income and the size of the non-traded good sector, 
while it reduces the size of the traded good sector as it provides (free) financing for the 
purchase of foreign goods. This last feature is unrealistic for the long run, because it 
ignores the nation’s budget constraint. It may have some relevance in the medium run, 
as well as for fast growing transition economies tha t outgrow their external indebtedness.
5.6 A  M o d el w ith  Im p erfect S u b stitu te s
We now lift the assumption that the goods produced by the state sector are perfect 
substitutes for goods produced abroad or by new local greenfields plants. Indeed, con­
sumers have shown a great desire to purchase ’modern’ goods. We capture this feature 
by assuming tha t state sector goods are inferior goods. We also give up the wage gap 
interpretation of wage formation in the state sector. Instead, we assume that capital in 
that sector depreciates (through physical decay or obsolescence) at an exogenous rate. 
The main benefit from this alternative modeling is the introduduction of a second rela­
tive price q, the price of state goods in terms of the price of traded goods. The CPI-based 
real exchange rate is then approximated by p(3q^) where (3 and 7  are, respectively, the 
weights of nontraded goods and state goods in the consumer basket.
5 .6 .1  T h e  m o d e l
Defining total real consumption as C = CT + p C N +  qCs we describe the choice over the 
two normal goods, traded and nontraded, as Cobb-Douglas leaving out the inferior state
153
sector good:
(16a) C T = a ( C - q C s )
(16b) pC N =  (1 -  a)(C -  qCs )
(16c) qCs  =  f ( C)  with f '{C)  < 0 and l im f (C )  — 0 when C  —» oo
Production is described as in Section 2.1 by Leontiev technologies, equations (1) to
(3) except that we now consider that all state sector firms are identical (0 2 ,* =  a2ii). 
Wages in both modern sectors are equal and (5) holds:
(5’) wT = wN = cp
Workers shed by the state sector are immediately hired in one of the two modern 
sectors so that (7) holds and there is no unemployment. Yet, we do not assume any 
wage gap: the state sector hoards labor and keeps producing yf  =  a \ K s  = 0,2L s . Full
employment is maintained by wage flexibility in the state sector (which may take the
form of wage arrears). Firms in the state sector just break even, with revenues equaling 
labor costs:
(6’) ws = a2q
there so tha t there is no remuneration, and, therefore, no accumulation of capital 
which is left to decay at the constant rate d. This implies tha t the state sector frees its 
labor at the same rate:
(17) * £  =  -d L s
Investment in the traded good sector is as in Section 2 so (4’) holds here, too. We 
maintain the assumption of an exogenously fixed capital inflow Z  so tha t the good market 
equilibrium is characterized by the two following conditions:
(18a) acpLN =  (1 — a)(cpLT +  Z)
(18b) a,2qLs = f (C) ,  where C = cp(LN +  LT) +  +  Z
The model is now fully described by equations (4’) to  (6 ’), (7), (17) and (18a, b).
5 .6 .2  B ig -b a n g
The initial situation is broadly the same as in Section 2. The traded good sector can­
not immediately start to operate as it starts without capital, but the nontraded good 
sector attracts labor from the state sector. The sudden decline of the state sector is
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now arbitrary, at the discretion of firm managers who trade off the size of their firms 
(determined by L s (0)) against the wages tha t they offer. We claim th a t this description 
of the big-bang bears a reasonable degree of realism. Consequently, the situation at time 
t =  0 is parametrized by L s (0):
(19) Lt ( 0) =  0; Ln ( 0) = L -  L s ( 0)
(20) cp(0) =  [a L^_ Ls(J))]
The initial value of the ratio p is determined by foreign financing Z and by the size 
of the state sector measured by ^^(O). Liberalization means tha t previously suppressed 
demand for traded goods suddenly materializes. Since there is not yet any domestic 
supply, foreign financing is the only way through which foreign goods can be purchased:
pjV
the larger Z is the lower is the price of traded goods and therefore the higher is p =
The more the state sector reduces its own operations, the more labor is available to 
produce nontraded goods and the lower is p.
The relative price q of state sector goods to  traded goods is given by the market 
equilibrium condition (18b) rewritten as:
(21) g(0) =  S[«+2t\o)m
The right hand-side of (21) is represented in Figure 5.6 by the downward-sloping 
schedule SS. This schedule shifts downward when Z  or L s (0) increase. Thus, q(0) is lower 
the larger foreign financing is because Z permits domestic consumers to  replace spending 
on domestic goods with (imperfectly substitutable) foreign goods. Quite obviously, the 
less the state sector shrinks the lower is the relative price of its output.
The overall CPI-based real exchange rate is a weighted average of p  and q. Its 
response to both foreign financing and the initial shedding of workers in the state sector 
is ambiguous as its two components respond in opposite directions.
5 .6 .3  T ra n sitio n  d y n a m ics
After big-bang and the sudden loss of a part of its work force, the state sector gradually 
withers away. The traded good sector starts accumulating capital and attracts labor to 
produce goods which are perfect substitutes for foreign goods.
The model can be summarized as follows:
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qFigure 5.6: q(0) at the Time of Big Bang
(22) T T  =  -  cp)LT
(23) (1 — a Z )&  =  cp{p2 — cp)LT +  8cpLT +  5(1 — a )Z  — 8acpL
and it is represented in Figure 5.7.
Depending on the initial jum p in L s (0), and the starting value of p(0)given by (20), 
we start at point A or B and move to the steady state described as follows:
cp = b2; 
L s  =  0; Lt  = a L  -  (1 -  a )(g ) ;  LN =  (1 -  a )L  +  (1 -  a ) (g )
while the relative price q ceases to be relevant once the state sector has disappeared.
Depending on the initial position, relative price p may or may not decline initially. 
Eventually, this real exchange rate appreciates towards its long-run level The real 
appreciation reflects increasing spending on consumption as firms in the traded good 
sector need to save progressively less for investment, which allows them  to raise real 
wages. If the initial real exchange rate was high as a result of a small reduction of 
the labor force in the state sector, it depreciates temporarily. However, as the state 
sector continues to shrink, it frees labor which is used to raise output of nontraded 
goods quickly. Thus, it reduces the pressure of demand. Note that, early on, demand 





Figure 5.7: Transition Dynamics
goods while obviously the demand for nontraded goods can only be satisfied by local 
production.
The behavior of the other relative price q is depicted in Figure 5.8 which represents a 
fixed supply and the demand curve described by (16c). Over time, both schedules shift 
leftwards. Supply declines by assumption (equation (17)). Demand declines as the econ­
omy’s GDP rises because the state sector’s output is an inferior good. W ithout further 
specification of demand, it is impossible to determine which of the two schedules moves 
fastest so the evolution of q is undetermined. If q remains approximately unchanged, 
the behavior of the CPI-adjusted real exchange rate is driven by the evolution of the 
nontraded/traded good price ratio.
An im portant limitation of this model is the assumption tha t the state sector declines
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qFigure 5.8: The State Sector
at an exogenously fixed rate. W hat happens, if we make the polar assumption tha t the 
state sector, which continuously breaks even, remains unchanged? This is easily shown 
by setting 5 =  0. In Figure 5.7 the ^  =  0 and =  0 schedules overlap at cp = b^ - 
Employment in the state sector remains undetermined like at the time of big-bang. 
Assume that L s  remains unchanged at its big-bang level L s {0). Then LT increases 
until it reaches its steady state level i T  =  a(L  — L s (0)) —(1 — ot)(-^). At tha t stage 
the real exchange rate jumps to its own steady state ^  and the transition process is 
over. The nontraded good sector declines to give room for the traded good sector to 
expand, converging to L N =  (1 — a)(L  — L s (0)) +  (1 — a ) ( ^ ) .  Any reduction of state 
sector employment would allow both modern sectors to  expand. In comparison with the 
case where the state sector declines, the real exchange rate is higher as demand for the 
nontraded goods meets lower supply.
5.7  C onclu sion
This paper presents a model of the real exchange rate during the transition process. The 
model emphasizes the link between productivity, capital accumulation, real wages and 
relative prices as the old state sector gradually makes room for the modern sectors to
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expand.
A key issue is how to model transition in order to study the behavior of the real 
exchange rate. We have argued that two features are specific to the transition process: 
the absence of any correlation between the nominal and the real exchange rate and trend 
real appreciation. The first characteristic justifies ignoring nominal aspects. The second 
characteristic points towards the Balassa-Samuelson effect, but closer scrutiny suggests 
tha t this effect is unlikely to be more than a small part of the story. Accordingly we 
have deliberately shut off the Balassa-Samuelson channel to  better analyze alternative 
sources of real appreciation.
Instead, the model proposes to represent transition w ith the following five features. 
First, a weak banking system, together with a fuzzy transformation of property rights, 
result in the almost complete absence of lending to the new private sector. The model 
is crude in assuming that investment is solely financed by retained profits, but it is well 
known that information problems can lead to the breakdown of bank lending (Akerlof 
1970); (Stiglitz and Weiss 1971). Second, parts of the old manufacturing sector con­
tinue to operate under soft budget constraints. This has the effect of freezing resources 
in low productivity production fines, many of which are actually effectively insolvent. 
The resulting inefficiency affects both the demand and the supply sides. Third, labor 
mobility away from the old state sector is limited by a variety of factors inherited from 
the command economy, including access to housing, health, education. This effect is 
captured through an admittedly ad hoc gap between wages in the modern sectors and 
wages in the old state sector. Fourth, transition is described as the instantaneous release 
of pent-up demand for services and for internationally traded goods, along with access to 
foreign financing which permits a discrete jum p in the supply of internationally traded 
goods. The result is the emergence of a market-determined real exchange rate, the ratio 
of the price of non-traded goods to the price of traded goods. Finally, the dismantling of 
’’Berlin walls” is accompanied by the availability of foreign financing. The model, again, 
is crude in treating this financing as exogenous and constant, but the main conclusions 
are unlikely to be overturned by a better account of intertem poral budget constraints.
A number of results emerge. First, the real exchange rate  is ju st the other side of
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the coin of the real wage. Labor costs and the real exchange rate need to be initially 
low to allow the new traded sector to generate high enough profit margins to be able to 
expand. At the same time a continuous real appreciation is needed to attract labor away 
from the state sector which is then forced to close down inefficient production fines. The 
link between real appreciation and rising productivity in the traded good sector can be 
seen as a Balassa Samuelson effect in reverse. Productivity increases are a reaction to 
the real appreciation, not the exogenous driving force behind it.
Second, the proper level of the real exchange rate is a knife-edge. Too low real wages 
do not provide incentives for labor to leave the state sector. Too high real wages reduce 
retained earnings and accumulation in the modern manufacturing sector. In the latter 
case another outcome occurs: there exist only the old manufacturing sector and the low 
capital intensive service sector. This knife-edge property gives rise to transition traps 
described below.
Third, frictions in the labor market and subsidies to the state sector (here cross 
subsidies inside the state sector) enhance this effect by requiring higher real wages and 
a more appreciated real exchange rate. The frictions can be so high that a modern 
manufacturing sector cannot emerge at all. This is a first case of transition trap.
Fourth, foreign finance tends to offset the effects of subsidies and labor market fric­
tions. Under certain conditions it sustains demand and tends to appreciate the real 
exchange rate which, in turn, imposes tougher foreign competition on the old sector. 
Put differently, limits to foreign borrowing causes the real exchange rate to be underval­
ued (given the productivity levels) and keeps real wages too low.
Fifth, if too large, foreign finance can lead to another transition trap akin to the 
Dutch disease. A large supply of foreign funds props up demand which leads to real 
appreciation and high real wages. This can wipe up profits in the modern traded sector 
and, given the financial market distortion, block investment and the development of 
state-of-the-art manufacturing.
These results suggest a number of policy implications. These implications are spe­
cific to the model of course and must be considered with great circumspection until more 
research determines their robustness. The first implication is tha t it is futile and possi­
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bly counter-productive to resist real appreciation. The real appreciation is the market 
channel through which labor is attracted out of the inefficient state sector. Yet, much 
as undervaluation blocks transition by preventing labor from migrating in the modern 
sectors (traded and non-traded goods), overvaluation may wipe out profitability in the 
new manufacturing sector.
The model also illustrates the crucial role IMF or World Bank money plays in the 
early days of reform. In the absence of outside sources, such financing allows to overcome 
the debilitating effects of distortions in the labor and financial markets. This is true even 
though we assume that foreign loans finance pure consumption. The popular argument 
that a current account financed consumption boom is harmful, does not hold in this 
model. Since we do not impose the long term  budget constraint on the country, this 
implication may have to be qualified. Nevertheless it is im portant to keep in mind tha t 
the inflows, although entirely consumed, raise the productivity of the economy and help 
the country to outgrow its external debt. Still the model should not be taken at face 
value. To the very least, direct investment is preferable because it accelerates capital 
accumulation over and above addition to retained earnings and because grants may act 
as a disincentive to the elimination of soft budget constraints in the state sector.
Other modeling strategies are possible. We have explored a version of the model 
where the good produced by the state sector an inferior imperfect substitute to foreign 
manufactured goods, so tha t demand declines as income increases. In that setup the role 
of the real exchange rate is not to crowd out the state sector (which declines because of 
capital depreciation and obsolescence) and real appreciation is not linked to productivity 
gains. Instead, because it determines real wages in the traded good sector, the real 
exchange rate affects the distribution of revenues between labor and firms. In the absence 
of financial markets, this is what determines the level of investment. Real appreciation 
sets in as the need for capital accumulation financed by saving declines.
Quite clearly, the model presented here should be seen as a first exploration of com­
plex phenomena. While we believe that the results shed some light on the role of the 
real exchange rate during the transition process, further research must explore some of 
its limitations.
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First, we have explicitly eliminated sector-level productivity changes which give rise 
to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The interplay of this effect with those outlined here 
may lead to interesting dynamics.
Second, we have assumed tha t financial markets are missing. Even though financial 
markets have played a limited role so far, their influence is growing and needs to be 
acknowledged. This concerns domestic markets which allow both for private savings 
and intertemporal consumption smoothing as well as outside borrowing . This also 
concerns foreign borrowing and the link between domestic and foreign interest rates. Our 
assumption of a constant and permanent flow of income from abroad is quite unrealistic. 
Our conjecture is tha t tha t what is im portant is that the country has only limited access 
to international capital markets.
Third, labor market frictions are captured by the existence of an exogenous and 
constant wage gap. A more explicit modeling of the labor market is obviously needed. 
An alternative natural extension would be to introduce explicit subsidies to the state 
sector. In the absence of a proper treatment of government subsidies including the sta te’s 
budget constraint, Appendix 2 shows that there exists an equivalence between subsidies 
and the wage gap.
Fourth, the adoption of Leontief technologies greatly simplifies the analysis. It is 
unlikely tha t allowing for substitutability between production factors will change the 
main results.
Fifth, the assumption of price and wage flexibility leads to full employment. This 
is obviously unrealistic. W hat is needed is a model which explains transition unem­
ployment. To be relevant such a model would also need to explore other sources of 
unemployment factors than western-style wage rigidities, including mismatch, search 
costs and rent seeking.
Finally, to keep the model tractable, we have left out all nominal variable in the 





1. the statement in section 4 tha t the real exchange rate is increasing during the 
transition process,
2 . the conditions on the parameter values that have to hold to allow the new traded 
sector to emerge,
3. tha t the exchange rate at big bang depends positively on the size of the wage gap
F.
1. We know from equation (15), that hiring in the new sector is positive as long as the 
relative price p doesn’t exceed the ratio of the productivities in the two new sectors^. 
We can use this fact to show that the real exchange rate p monotonically appreciates. 
The slope of the LT (cp) curve (18) is given by:
(A1.1)*£ =  2 £ ( 1 + £ ) * £ >  
where B  =  (1  -  a ) ( ^  -  F(b2 +  F)).
The left hand side of equation (A l.l) is positive as long as cp < b .^ Hence the real 
exchange rate is monotonically increasing for cp <  62 as long as 
(A1.2) l +  j% > 0 .
If condition (Al.2) holds at t =  0 it also holds for the subsequent higher exchange 
rates. To show tha t it holds at t =  0 we first solve explicitly for the initial exchange 
rate. The real exchange rate at t =  0 follows from equations (16) and (17):
(A1.3) cp(0) =  - f  ± ( £  +  B ) i  
where Q = (a — 2)(F  +  ^ )  <  0.
To make sure that the real exchange rate is well defined for any parameter value, we 
check tha t the term under the square root is unambiguously positive.
(A1.4) B  > = £  «  (1 -  a ) ( f £  +  f ) >  = f ( F  +  | ) 2 
which is clearly true for all parameter values.
The initial exchange rate cp(0 ) has to exceed F  y to allow the new non-traded 
sector to draw workers out of the state sector (i.e. we exclude a negative employment 
level in the non-traded good sector). This condition rules out the lowest of the two 
solutions in (Al.3) (corresponding to the case where the square root is subtracted):
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(A1.5) cp(0) >  F +  bf  - ( ^  + B )J  >  f  ( F +
Now we can prove tha t the real exchange rate monotonically appreciates. Given that 
the initial exchange rate is low enough to permit a successful transition, it appreciates 
if (see (A l.l)  and (Al.2) :
(A1.6) 1 +  >  0 <!=» Q (%  +  B) i  < 2 ( £  +  B)
This inequality holds for all values of F  and Z, because the left hand side is negative 





This Thesis has analysed the factors that give rise to real exchange rate movements 
and their impact on the welfare of economic agents. All chapters but the last one have 
concentrated on the effects of monetary shocks and traced the transmission of nominal 
shocks onto the welfare of agents who differ either by where they are living or by the 
source of their incomes i.e. the sectors from which they draw their income vary in their 
exposures to international trade.
Chapter two has compared the empirical evidence with the predictions of models 
that allow for nonneutralities of monetary policy shocks. It has concentrated on liquidity 
models and sticky price models. Special emphasis has been placed on the distinction 
between different forms of price stickiness and the spillover effects of monetary policy 
on foreign countries; two of the recurring themes of this Thesis. We have argued that 
models with stickiness in the consumer’s currency are better equipped to match the data 
than models tha t assume stickiness in the producer’s currency. Not only does a direct 
investigation of prices across countries seem to support this claim, the models also fare 
better in several other aspects. They generate a higher volatility of real and nominal 
exchange rates, which is in line with the data. Furthermore they are much better at 
generating cross country correlations of consumption and production. W ith respect to 
monetary shocks, the simple models with stickiness in the consumer’s currency predict 
that output is positively correlated across countries while consumption is independent.
Chapter three has shown tha t the type of price stickiness has im portant implications
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for the reaction of welfare and exchange rates to money supply shocks. If prices are 
sticky in the consumer’s currency, beggar thy neighbour effects are prevalent, while if 
prices are sticky in the producer’s currency, they disappear. Furthermore, the exchange 
rate is more sensitive to money supply shocks if prices are sticky on the retail level.
It should be said tha t the two forms of price stickiness are not mutually exclusive. 
In Chapter three we have argued that price stickiness in the producer’s currency can 
be seen as a short cut to wage stickiness. There are good reasons to believe that both 
forms of stickiness exist. In Chapter two we have shown tha t the persistence of the 
effect of monetary policy on the economy is more easily reconciled with stickiness in the 
producer’s currency/stickiness in wages than with stickiness in the consumer’s currency. 
Christiano et al (2001) make exactly this point, calibrating a closed economy model. 
They argue tha t it is wage stickiness that creates the persistence rather than price 
stickiness.
The question of which price stickiness is relevant is of practical importance for inter­
national monetary coordination because it determines the sign of the spillovers. Hence, 
the impact tha t monetary policy co-ordination has on the level of inflation, could easily 
depend on the type of stickiness.
Chapter two has concluded that sticky price models are observationally equivalent 
with respect to the evidence from empirical studies. As a result, a critical evaluation of 
the importance of the two market imperfections underlying this model is rather difficult. 
In both models monetary expansions tend to lower interest rates temporarily. Nominal 
and real exchange rates depreciate, output and consumption increase at home and there 
are a positive spillovers to foreign production. This is true even though in liquidity 
models the output expansion occurs via aggregate supply while in sticky price models 
it occurs via aggregate demand. It appears tha t to distinguish between the importance 
of the two imperfections/rigidities we need to learn more about the reaction of output 
and consumption for less aggregated data. If we assume that agents inside a country are 
exposed at varying extents to trade, tha t agents are not able to pool their risks, and tha t 
we have data on production and consumption, we might be able to distinguish between 
the models. Liquidity constraints should not give rise to  differences across sectors, while
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sticky prices might. Chapter four makes a contribution to this kind of analysis by tracing 
the impact on tradable and nontradable producers separately.
Chapter three also illustrates the point tha t the effect of a monetary expansion on 
the world economy depends crucially on the structure of the labour market if wages are 
sticky. It suggest that if wage stickiness is important, than we need to think carefully 
about the structure of the labour market. While there is widespread agreement tha t 
firms enjoy monopolistic power in the goods market, there is much less of a consensus 
on the type of labour market model. A labour market characterised by search frictions 
might be a good starting point.
While Chapter three has compared the impact of asymmetric money supply shocks on 
agents’ welfare across countries, Chapter four has concentrated on the distributive effects 
inside a country. The analysis shows that if there is no labour mobility across sectors, 
if prices are sticky in the producer’s currency and tha t monopolistic competition is an 
im portant feature of the economy, it is agents in the non-tradable sectors tha t benefit 
the most from an unanticipated money supply shock. This result contradicts the popular 
belief that it is always the tradable sector which benefits the most from devaluations 
from a monetary loosening. The reason is tha t people tend to  look at employment 
and production within sectors and not welfare. While it is true tha t the production of 
tradables tends to increase by more than tha t of non-tradables in the short run, the 
relative employment effect in the long run tends to be the other way around. This is 
because home consumption compared to foreign consumption increases permanently. As 
a result, the life time income of non-tradable producers rises more than that of tradable 
producers. This effect is stronger the more open an economy is.
The assumption that there is no mobility across sectors and that there is no risk 
sharing across sectors is rather extreme and the chapter points out that the welfare result 
is sensitive to a change in the main assumptions. Nevertheless it would be worthwhile to 
extend the analysis, possibly by calibrating the model to develop a better understanding 
of the relevance of the different effects.
Furthermore, the model in Chapter four could be used to try  to move towards a 
political economy of monetary policy. Such an analysis would be particularly interesting
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with respect to the setting of permanent exchange rates for countries joining another 
currency block, like a country wanting to join the European Monetary Union. The entry 
exchange rate for a country can clearly not be market determined as any announced 
exchange rate would be perfectly credible. As a consequence the exchange rate to some 
extent will most likely be determined politically, w ith different lobbies wanting differ­
ent exchange rates. It is not inconceivable that this game will result in cross country 
coalitions arguing for a low or high exchange rate.
An analysis of the political economy of exchange rates would need to move away from 
the zero probability shocks employed in much of this Thesis. Clearly agents would have 
to be able to anticipate monetary policy shocks for the investigation to be interesting. 
There have been recent advances in closed economy models to move towards models that 
allow for rational expectations (see Henderson et al (2001)). It would be worthwhile 
employing these techniques to two country models.
Similarly an endogenisation of monetary policy would allow us to discuss the need 
for international monetary policy coordination in a meaningful way. As we have pointed 
out before, the need for coordination is likely to depend strongly on the type of price 
stickiness.
Chapter five has focused on the real exchange rate in transition economies. It departs 
quite drastically from the type of analysis in the preceding chapters, as in this section 
we have argued tha t price stickiness was not the most relevant feature behind the real 
exchange rate movements in the early phases of transition. This is why rather than 
looking at monetary policy as the driver of real exchange rate fluctuations, the chapter 
abstracts from nominal variables completely.
The key element in the analysis has been to model the structural aspects of tran ­
sition in order to study the behavior of real exchange rates. The model incorporates 
the following five transition features. First, a weak banking system results in an almost 
complete absence of lending to the new private sector. Second, parts of the old manufac­
turing sector continue to operate under soft budget constraints. Third, labor mobility 
away from the old state sector is limited by a variety of factors inherited from the com­
mand economy, including access to housing, health and education. Fourth, transition is
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described as the instantaneous release of pent-up demand for services and for interna­
tionally traded goods, along with access to foreign financing which permits a discrete 
jum p in the supply of internationally traded goods. Fifth, the dismantling of ’’Berlin 
walls” is accompanied by the availability of foreign financing.
A number of results emerged. Firstly the real exchange rate is just the flip side of the 
real wage. Labor costs and the real exchange rate initially need to be low to allow the 
new traded sector to generate sufficiently high profit margins to be able to expand. At 
the same time a continuous real appreciation of the exchange rate is needed to attract 
labor away from the state sector which is then forced to close down inefficient production 
lines. The link between real appreciation and rising productivity in the traded goods 
sector can be seen as a Balassa Samuelson effect in reverse i.e. a productivity increase 
is a reaction to the real appreciation and not the exogenous driving force behind it. 
Secondly, frictions in the labor market and subsidies to the state sector, i.e. cross 
subsidies inside the state sector, enhance this effect by requiring higher real wages and 
a greater appreciation of the real exchange rate. The frictions can be so high tha t a 
modern manufacturing sector cannot emerge at all. This is the first case of a transition 
trap. Thirdly, foreign financing tends to offset the effects of subsidies and labor market 
frictions. Under certain conditions it sustains demand and tends to cause an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate which, in turn, imposes tougher foreign competition on the old 
sector. Fourthly, if too large, foreign financing can lead to another transition trap similar 
to the Dutch Disease. A large supply of foreign funds props up demand which leads to 
a real appreciation of the exchange rate and high real wages. This can wipe out profits 
in the modern traded sector and, given the financial market distortion, block investment 
and development of state-of-the-art manufacturing.
Quite clearly, the model presented here should be seen as a first exploration of a 
complex phenomena. While we believe that the results shed some light on the role of 
the real exchange rate during the transition process, further research must explore some 
of its limitations. Firstly, we have explicitly eliminated sector-level productivity changes 
which give rise to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The interplay of this effect with those 
outlined here may lead to interesting dynamics. Secondly, we have assumed tha t financial
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markets are missing. Even though financial markets have played a limited role so far, 
their influence is growing and needs to be acknowledged. Thirdly, labor market frictions 
are captured by the existence of an exogenous and constant wage gap. A more explicit 
modeling of the labor market is obviously needed. Fourthly, the assumption of price and 
wage flexibility leads to full employment. This is again unrealistic. W hat is needed is 
a model which explains transition unemployment. To be relevant such a model would 
also need to explore sources of unemployment other than western-style wage rigidities, 
including mismatches, search costs and rent seeking.
This Thesis has concentrated on only a subset of the shocks and distortions tha t are 
relevant for the movement of real exchange rates and their associated welfare effects. 
Thus, the effect of fiscal shocks is completely absent from this Thesis, even though their 
effect on real exchange rate movements is likely to be large. The models used in Chapters 
three and four would be a good starting point for such an analysis. Similarly real shocks 
have not been discussed but are clearly relevant for an understanding of real exchange 
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